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ABSTRACT 
This Article describes the anomaly of executions in the context of the U.S. 
Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. While the Supreme 
Court routinely reads the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to pro-
tect prisoners from harm, the Court simultaneously interprets the Eighth 
Amendment to allow inmates to be executed. Corporal punishments short 
of death have long been abandoned in America's penal system, yet execu-
tions-at least in a few locales, heavily concentrated in the South-persist. 
This Article, which seeks a principled and much more consistent interpreta-
tion of the Eighth Amendment, argues that executions should be declared 
unconstitutional as "cruel and unusual punishments." In so doing, the Ar-
ticle explores the history of the "cruel and unusual" catchphrase in English 
and American law and critiques the Supreme Court's "evolving standards 
of decency" test. The Article also describes the abandonment of corporal 
punishments as penal sanctions and discusses existing Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence on that topic. The Article explains how executions are cru-
el-and were thought to be so even by some of America's founders-and 
have, over time, become unusual. The Article further highlights how the 
U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally transformed the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause calculus, making modern-day exe-
cutions unusual in the extreme because of the arbitrary and discriminatory 
way in which they are carried out. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Eighth Amendment, ratified in 1791/ contains just sixteen words: 
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted."2 That amendment, however, has gen-
erated enormous controversy, spawning thousands of court cases3 and 
caustic reactions to U.S. Supreme Court decisions construing it.4 Courts 
have wrestled over the meaning of "excessive,"5 and jurists, lawyers, and 
scholars alike have spilled gallons of ink fiercely debating how to interpret 
the phrase "cruel and unusual punishments."6 There is relatively little legis-
lative history from the First Congress7 and the state ratification debates8 
1 United States v. Austin, 614 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (D. N.M. 1985) ("The eighth 
amendment ... was proposed in 1789 and ratified two years later in 1791."). 
2 U.S. CONST., amend. VIII (ratified Dec. 15, 1791). 
3 "ALLFEDS" and "ALLSTATES" Westlaw database searches for "Eighth Amendment" 
both yielded "10000 Documents"-the maximum retrievable number-as "Results." 
4 In 2005, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit 
the execution of juvenile offenders. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). In 2008, the 
Court also held that those provisions prohibit the death penalty for non-homicidal child 
rape. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). Both decisions generated heated and 
sustained public debate. 
5 E.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335 (1998) ("Excessive means 
surpassing the usual, the proper, or a normal measure of proportion."); Alexander v. 
United States, 509 U.S. 544, 559 (1993) (commenting on "excessive" penalties within the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause); United States ex rel. 
Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 435 (1921) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) ("It was assumed in Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 U.S. 86, Ill 
... that an excessive fine, even if definite, would violate the Eighth Amendment."). 
6 E.g., Michael J. Zydney Mannheirner, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, 98 
IowAL. REv. 69 (2012); Kevin White, The Constitutional Limits of the "National 
Consensus" Doctrine in Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1371 
(2012); John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REv. 899 (2011); Aimee Logan, Who Says So? Defining 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment by Science, Sentiment, and Consensus, 35 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 195 (2008); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, When the Federal Death 
Penalty Is "Cruel and Unusual," 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 819 (2006); Susan M. Raeker-Jordan, 
Parsing Personal Predilections: A Fresh Look at the Supreme Court's Cruel and Unusual 
Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 58 ME. L. REv. 99 (2006); Douglas L. Simon, Making 
Sense of Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A New Approach to Reconciling Military and 
Civilian Eighth Amendment Law, 184 MIL. L. REv. 66 (2005); Shannon D. Gilreath, Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment and the Eighth Amendment as a Mandate for Human Dignity: 
Another Look at Original intent, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 559 (2003); Stephen T. Parr, 
Symmetric Proportionality: A New Perspective on the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause, 68 TENN. L. REv. 41 (2000). 
7 JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE 
FOUNDERS' EIGHTH AMENDMENT 186 (2012) (quoting the statements of Representatives 
William Loughton Smith and Samuel Livermore at the First Congress). 
8 I d. at 186-87 (discussing the comments of Abraham Holmes at the Massachusetts 
convention and Patrick Henry's comments at Virginia's convention). 
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concerning the Eighth Amendment, further fueling the contentious public 
debate over the text.9 
The Eighth Amendment-the subject of multiple books10 and count-
less law review articles11-has been described as "something of an enig-
ma.'m American judges rarely considered that amendment and state-law 
equivalents in the decades following the ratification of the U.S. Bill of 
Rights, so for generations the American people have wrestled mightily over 
the meaning of the bar on "cruel and unusual punishments.'' 13 Because 
what is "cruel and unusual" is largely a subjective determination, that 
long-standing debate is almost certain to continue.14 What is "cruel and 
9 The death penalty itself has been a major focus of the Eighth Amendment debate. 
Compare John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria's Vision: The Enlightenment, America's 
Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 195, 254 (2009) 
with RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE 
(2001). 
10 E.g., BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7; MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (20 11) ( 1973 ); VINCENT 
BURANELLI, THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT: THE AMERICAN HERITAGE HISTORY OF THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS (1991 ); MICHAEL L. RADELET, FACING THE DEATH PENALTY: ESSAYS ON A CRUEL 
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT (1990); LARRY CHARLES BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL 
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT (1975). 
11 E.g., Laurence Claus, Methodology, Proportionality, Equality: Which Question Does 
the Eighth Amendment Pose?, 31 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 35 (2008); John F. Stinneford, 
The Original Meaning of "Unusual": The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel 
Innovation, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1739 (2008); Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination 
Eighth Amendment, 28 HARv. J.L. & Soc. PoL'Y 119 (2004); Celia Rumann, Tortured 
History: Finding Our Way Back to the Lost Origins of the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. 
REv. 661 (2004); Hugo Adam Bedau, Interpreting the Eighth Amendment: Principled vs. 
Populist Strategies, 13 T.M. CooLEY L. REv. 789 (1996); Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay 
Wishingrad, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical 
Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFF. L. 
REv. 783 (1975); Note, What Is Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 24 HARv. L. REv. 54 
(1910). 
12 JoLee Adamich, Nick Chase, Jennifer Nestle & Evan Rice, The Selected Cases of 
Myron H Bright: Thirty Years of His Jurisprudence, 83 MINN. L. REv. 239, 254 (1998). 
13 U.S. CONST., amend. VIII (ratified Dec. 15, 1791). 
14 Compare Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 (1989) ("the terms 'cruel' and 
'punishments' clearly suggest some inquiry into subjective state of mind") and Bland v. 
State, 164 P.3d 1076, 1082 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (Chapel, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is 
simply unavoidable and inevitable that we turn to our societal conceptions of what is 
moral and appropriate to fill in the contours of constitutional terms that are as subjective 
and indeterminate as 'cruel' and 'unusual."') with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,608 
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth 
Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should 
be determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded 
foreigners, I dissent."). 
300 
The Anomaly of Executions 
unusual" to one Justice may not be to another, leading to a plethora of 
five-to-four decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court in this area of lawY 
The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence-in a state of 
flux in recent years16-has aptly been described as a "mess."17 Even the 
Justices-who grapple with capital cases every year-seem dissatisfied and 
uneasy with the state of the law. For example, in a 2008 decision outlaw-
ing executions for non-homicidal child rape, the Court forthrightly 
acknowledged that its Eighth Amendment case law pertaining to capital 
punishment "is still in search of a unifying principle." 18 "When the law 
punishes by death," Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in that case, "it risks 
its own sudden descent into brutality, transgressing the constitutional 
commitment to decency and restraint." 19 
Judges are prone to interpret provisions of the U.S. Constitution dif-
ferently, and the Eighth Amendment is no exception. The meaning of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause-already the subject of uncertainty 
in the founding era and the decades that followed-was complicated even 
further by the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification in 1868.20 "At most," 
law professor Akhil Amar writes of 1789, when the First Congress origi-
nally debated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, "the clause 
seemed to disfavor the odd-ball statute, wholly out of sync with other con-
gressional criminal laws. "21 But after the Fourteenth Amendment's post-
Civil War ratification, the Eighth Amendment was held to apply to the 
states.22 In prior times, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause only 
constrained the federal government's actions.23 "Once applied against 
states," Amar notes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, "the 
clause might have more judicially enforceable bite against state legisla-
15 E.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 
(1987), overruled, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238 (1972). 
16 E.g., Richard M. Re, Can Congress Overturn Graham v. Florida?, 34 HARv. J.L. & 
PuB. POL'Y 367, 371 (2011). 
17 Tom Stacy, Cleaning up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. &MARYBILLRTS. J. 
475 (2005); John "Evan" Gibbs, Jurisprudential Juxtaposition: Application of Graham v. 
Florida to Adult Sentences, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 957, 968 (2011); John D. Castiglione, 
Qualitative and Quantitative Proportionality: A Specific Critique of Retributivism, 71 
OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 75 (2010); J. Richard Broughton, Some Reflections on Conservative 
Politics and the Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 4 CHARLESTON L. REv. 537, 543 (201 0). 
18 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437 (2008). 
19 Id. at 420. 
20 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV (ratified July 9, 1868). 
21 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 279 (1998). 
22 See generally GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA (2006). 
23 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 
Wall.) 475 (1866). 
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tures."24 "[T]he meaning of the Bill of Rights," Amar sagely notes, "shifted 
when its words and principles were refracted through the prism of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. "25 
Not surprisingly, the "cruel and unusual punishments" language has 
been subject to varied constructions and interpretations over time.26 But 
only in the late nineteenth century, in the post-Reconstruction Era, did the 
U.S. Supreme Court finally weigh in on the murkily understood27 text. 
When it did, the Court held-in dicta, no less-that the language only 
barred gruesome "punishments of torture" such as breaking on the wheel, 
burning at the stake, crucifixion, emboweling alive, beheading, drawing 
and quartering, and public dissection for murder.28 The "cruel and unusu-
al" proscription, one Justice emphasized in 1892, was "usually applied to 
punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumb-screw, the 
24 AMAR, supra note 21, at 171, 279. As Amar explains: "When judged against a national 
baseline, perhaps a single state legislature, or the legislatures of an entire region, might 
indeed be 'unusual' and out of sync with general national sentiment and national 
morality." Id. at 279-80. 
25 Akhil Reed Amar, America's Lived Constitution, 20 YALE L.J. 1734, 1779 (20 11 ). 
26 In The Morality of Law, the noted Harvard law professor, Lon L. Fuller, wrote that the 
"cruel and unusual punishments" phrase "calls to mind at once the whipping post and the 
ducking stool." LON L. FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 105 (1964 ). However, earlier 
judicial decisions once held that whipping-a once popular form of punishment, 
especially as regards slaves-was not a cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Cannon, 
190 A.2d 514, 517 (Del. 1963) (refusing to hold that whipping was a cruel and unusual 
punishment); In re Candido, 31 Haw. 982, 1931 WL 2830 *9 (Haw. Terr. 1931) 
("whipping with a cat-o' -nine-tails" did not constitute a cruel and unusual punishment); 
Garcia v. Territory ofNew Mexico, 1 N.M. 415, 1869 WL 2421 *2 (N.M. Terr. 1869) 
(the punishment of the crime of stealing mules by the infliction oflashes on the bare back 
did not constitute a cruel and unusual punishment). 
27 The "cruell and unusuall Punishments" provision of the English Declaration of Rights 
of 1688 was prompted by abuses of the infamous Lord Chief Justice George Jeffreys of 
the King's Bench during the Stuart reign of James II. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 
957, 967-69 (1991). Historians, however, do not agree on which abuses. Id. One of the 
seminal studies of the Eighth Amendment pointed out that many early Americans (who 
often focused on the mode of punishment) may have misunderstood the original meaning 
of the English Declaration-later enacted by Parliament as the English Bill of Rights of 
1689. Anthony Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original 
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839, 843-44, 860 (1969). As Anthony Granucci wrote: 
"Executing male rebels by drawing and quartering continued with all its embellishments 
until1814, when disembowelling was eliminated by statute. Beheading and quartering 
were not abolished until1870. The burning of female felons continued in England until 
the penalty was repealed in 1790." I d. at 855-56. Compare Stephen E. Meltzer, Harmelin 
v. Michigan: Contemporary Morality and Constitutional Objectivity, 27 NEW ENG. L. 
REv. 749, 760 n.95 (1993) ("It is asserted by some historians that the framers of the 
American Constitution misinterpreted the meaning of the cruel and unusual punishments 
clause of the English Bill of Rights. The clause was not misunderstood, nor was it meant 
differently than it was shown to mean in the English Bill of Rights."). 
28 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 
(1890). 
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iron boot, and the like, which are attended with acute pain and suffer-
ing."29 The proscription was thus read-as it still is by Justice Antonin 
Scalia and others30-to restrict only a small subset of cruel punishments: 
those involving torture, a lingering death, or especially severe bodily pain.Jl 
29 O'Neil v. State of Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). The Eighth 
Amendment itself, of course, contains no reference to "methods" or "modes" of 
punishment. 
30 "The Eighth Amendment," Justice Scalia has written, "is addressed to always-and-
everywhere 'cruel' punishments, such as the rack and the thumbscrew." Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). He and some of his 
colleagues-unhappy with the Supreme Court's "evolving standards of decency" test-
thus read the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to bar only certain "modes" of 
punishment, but not death itself. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 981 (opinion of Scalia, J.) 
("The early commentary on the Clause contains no reference to disproportionate or 
excessive sentences, and again indicates that it was designed to outlaw particular modes of 
punishment.") (italics in original); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) ("the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual punishments' 
was aimed at excluding only certain modes of punishment") (italics in original); see also 
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2049 n.3 (Thomas, J. dissenting) ("The Court ignores entirely the 
threshold inquiry of whether subjecting juvenile offenders to adult penalties was one of 
the 'modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time 
that the Bill of Rights was adopted."') (citation omitted); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 99 
(2008) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Consistent with the original understanding of the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause, this Court's cases have repeatedly taken the view that 
the Framers intended to prohibit torturous modes of punishment akin to those that formed 
the historical backdrop of the Eighth Amendment."); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
608 n.l (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court ignores entirely the threshold inquiry in 
determining whether a particular punishment complies with the Eighth Amendment: 
whether it is one of the 'modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and 
unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted."') (citation omitted); see also J. 
Amy Dillard, And Death Shall Have No Dominion: How to Achieve the Categorical 
Exemption of Mentally Retarded Defendants from Execution, 45 U. RicH. L. REv. 961, 
987 (2011) ("In the opening lines of his dissenting opinion in Atkins, Justice Scalia 
condenms the 'evolving standards of decency' rationale supporting the majority's 
declaration that the execution of mentally retarded defendants would abridge the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against 'cruel and unusual punishment."'). 
31 See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 983 ("Throughout the 19th century, state courts 
interpreting state constitutional provisions with identical or more expansive wording (i.e., 
'cruel or unusual') concluded that these provisions did not proscribe disproportionality 
but only certain modes of punishment.") (italics in original); see also People ex rel. 
Kemmler v. Durston, 55 Hun 64, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 815 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1889): 
We have no doubt that if the legislature of this state should undertake to prescribe, for any 
offense against its laws, the punishment of burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, 
disembowelling, or hanging in chains, to perish by exhaustion, it would be the duty of the 
courts to pronounce upon such attempt the condenmation of the constitution. In the case 
supposed, no doubt could exist, because the statute would be, on its face, repugnant to the 
provision of the constitution against cruel and unusual punishments. It is common 
knowledge that the punishments mentioned are unusual, and, by the common consent of 
mankind, they are cruel punishments, because they involve torture and a lingering death. 
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Yet, for decades now, the Eighth Amendment has been used to strike 
down a variety of prison abuses and an array of punishments other than 
physically torturous ones.32 Indeed, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause has long been used to invalidate punishments less severe than 
death.33 For example, in Jackson v. Bishop,34 the late Justice Harry 
Blackmun-then writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit-held in 1968 that whipping a prisoner with a strap in order to main-
tain discipline is prohibited.35 
That ruling by Justice Blackmun-who later came to view capital pun-
ishment as unconstitutionaP6-shows that non-lethal corporal punishments 
have also been in the Eighth Amendment's crosshairs. "[W]e have no diffi-
culty in reaching the conclusion," Blackmun wrote, "that the use of the 
strap in the penitentiaries of Arkansas is punishment which, in this last 
third of the 20th century, runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment." 37 "[T]he 
strap's use, irrespective of any precautionary conditions which may be im-
posed," he concluded, "offends contemporary concepts of decency and 
human dignity and precepts of civilization which we profess to possess. "38 
"Corporal punishment," he emphasized, "is degrading to the punisher and 
to the punished alike." 39 
32 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (a California statute criminalizing 
narcotics addition constituted a cruel and unusual punislunent). The Eighth Amendment 
has also been read to strictly regulate certain aspects of capital trials even before the 
punishment itself. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584 (1988) ("The fundamental 
respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punislunent gives rise to a special '"need for reliability in the determination that 
death is the appropriate punishment'" in any capital case."); Sue Ann Gerald Shannon, 
Atkins v. Virginia: Commutation for the Mentally Retarded?, 54 S.C. L. REv. 809 (2003) 
("courts have repeatedly remarked that 'death is different' and ... have placed significant 
procedural and substantive safeguards on capital trials"). 
33 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (prison guards violated the Eighth 
Amendment by handcuffing shirtless prisoner to hitching post for seven hours). 
34 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). 
35 Id. at 579. 
36 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of 
cert.) ("Experience has taught us that the constitutional goal of eliminating arbitrariness 
and discrimination from the administration of death can never be achieved without 
compromising an equally essential component of fundamental fairness-individualized 
sentencing."). 
37 Jackson, 404 F.2d at 579. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 580. A Treatise on the Office of the Justice of the Peace, published in 1581, stated 
that corporal punislunents are either capital or not capital. Capital punislunents, that 
treatise reported, are inflicted "in sundrie ways; as by hanging, burning, boiling, pressing: 
not capital," the treatise added, "are of divers sorts, as cutting off the hand or ear, burning 
or branding the hand, face, shoulders, whipping, imprisonment, stocking, sitting in the 
pillory, or on the cucking-stool." James v. Commonwealth, 1825 WL 1899 *8 (Pa. 1825). 
Of the non-lethal kinds of corporal punishments, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote 
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The modern debate over the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause-
centered for more than fifty years on the U.S. Supreme Court's "evolving 
standards of decency" test40-has often focused on the concept of propor-
tionality.41 That concept was popularized in America by Cesare Beccaria's 
bestselling 1760s treatise, On Crimes and Punishments, a book admired by 
many of America's founders.42 While the founders embraced the concept of 
proportionality, the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court remain divided as 
to whether that concept should be relevant to Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence at all,43 with a tug of war simultaneously taking place as to whether 
the Eighth Amendment should be read in an "originalist" or a contempo-
rary manner.44 The latter divide is emblematic of the larger debate over 
in 1825, "our old laws had more sorts than we now have; as pulling out the tongue for 
false rumors, cutting off the nose, and for adultery, taking away the priyy parts." Id. 
40 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
41 See generally E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARDS. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY 
PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS (2008). 
The concept of proportionality, a major topic of Cesare Beccaria's famous 1760s treatise, 
On Crimes and Punishments, dates back to even before America's founding. Bessler, 
supra note 9, at 196. A whole chapter ofMontesquieu's influential1748 treatise, The 
Spirit of the Laws, is devoted to that very subject. CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT 
OF THE LAWS 91 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Millier & Harold Samuel Stone, eds., 
trans. 1989) (1748) (in Chapter 16, titled "On the just proportion between the penalties 
and the crime," Montesquieu writes: "Among ourselves, it is a great ill that the same 
penalty is inflicted on the highway robber and on the one who robs and murders.") (italics 
in original). 
42 See generally BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7; Bessler, Revisiting 
Beccaria's Vision, supra note 9. 
43 Compare Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) ("The concept of 
proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.") (opinion of Justice Kennedy, joined 
by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor) with id. at 2039 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring) ("Applying the 'narrow proportionality' framework to the particular facts of 
this case, I conclude that Graham's sentence of life without parole violates the Eighth 
Amendment."); id. at 2044 (Thomas, J., dissenting; joined by Justices Scalia and Alito) 
("[T]he Court has held that the Clause authorizes it to proscribe not only methods of 
punishment that qualify as 'cruel and unusual,' but also any punishment that the Court 
deems 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime committed. This latter interpretation is 
entirely the Court's creation. As has been described elsewhere at length, there is virtually 
no indication that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause originally was understood to 
require proportionality in sentencing.") (citations omitted). 
44 Chief Justice John Roberts-as well as Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito-have 
written or joined opinions making reference to the "original meaning" of the Eighth 
Amendment. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447, 469 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting; 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas) (arguing that the Court's 
holding "is not supported by the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment"); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607-8 (2005)(Scalia, J., dissenting; joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Thomas) ("The Court reaches this implausible result by purporting to 
advert, not to the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, but to 'the evolving 
standards of decency' of our national society.") (citation omitted); id. at 626 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) ("The Court has, however-! think wrongly-long rejected a purely 
originalist approach to our Eighth Amendment .... "); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
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how the Constitution, as a whole, should be read.45 While originalists look 
to historical understandings, "living constitutionalists"46 view the "cruel 
and unusual punishments" prohibition as part of what one scholar calls the 
nation's "breathtakingly abstract, principled constitution. "47 
This ongoing Eighth Amendment debate might well determine the fate 
of America's 3,000 plus death row inmates.48 If "cruel and unusual pun-
ishments" is read in line with eighteenth-century attitudes, their fate is 
sealed. In 1791, an array of crimes, including murder and other felonies, 
were punishable by death, with death sentences being mandatory for such 
crimes.49 In that slave-holding era, brutal corporal punishments were also 
337, 340, 348 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting; joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Thomas) ("Beyond the empty talk of a "national consensus," the Court gives us a brief 
glimpse of what really underlies today's decision: pretension to a power confined neither 
by the moral sentiments originally enshrined in the Eighth Amendment (its original 
meaning) nor even by the current moral sentiments of the American people.") (emphasis 
in original); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36, 40 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting; 
joined by Justice Scalia) ("[A]lthough the evidence is not overwhelming, I believe that the 
text and history of the Eighth Amendment, together with the decisions interpreting it, 
support the view that judges or juries-but not jailers-impose 'punishment.' At a 
minimum, I believe that the original meaning of 'punishment,' the silence in the historical 
record, and the 185 years of uniform precedent shift the burden of persuasion to those 
who would apply the Eighth Amendment to prison conditions."). 
45 Compare CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDs: WHY THE FOUNDING 
DOCUMENT DOESN'T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 37 (2009) ("originalists, including 
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, believe that the Constitution should be 
understood to mean what it meant at the time that it was ratified") with id. at I 0 (noting 
that Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall "were willing to use their own 
judgments about the requirements of justice in order to move constitutional law in bold 
new directions--protecting privacy, banning discrimination, and striking down capital 
punishment"). 
46 LisaK. Parshall, Embracing the Living Constitution: Justice Anthony M Kennedy's 
Move away from a Conservative Methodology of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 N.C. 
CENT. L. REv. 25, 44 (2007) ("The interpretation of the Eighth Amendment exemplifies 
the division between adherents and opponents of a 'living Constitution."'). 
47 RONALD DWORKIN: LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, 
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 127-28 (1993). 
48 Facts about the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (Aug. 6, 2013). 
49 A federal law approved by Congress in 1790 made the following crimes capital 
offenses: treason, murder, piracy, robbery, forgery, counterfeiting, and rescuing any 
capital offender from the gallows. An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against 
the United States, § § 1, 3, 8, I 0, 14, 23 (approved Apr. 30, 1790). The law itself provided 
that any such offender "shall suffer death," making death sentences mandatory. !d. §§ I, 
3, 8, 10, 14, 23. That same law-invoked so often by Justice Scalia in defense of 
executions (see, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 88 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring)}-also 
allowed murderers' bodies to be "delivered to a surgeon for dissection"; permitted the use 
of the pillory for perjurers; allowed public whipping of certain offenders "not exceeding 
thirty-nine stripes"; and authorized up to a seven-year term of imprisonment and a fine not 
exceeding one thousand dollars for "any person or persons" who "shall unlawfully cut off 
the ear or ears, or cut out or disable the tongue, put out an eye, slit the nose, cut off the 
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then commonly inflicted by slaveholders, the military, and judicial systems 
alike.50 
Conversely, if current conceptions of justice, human rights and moral-
ity are considered, a different result might be reached as regards the consti-
tutionality of executions. This is especially so if Supreme Court Justices 
stop deferring excessively to legislative judgments and focus on the Consti-
tution's text to independently decide what constitutes a "cruel and unusu-
al" punishment.51 In the founding era, it must be recalled, executions were 
the ordinary-or usual-punishment for many categories of offenders; to-
day, however, life-without-parole sentences have far eclipsed executions as 
the public's preferred punishment for felony murders and first-degree mur-
derers.52 
The prior decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, where the Justices 
have sparred over these issues, frame the current, highly contentious de-
bate. In Ingraham v. Wright,53 a 1977 decision finding the Eighth Amend-
ment inapplicable to public school discipline,54 the majority opinion noted 
nose or a lip, or cut off or disable any limb or member of any person, with intention in so 
doing to maim or disfigure such person." !d. at§§ 4, 13, 15-16, 18 (emphasis added). 
50 In re Candido, 31 Haw. 982, 1931 WL 2830 *8 (1931) ("There can be no doubt that in 
1791 when the Eighth Amendment was framed and adopted whipping was a well known 
form of punishment commonly used by the executive departments of the federal 
government and of some of the states."). 
51 The concepts of deference and independence are mutually exclusive. "Deference" is 
defined as "the act or attitude of deferring: a yielding of judgment or preference out of 
respect for the position, wish, or known opinion of another." WEBSTER'S THIRD 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 591 (2002). "Independence," in 
common parlance, refers to "the quality or state of being independent." /d. at 1148. To be 
"independent" means to be "not subject to control by others: not subordinate." !d. 
52 At common law in 1791, even offenders as young as seven years of age could be 
executed. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 587 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
("Perhaps even more important than our specific holding today is our reaffirmation of the 
basic principle that informs the Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. If the 
meaning of that Amendment had been frozen when it was originally drafted, it would 
impose no impediment to the execution of7-year-{)ld children today. The evolving 
standards of decency that have driven our construction of this critically important part of 
the Bill of Rights foreclose any such reading of the Amendment.") (citing Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989)). 
53 430 u.s. 651 (1977). 
54 !d. at 669, 671. The majority opinion in Ingraham ruled that the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause was intended to apply in the criminal context. !d. at 664 ("Bail, fines, 
and punishment traditionally have been associated with the criminal process, and by 
subjecting the three to parallel limitations the text of the Amendment suggests an 
intention to limit the power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function of 
government. An examination of the history of the Amendment and the decisions of this 
Court construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it 
was designed to protect those convicted of crimes. We adhere to this longstanding 
limitation and hold that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the paddling of children 
as a means of maintaining discipline in public schools."). In Ingraham, the Supreme Court 
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that "[t]he applicability of the Eighth Amendment always has turned on its 
original meaning, as demonstrated by its historical derivation. "55 But long 
before that, the Supreme Court's 1910 decision in Weems v. United States56 
flatly rejected a purely historical interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. 57 
In holding unconstitutional a corporal punishment involving more than 
twelve years of hard labor in chains,58 the Court in Weems emphasized: 
"Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. 
Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application 
than the mischief which gave it birth. "59 For more than one hundred years, 
the Supreme Court has thus rejected a view of the Eighth Amendment that 
relies solely on historical understandings. 
This Article argues that the time has come to declare executions un-
constitutional as "cruel and unusual punishments." It shows the bizarre 
anomaly of present-day American executions, not only in terms of modern 
Western thought and norms emphasizing equality and human rights, but in 
light of existing Eighth Amendment principles. The Eighth Amendment, in 
rulings dating back many decades, has already been interpreted to bar non-
lethal corporal punishments-that is, bodily punishments short of death. 60 
In fact, the federal courts have long characterized unprovoked and gratui-
tous inmate beatings and other forms of prisoner mistreatment and abuse 
as "obvious" or "clear" Eighth Amendment violations.61 The Supreme 
Court itself recognizes the government's duty to protect prisoners from 
harm and provide them with their basic needs: shelter, medical care, and 
specifically left open the issue of whether public school students have a substantive due 
process right to remain free from severe corporal punishments. !d. at 659 n.12. 
55 !d. at 670 n.39. 
56 217 u.s. 349 (1910). 
57 Id. at 373. 
58 Id. at 363-64. 
59 Id. at 373. 
60 See Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) ("handcuffing inmates to the fence 
and to cells for long periods of time" are "forms of corporal punishment" that "run afoul 
of the Eighth Amendment"). Decades ago, the U.S. Supreme Court itself noted American 
society's "general abandonment of corporal punishment as a means of punishing criminal 
offenders." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660 (1977). 
61 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 734-35 & n.2, 737-38, 741 (2002) (attaching prisoner to 
"hitching post," causing "pain and discomfort" resulting in dehydration, a sunburn and 
muscle aches, was characterized as an "obvious" and "clear" Eighth Amendment 
violation); Tucker v. Randall, 948 F.2d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Deliberate 
nontreatment of broken ribs and a broken hand for 9'h months, resulting in permanent 
deformities, presents a clear Eighth Amendment violation."); Merced v. Moylan, No. 
9:05-CV-1426, 2007 WL 3171800 *10 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2007) ("Attacking a 
handcuffed prisoner and causing injury, without provocation, constitutes a clear Eighth 
Amendment violation of which a reasonable person should have known."); see also 
Henderson v. DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055, 1066 (7th Cir. 1991) ("In sum, in 1982 it was 
clearly established that prison inmates had a right under the eighth amendment of the 
Constitution to adequate heat and shelter."). 
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the like. 62 The contradiction of the law protecting prisoners from harm 
while simultaneously allowing their execution-a kind of Dr. Jekyll-and-
Mr. Hyde63 jurisprudence-is the focal point of this Article's critique. 
This Article argues for a principled interpretation of the U.S. Constitu-
tion's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Part II of the Article discuss-
es the Eighth Amendment's origins, from the English Bill of Rights to the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights to the state ratifying conventions that gave 
life to James Madison's "cruel and unusual punishments" language.64 It 
also shows how the catchphrases "cruel and unusual" and "cruel or unu-
sual"-used in English law and the founders' time to describe criminal as-
saults or to designate the severity of a homicide-became part of the no-
menclature of American law. The cruel and unusual terms, history reveals, 
also constituted a well-established benchmark to gauge the mistreatment of 
slaves and mariners while simultaneously regulating the law of homicide 
and manslaughter. Those two conjoined words-by virtue of the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments-have long forbidden the "cruel and unusu-
al" punishment of criminals throughout the United States.65 
Following Part II's historical account and its description of early 
American cases construing the "cruel and unusual" language, Part III dis-
cusses the current state of America's death penalty and existing Eighth 
Amendment case law. That section emphasizes the arbitrary and racially 
discriminatory manner in which U.S. death sentences are imposed, as well 
as the many thorny problems that continue to plague America's death pen-
alty. Those thickets include the risk of executing the innocent, an error-
ridden system, and prolonged stays on death row. Among other things, 
Part III highlights the racial bias and stark geographic disparities now so 
62 E.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) ("That the Eighth Amendment 
protects against future harm to inmates is not a novel proposition. The Amendment, as we 
have said, requires that inmates be furnished with the basic human needs, one of which is 
'reasonable safety."'); see also Martino v. Carey, 563 F. Supp. 984, 999 (D. Ore. 1983) 
("Functioning plumbing, including toilets, sinks and showers, is a basic necessity of 
civilized life. The provision of adequate means of hygiene, and the sanitary disposal of 
bodily wastes so that the wastes do not contaminate the cells, are constitutionally 
required. This is so because the facility's obligation to provide basic minima of shelter 
and sanitation will otherwise not be satisfied."); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 523 
(2d Cir. 1967) ("We are of the view that civilized standards of humane decency simply do 
not permit a man for a substantial period of time to be denuded and exposed to the bitter 
cold of winter in northern New York State and to be deprived of the basic elements of 
hygiene such as soap and toilet paper."). 
63 See ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, THE STRANGE CASE OF DR. JEKYLL AND MR. HYDE 
(1886). In Robert Louis Stevenson's novel, the kind and virtuous Dr. Jekyll-the 
respectable physician-protector-is transformed into the monstrous and wicked Mr. Hyde. 
State v. Yarborough, 39 Kan. 581, 18 P. 474 (Kan. 1888). 
64 The Eighth Amendment's language was plainly derived from the English Bill of Rights 
and the Virginia Declaration of Rights and was included, albeit in modified form, in the 
constitutional amendments James Madison proposed in 1789. United States v. Moore, 486 
F.2d 1139, 1235 n.160 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, C.J., dissenting). 
65 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 203-08. 
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closely associated with capital charges, death sentences and executions. 
Statistics show that the vast majority of American executions take place in 
just a few locales, mostly in the South, and that only a tiny percentage of 
U.S. counties-many of them in Texas-account for the vast majority of 
those executions.66 
Next, Part IV compares the reality of America's capital punishment 
system as it exists today with the constitutional guarantees set forth in the 
Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses. In particular, Part IV describes how death sen-
tences and executions are cruel-and were, in fact, labeled as such long 
ago, even by some of America's founders-and have, over time, become 
unusual. Part IV further describes how, in early America, the "cruel" and 
"unusual" labels were attached to particular criminal conduct or mistreat-
ment, with judges or juries-through adjudication-making factual and 
legal findings as to whether specific conduct qualified as "cruel and unusu-
al."67 Finally, Part IV highlights how the Fourteenth Amendment, with its 
emphasis on equality and non-random, non-arbitrary outcomes, revolu-
tionized American law by restricting state power. 
The Fourteenth Amendment, a Reconstruction Era provision ultimate-
ly read by the U.S. Supreme Court to selectively incorporate protections of 
the Bill of Rights against the states, broadened the Eighth Amendment's 
scope and reach by making the "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibi-
tion applicable to the states.68 In the process, the Fourteenth Amendment 
fundamentally transformed the U.S. Constitution, the relationship between 
the federal government and the states, and the "cruel and unusual punish-
ments" calculus. Not only does the Fourteenth Amendment, like the Fifth 
Amendment before it,69 specifically ensure "due process of law," but the 
Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees "the equal protection of the 
laws. "70 The Eighth Amendment cannot be read in isolation, but must be 
considered in light of its new companion, the Fourteenth Amendment, with 
its focus on equality and equal treatment.71 To fail to take into account 
66 Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria's Vision, supra note 9, at 200 n.927 ("The rate of 
executions varies widely by state, but also by counties within states."). 
67 Early American judicial proceedings were handled much differently than they are 
today, including with respect to the division of authority between judge and jury. See 
Meghan J. Ryan, The Missing Jury: The Neglected Role of Juries in Eighth Amendment 
Punishments Clause Determinations, 64 FLA. L. REv. 549, 575 (2012) ("Early American 
jurors were not only charged with fact-finding, as their English ancestors were, but they 
were also informed that they had the power, and the right, to determine the law in the case 
at hand."). 
68 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 203-08. 
69 U.S. CONST., amend. V (ratified Dec. 15, 1791). 
70 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV (ratified July 9, 1868). 
71 In analyzing their objectives, provisions of constitutions are routinely read together 
with one another. Application of Lamb, 169 A.2d 822, 826 (N.J. Super. 1961) ("The 
various provisions of our Constitution with respect to the three divisions of government 
must be read, analyzed and interpreted together in determining the intended objectives of 
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Fourteenth Amendment values when interpreting the Eighth Amendment 
and resolving disputes over the Constitution's meaning would be like omit-
ting discussion of the Civil War from an American history course. 
After describing the Supreme Court's "evolving standards of decency" 
test and summarizing existing precedents applying it, this Article-in Part 
V-offers its critique of that approach. The lofty sounding "evolving 
standards of decency" test-which now asks largely whether American 
society has reached a "national consensus" as to a particular punishment-
has guided the Court's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause jurispru-
dence for more than a half century. That majoritarian test, however, has 
proven problematic because, to date, it has failed to produce anything re-
sembling a sensible body of Eighth Amendment case law. The "evolving 
standards" test, in fact, gives short-shrift to the Constitution's text and has 
led to an untenable state of affairs: one in which the death penalty is de-
clared constitutional while less serious corporal punishments are found to 
be unconstitutional. After recalling the abandonment of non-lethal cor-
poral punishments in the American penal system, Part V specifically argues 
that the Eighth Amendment should be read in a more intellectually con-
sistent and straightforward manner. 
The Article concludes that the Supreme Court, exercising its judicial 
independence72 and reading the "cruel and unusual" language in a more 
logical and principled fashion, should reevaluate its hopelessly irreconcila-
ble Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In particular, the Article argues that 
the Court should declare U.S. executions unconstitutional because they are 
"cruel and unusual punishments. "73 Indeed, the Constitution's text-with 
this fundamental and basic document."); Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas, 95 
S.W.3d 253, 262 (Tex. 2002) ("Rules of constitutional interpretation dictate that all 
clauses must be given effect."); Marsh v. Department of Civil Service, 370 N.W.2d 613, 
617 (Mich. App. 1985) ("Provisions of the constitution should be read in context, not in 
isolation, and they should be harmonized to give effect to all."); Johnson County Bd. of 
Election Com'rs v. Holman, 655 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Ark. 1983) ("Since we must give 
effect to all the language in the Constitution, we find no difficulty in reconciling the two 
quoted provisions."); Olson v. City of West Fargo, 305 N.W.2d 821, 825 (N.D. 1981) 
("[A] court must give effect and meaning to every provision of the Constitution and, if 
possible, reconcile apparently inconsistent provisions. Further, this court has recognized 
that all constitutional provisions have equal dignity."). 
72 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is"); see also Chandler v. 
Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit of the United States, 398 U.S. 74, 143 (1970) (Black, J., 
dissenting) ("The wise authors of our Constitution provided for judicial independence 
because they were familiar with history; they knew that judges of the past-good, 
patriotic judges-had occasionally lost not only their offices but had also sometimes lost 
their freedom and their heads because of the actions and decrees of other judges. They 
were determined that no such things should happen here."). 
73 In the past, some Supreme Court Justices have themselves argued for this result. 
Lindsey S. Vann, History Repeats Itself The Post-Furman Return to Arbitrariness in 
Capital Punishment, 45 U. RICH. L. REv. 1255, 1260 (2011) ("Justices Brennan and 
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its emphasis on cruelty and unusualness as well as due process and equal 
protection-compels that result when the reality of American executions is 
considered. Instead of looking to the concepts articulated in the Constitu-
tion as guiding lights, the Court has thus far fixated on its "evolving stand-
ards of decency" test, even though that test had produced absurd results. It 
makes perfect sense that harsh corporal punishments are no longer allowed 
within the U.S. penal system, but following that logic, it makes no sense 
that capital punishment-a much more draconian sanction-should con-
tinue to be permitted. 
II. "CRUEL AND UNUSUAL": A SHORT HISTORY 
A. The Origins of the Phrase 
The phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" first appeared in English 
law.74 The English Declaration of Rights-later the English Bill of Rights of 
1689-grew out of the Glorious Revolution of 168875 and provided in 
part: "[E]xcessive Bail ought not to be required nor excessive Fines im-
posed; nor cruel and unusual Punishments inflicted. "76 That clause-the 
Eighth Amendment's oldest predecessor-is what inspired a number of 
equivalent provisions in state bills of rights and constitutions.77 Indeed, that 
language in the English Bill of Rights-copied verbatim by Virginia planta-
tion owner George Mason for inclusion in Virginia's 1776 Declaration of 
Rights78-would become the linguistic source for the Eighth Amendment 
itsel£.79 During the Revolutionary War, Great Britain and the United States 
of America fought bitterly, but one thing is clear: both English subjects and 
early Americans despised cruel and unusual punishments, though under-
standings of what those were seems to have varied substantially from per-
son to person. 80 
Marshall found the death penalty per se unconstitutional based in part on its arbitrary 
imposition."). 
74 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976). 
75 People ex rel. Kemmler v. Durston, 55 Hun 64, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 814 (1889) (noting that 
the "cruel and unusual punishments" language "originated in the well known 'bill of 
rights' of England," with the English Bill of Rights described as "one of the first fruits of 
the great revolution of 1688"). 
76 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 
966 (1991). 
77 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 162-80. 
78 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § IX (June 12, 1776). 
79 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890) ("[t]he provision in reference to cruel and 
unusual punishments was taken from the well-known act of parliament of 1688, entitled 
'An act for declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, and settling the succession of 
the crown'"); Amy L. Riederer, Working 9 to 5: Embracing the Eighth Amendment 
through an Integrated Model of Prison Labor, 43 VAL. U. L. REv. 1425, 1429 (2009) 
("the language of the Eighth Amendment was substantially copied from the language of 
the English Act of Parliament in 1688"). 
80 Near the end of his life, Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, wrote that Virginia's 
prohibition "against excessive bail and excessive fines, was borrowed from England with 
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In both the English Bill of Rights and the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights, the conjunctive and separated the cruel and unusual terms. English 
and American lawmakers, however, often paid little attention to the con-
junctive word that separated those words. For example, a 1689 pro-
nouncement of more than ten Lords in Great Britain's Parliament, pertain-
ing to the notorious case of convicted perjurer Titus Oates, uses "nor" in-
stead of "and" in the key position, to wit: "[T]hat excessive Bail ought not 
to be required, nor excessive Fines imposed, nor cruel nor unusual Punish-
ments inflicted."81 In fact, the phrases "cruel and unusual" and "cruel or 
unusual" were often used interchangeably,82 with early American state con-
stitutions often employing "cruel or unusual" instead of the "cruel and 
unusual" verbiage.83 
Sometimes, the word "unusual" was omitted entirely from constitu-
tional documents, 84 making a given provision's sole emphasis-at least in 
the eyes of some-on cruelty.85 In the 1792 constitutions of Delaware and 
Kentucky, for example, state lawmakers just prohibited "cruel" punish-
additional reprobation of cruel and unusual punishments." BESSLER, CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 376 n.40. 
81 10 How. St. Tr. 1079, 1316 (K.B. 1685); 1 THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
HOUSE OF LORDS, FROM THE RESTORATION IN 1660, TO THE PRESENT TIME 367 (1742). 
That substitute language-as one scholar writes-"indicates that during the time the 
Eighth Amendment was adopted the 'and' and the 'or' may have been used 
interchangeably when describing cruel and/or unusual punishments." Samuel J.M. 
Donnelly, Capital Punishment: A Critique of the Political and Philosophical Thought 
Supporting the Justices' Positions, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 100 n.532 (1992); compare id. 
at 100 ("The first Congress, which proposed the Eighth Amendment, may have rejected 
both punishments which are 'cruel' and punishments which are 'unusual' rather than only 
punishments which are at the same time 'cruel and unusual."'). 
82 E.g., JOHN P. DuvAL, ED., COMPILATION OF THE PuBLIC ACTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE 
COUNCIL OF THE TERRITORY OF FLORIDA, PASSED PRIOR TO 1840, at 223 (1839) (the 
editorial summary of Florida's 1828 prohibition on "cruel or unusual punishment" of 
slaves, set forth in the margin next to the statutory prohibition itself, read as follows: 
"Cruel and unusual punishment of slaves"). 
83 Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights under State Constitutions 
When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted 
in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEx. L. REv. 7. 78 (2008) (discussing the 
language variations in state constitutions); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
243-44 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing early American provisions). 
84 The English Declaration of Rights, in a recital, declared "that excessive bail hath been 
required of persons committed in criminal cases, to elude the benefit of the laws made for 
the liberty of the subject; and excessive fines have been imposed, and illegal and cruel 
punishments inflicted." People ex rei. Kemmler v. Durston, 55 Hun 64, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 814 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1889). The use of"illegal and cruel" instead of"unusual and cruel" in that 
recital only further confounded the debate over the Eighth Amendment's meaning. 
85 Cf Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from cert. 
denial) ("Not only have 46 of the 48 States that once regularly imposed hanging 
abandoned the practice, but many state legislatures rejected the practice because it was 
perceived as inhumane and barbaric, precisely the concern that lies at the core of the 
Eighth Amendment."). 
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ments, dropping the word "unusual" altogether.86 In the founding era, one 
finds unduly harsh or draconian punishments described with all sorts of 
labels, including the following: "barbaric," "barbarous," "cruel," "dispro-
portioned," "ignominious," "illegal," "immoderate," "infamous," "inhu-
man," "inhumane," "ludicrous," "odius," "sanguinary," "severe," "un-
christian," "unheard-of," "unnatural" and "unusual." 87 Of that varied 
terminology, though, only "cruel" and "unusual" made it into the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause. 
The concepts of cruelty and unusualness, linked together like a chain 
and related to one another in at least some fashion, 88 do, of course, have 
separate meanings, as English dictionaries have long shown. While cruelty 
has to do with causing pain or distress or tormenting someone, unusualness 
has to do with uncommonness.89 The close proximity of cruel and unusual 
in the Eighth Amendment suggests, however, that the words were intended 
by the Founding Fathers to be read together.90 How modern-day judges 
86 Stacy, supra note 17, at 504 ("Delaware and Kentucky enacted constitutions in 1792 
during the year following the Bill of Rights' ratification. All of these constitutions 
prohibited 'cruel punishments,' omitting entirely any reference to the term 'unusual.' 
Numerous state constitutions enacted after the Founding period used this same 
language."). 
87 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 446 (listing references). 
88 In ordinary parlance, a punishment that is "cruel" can also easily be found to be 
"unusual" in the sense that one would not ordinarily expect a civilized society to impose a 
cruel punishment. Conversely, a punishment that is "unusual" might naturally be 
considered "cruel" in the sense that it might be deemed unconscionable or unfair to 
arbitrarily impose an outlier punishment on one person (or a small group of people) when 
others engaged in identical conduct are not receiving that particular punishment. After all, 
there is something inherently unusual in selectively inflicting a cruel punishment, just as a 
finding of cruelty can, in and of itself, be influential in determining that a punishment is 
unusual. The "selective prosecution" doctrine is itself premised on the notion that a 
prosecutor's decision may not be deliberately based upon unjustifiable standards "such as 
race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 
(1985) (citations omitted). 
89 In 1785, Samuel Johnson's dictionary defined "cruel" as "[b]loody; mischievous; 
destructive; causing pain." The 1828 edition of Noah Webster's dictionary defined "cruel" 
as "[i]nhuman; barbarous; savage; causing pain, grief or distress; exerted in tormenting, 
vexing or afflicting." John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality under the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REv. 899, 911 (2011) (citations omitted). 
Seventeenth-century English dictionaries, by contrast, defined "unusual" as "[n]ot usual; 
uncommon; exceptional." Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments 
Clause Prohibit Only Punishments That Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. 
REv. 567, 602 (2010) (citations omitted). 
90 In early English legal history, one can even find reference to "unusual Cruelties." See, 
e.g., 1 THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, FROM THE RESTORATION 
IN 1660, TO THE PRESENT TIME 362 (1742) (this language appears in 1689, the same year 
that the English Bill of Rights was put in place: "[T]hat which most nearly touch'd his 
Majesty, was the French King's unchristian Prosecution of many of his Majesty's English 
Protestant Subjects, for Matters of Religion, contrary to the Law of Nations, and express 
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read the proscription against "cruel and unusual punishments" is, as it 
must be, for them to decide on a case-by-case basis.91 Cruel and unusual, 
though related, are not identical, conjoined twins. Rather, those terms-
connected by the and-can be thought of as fraternal twins conceived at 
the same time but whose linguistic qualities and characteristics differ. 
The Eighth Amendment, it is clear, was not drafted in a vacuum; it 
came about as a product of the American Revolution. An examination of 
centuries-old laws and legal treatises also plainly shows that the concept of 
cruelty-the first part of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause-has 
long been a familiar one to Anglo-American lawyers and jurists. In 1583, 
Sir Robert Beale-a clerk of the Privy Council who invoked the Magna 
Carta-condemned "the racking of grievous offenders, as being cruel, bar-
barous, contrary to law, and unto the liberty of English subjects."92 In 
1641, "The Body of Liberties"-a code of laws drafted by the Cambridge-
educated, Puritan preacher Nathaniel Ward, and later adopted by the Gen-
eral Court of Massachusetts-also used the term "cruel"93 almost half a 
century before the issuance of the English Bill of Rights. Clause 46 of that 
Massachusetts legal code read: "For bodilie punishments we allow amongst 
us none that are inhumane, barbarous or cruel." 94 The concept of cruelty 
also appears in the writings of influential thinkers such as Coke,95 Groti-
us,96 Montesquieu/7 Beccaria/8 Vattel/9 Burlamaqui,100 Bentham/01 Ro-
milly/02 and others.103 
Treaties, forcing them to abjure their Religion by strange and unusual Cruelties ... ") 
(italics in original). 
91 Neither America's Founding Fathers nor the Fourteenth Amendment's framers are 
around to interpret the words they adopted, leaving it to today's judges to make decisions 
in cases and controversies as they arise. 
92 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 171-72; Robert J. McWhirter, Baby, 
Don't Be Cruel, 46 ARiz. ATT'Y 38, 44 (2010) (quoting LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS 232 (1999)). 
93 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 173-74. 
94 Id. at 174. 
95 SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: 
CONTAINING THE EXPOSITION OF MANY ANCIENT AND OTHER STATUTES, ch. 26, p. 42 
(1797) (1642) ("Odium, signifieth hatred, and atia or acia in this writ signifieth malice, 
because that malice is acida, that is, eager, sharpe and cruel!.") (italics in original); SIR 
EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: 
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES, 
ch. 6, p. 44 (1669) (using the word "cruel!" in a chapter titled "Of Felony by Conjuration, 
Witchcraft, Sorcery or Inchantrnent"); SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE 
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS, ch. 1, 
p. 33 (1671) (noting that the "Earl of Northumberland ... was by the Rebels cruelly and 
causelessly slain"). 
96 HUGO GROTIDS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: INCLUDING THE LAW OF NATURE AND 
OF NATIONS 54, 74, 330 (2010) (1625) (referencing "cruel treatment," "cruel acts," "cruel 
wrath," and "an inducement to captors to refrain from the cruel rigor of putting prisoners 
to death"). 
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The concept of unusualness-the second part of the "cruel and unu-
sual punishments" prohibition-has likewise been with Anglo-American 
law for centuries. The British House of Commons, in commenting on the 
97 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 41, at 62, 84-85, 87, 91, 200, 206, 251, 258, 489, 670, 673-
74 (referencing "the most cruel provision of this law," "a cruel penalty," "cruel 
punishments," "cruel penalties," "a crafty and cruel tyrant," "cruel laws," "cruel slavery," 
"cruel masters," and "cruel" monarchs and princes, and noting that "[i]n China robbers 
who are cruel are cut to bits"). Montesquieu also called Roman laws "very severe" and 
"full of very cruel provisions." BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 36. 
98 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 64, 69-70, 80, 89 (Richard Bellamy, 
ed. & Richard Davis, trans., 1995) (1764) (referencing "cruel laws," "cruel" penal 
servitude, "cruel tortures," "cruel example," and "cruel prerogatives"). Beccaria viewed 
torture itself as "a cruelty" and opposed the death penalty "because of the example of 
cruelty that it gives to men." BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 35. 
99 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 20-21,25, 148, 178, 191-93, 197, 199, 
215, 224, 226, 228, 236 (Thomas Adamo, ed., 2011) (1758) (referencing "a cruel tyrant," 
a "cruel and perfidious" enemy, a "cruel" fate, "cruel experience," "cruel treatment," "a 
cruel decision," "cruel distress," "cruel necessity," "the dread of a cruel punishment," 
"cruel punishments," "cruel expedient," "cruel licentiousness," a prince's "cruel and 
arbitrary disposition," "cruel" war, "cruel enemies," and "cruel conditions"). 
100 JEAN-JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW, chs. II & 
IV (Thomas Nugent, ed. 2006) (1747) (referring to "an unjust and cruel prince," "bloody 
and cruel wars," and the oppression of a subject "in so cruel a manner"). 
101 There are more than a dozen references to the concept of"cruelty" in Bentham's book, 
The Principles of Morals and Legislation. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION 58,102,114-19,122,137,151,180-81,311 (RobertM. Baird& Stuart 
E. Rosenbaum, eds. 1988) (1789). 
102 Samuel Romilly argued that the English mode of punishing treason-that the offender 
be dragged to the gallows; be hanged by the neck; while alive, be cut down, with his 
entrails taken out and burned; then beheaded and dismembered-"inflicts a most cruel 
death." Romilly further argued against laws creating a "standard of cruelty." "I call upon 
you to remember," Romilly said, "that cruel punishments have an inevitable tendency to 
produce cruelty in the people." Basil Montagu, The Debate in the House of Commons 
(Apr. 5, 1813), reprinted in 4 JAMES E. CRIMMINS, ED. THE DEATH PENALTY: DEBATES IN 
BRITAIN AND THE U.S., 1725-1868 (2004). 
103 InA Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, sergeant-at-law William Hawkins-in a 
chapter entitled "OfMurder"-wrote in Section 41 of the applicable law: "It is to be 
observed, that wherever a person, in cool blood, by way of revenge, unlawfully and 
deliberately beats another in such a manner that he afterwards dies thereof, he is guilty of 
murder, however unwilling he might have been to have gone so far." 1 WILLIAM 
HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN; OR, A SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPAL 
MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER PROPER HEADS 99 (John 
Curwood, Esq., 8th ed. 1824). In Section 42, Hawkins then added: "Also it seems, that he 
who, upon a sudden provocation, executes his revenge in such a cruel manner, as shews a 
cruel and deliberate intent to do mischief, is guilty of murder, if death ensure; as where 
the keeper of a park, finding a boy stealing wood, tied him to a horse's tail and beat him, 
whereupon the horse ran away and killed him." Id.; see also 1 id. at 98 (noting that "so 
base and cruel a revenge cannot have too severe a construction'); 1 id. at 789 ("A master 
is not justified in beating his servant in a cruel or barbarous manner, or with an improper 
instrument."). 
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harsh, seventeenth-century punishment of Titus Oates, ordered to be pillo-
ried every year for life, declared that Oates' punishment was "barbarous," 
an "ill Example to future Ages," and "unusual" in that "an Englishman 
should be exposed upon a Pillory, so many times a Year, during his 
Life." 104 Even before the U.S. Bill of Rights was adopted, the phrase "cruel 
or unusual" appears in American trade legislation.105 In early American 
slave codes, slave owners and their overseers were legally permitted to 
whip or chastise slaves, though not-at least in some places-with "unusu-
al rigor." 106 The word "unusual" actually appears in America's founding 
document, the Declaration of Independence, 107 and the notion of "unusual 
punishments" was discussed at Virginia's ratification convention.108 
B. Blackstone's Commentaries 
The concepts of cruelty and unusualness were certainly not novel ones 
to America's Founding Fathers. In William Blackstone's Commentaries on 
the Laws of England-a highly influential source for American colonial 
lawyers109-the term "cruel" appears multiple times. "The laws of the Ro-
104 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 175-76. In the modem era, members 
of the U.S. Supreme Court have emphasized that whether a punishment is "unusual" is 
tied to its frequency or acceptance and whether the punishment is uncommon. Thompson 
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988) ("whether an action is 'unusual' depends, in 
common usage, upon the frequency of its occurrence or the magnitude of its acceptance"); 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991) ("the word 'unusual"' means "[s]uch as 
is [not] in common use"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) ("these sentences are 'unusual' in the sense that the penalty of death is 
infrequently imposed for murder, and that its imposition for rape is extraordinarily rare"). 
The term "unusual" has been described as a "common synonym" of"uncommon." Miller 
v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2481 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
105 See An Act for Granting to the United States in Congress Assembled, Certain Imposts 
and Duties Upon Foreign Goods Imported into this State, and for the Purpose of Paying 
the Principal and Interest of the Debt Contracted in the Prosecution of the Late War with 
Great Britain (Oct. 20, 1783). 
106 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 314. 
107 In one of its recitals, the Declaration of Independence declared that the "King of Great 
Britain," George III, "has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, 
uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their Public Records, for the sole 
purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures." DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE (July 4, 1776). 
108 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 299, 301. 
109 James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARv. 
L. REv. 1613, 1614 n.l (2011) ("First published in England between 1765 and 1769, when 
Blackstone held the Vinerian chair at Oxford, the Commentaries on the Laws of England 
enjoyed remarkable success in America."); Guy I. Seidman, The Origins of 
Accountability: Everything I Know about the Sovereign's Immunity, I Learned from King 
Henry III, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 393, 479 (2005) ("By 1776, American lawyers and many 
of the Founding Fathers were well-versed in English law and practice through Blackstone. 
The Commentaries, in short, were widely known in America and had an enormous 
influence on American legal thought."); Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding and the Death 
Penalty: The Scope of a Capital Defendant's Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 
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man kings, and the twelve tables of the decemviri," Blackstone wrote, 
"were full of cruel punishments." 110 "It is, it must be owned," Blackstone 
observed, "much easier to extirpate than to amend mankind; yet that mag-
istrate must be esteemed both a weak and a cruel surgeon, who cuts off 
every limb, which through ignorance or indolence he will not attempt to 
cure." 111 Elsewhere, Blackstone refers to a "cruel law" 112 and "cruel 
edicts," 113 mentions a "cruel process," 114 and writes of "most cruel and 
disagreeable hardships" 115 and "the cool and cruel sarcasm of the sover-
eign."116 In America, apprenticeships and the study of Blackstone's Com-
mentaries remained the primary means of legal education until the late 
1800s, making early American lawyers especially familiar with Black-
stone's treatise.117 
In his Commentaries, Blackstone actually used the phrase "cruel and 
unusual" in two separate contexts.118 First, Blackstone used those words to 
define "murder by express malice." 119 In detailing the elements of murder, 
Blackstone wrote that "the killing must be committed with malice afore-
thought, to make it the crime of murder." 120 "This," he explained, "is the 
1, 4 n.24 (1989) ("Included among those who read and acknowledged the authority of 
Blackstone's Commentaries were John Adams, Nathaniel Green, James Madison, 
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and Patrick Henry.") (citing Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William 
Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 731, 743-45 (1976)). St. George Tucker's annotated American edition of 
Blackstone's Commentaries, published in 1803, was also later a standard legal reference 
for American lawyers. David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth 
Century, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1359, 1370-72 (1998). 
110 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF 
THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769, at 17 (1769) (1979) (italics in original). 
111 !d. at 18 (italics in original). 
112 Id. at 138. 
113 Id. at 151. 
114 Id. at 323. 
115 Id. at 219. 
116 !d. at 399. 
117 Jessica J. Sage, Authority of the Law? The Contribution of Secularized Legal 
Education to the Moral Crisis of the Profession, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 707, 714 (2004); 
see also Jason J. Kilborn, Who's In Charge Here? Putting Clients in Their Place, 37 GA. 
L. REv. 1, 14 n.62 (2002) ("The influence of English law practice on the American bar 
was inevitable, as the primary early sources of legal training for aspiring American 
lawyers were apprenticeship, reading Coke or Blackstone in the office of an English-
trained barrister, and study in one ofthe English Inns of Court."); Kopel, supra note 109, 
at 1372 ("Almost every prospective lawyer began his studies by reading Tucker's 
Blackstone, and some lawyers may never have read anything else. Thomas Jefferson 
recommended Tucker's Blackstone as part of the course of study for aspiring law 
students, since the Tucker book was the best source for overall mastery of American 
law."). 
118 Ryan, supra note 89, at 601 nn.l97 & 199 (citing Blackstone's use of"cruel and 
unusual"). 
119 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at 199. 
120 !d. at 198 (italics in original). 
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grand criterion, which now distinguishes murder from other killing: and 
this malice prepense, malitia praecogitata, is not so properly spite or ma-
levolence to the deceased in particular, as any evil design in general; the 
dictate of a wicked, depraved, and malignant heart; un disposition a faire 
un male chose and it may be either express, or implied in law." 121 
"Express malice," Blackstone wrote, "is when one, with a sedate de-
liberate mind and formed design, doth kill another: which formed design is 
evidenced by external circumstances discovering that inward intention; as 
lying in wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges, and concerted schemes 
to do him some bodily harm." 122 "Also," Blackstone added, "if even upon 
a sudden provocation one beats another in a cruel and unusual manner, so 
that he dies, though he did not intend his death, yet he is guilty of murder 
by express malice; that is, by an express evil design, the genuine sense of 
malitia. "123 
Following that legal pronouncement, Blackstone-in the very next 
sentence-then listed these specific examples along with an explanation for 
why it would be considered murder by express malice: "As when a park-
keeper tied a boy, that was stealing wood, to a horse's tail, and dragged 
him along the park; when a master corrected his servant with an iron bar, 
and a schoolmaster stamped on his scholar's belly, so that each of the suf-
ferers died; these were justly held to be murders, because the correction 
being excessive, and such as could not proceed but from a bad heart, it was 
equivalent to a deliberate act of slaughter." 124 "Neither shall he be guilty of 
a less crime, who kills another in consequence of such a wilful act, as shews 
him to be an enemy to all mankind in general; as going deliberately with a 
horse used to strike, or discharging a gun, among a multiple of people." 125 
"So if a man resolves to kill the next man he meets, and does kill him, it is 
murder although he knew him not; for this is universal malice," Blackstone 
concluded.126 
121 Id. at 198-99 (italics in original). 
122 !d. at 199. "This takes in," Blackstone explained, "the case of deliberate duelling, 
where both parties meet avowedly with an intent to murder: thinking it their duty, as 
gentlemen, and claiming it as their right, to wanton with their own lives and those of their 
fellow creatures; without any warrant or authority from any power either divine or human, 
but in direct contradiction to the laws both of God and man: and therefore the law has 
justly fixed the crime and punishment of murder, on them, and on their seconds also." Id. 
123 !d. (italics in original); compare id. at 200. In Pleas of the Crown, Sir Matthew Hale 
had written in 1678: "In Cases ofMurder, there must be Malice; and if a Man assaults 
another with a dangerous Weapon, tho' without Provocation, 'tis express Malice from the 
nature of the Fact, which is Cruel." SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF TIIE CROWN: OR, A 
METHODICAL SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT 19 
(1716) (1678). 
124 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at 199-200 (citing 1 Hal. P. C. 454, 471-74). 
125 !d. at 200. 
126 !d. Blackstone ended his discussion of murder by express malice by further explaining: 
"And, iftwo or more come together to do an unlawful act against the king's peace, of 
which the probable consequence might be bloodshed; as to beat a man, to commit a riot, 
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After referring to a beating in a "cruel and unusual manner" under 
the rubric of murder by express malice, 127 Blackstone then wrote of cases of 
murder by implied malice and also contrasted deadly beatings where only 
"manslaughter" would be found. "[I]n many cases where no malice is ex-
pressed," Blackstone noted, "the law will imply it: as, where a man wilfully 
poisons another, in such a deliberate act the law presumes malice, though 
no particular emnity can be proved." 128 As Blackstone further explained: 
"[I]f a man kills another suddenly, without any, or without a considerable, 
provocation, the law implies malice; for no person, unless of an abandoned 
heart, would be guilty of such an act, upon a slight or no apparent 
cause." 129 "No affront, by words, or gestures only," he wrote, "is a suffi-
cient provocation, so as to excuse or extenuate such acts of violence as 
manifestly endanger the life of another." 130 "But if the person so provoked 
had unfortunately killed the other, by beating him in such a manner as 
shewed only an intent to chastise and not to kill him," Blackstone clarified, 
"the law so far considers the provocation of contumelious behavior, as to 
adjudge it only manslaughter, and not murder." 131 
In his second reference, Blackstone later referred to the concept of 
"cruel and unusual punishments" in discussing the English Bill of Rights.132 
That reference-in Chapter 29 of Book Four, a chapter titled "OF 
juDGMENT, AND IT'S CONSEQUENCES"-was prefaced by Blackstone's dis-
cussion of criminal judgments and the possibility of an offender's "pardon" 
or "praying the benefit of clergy" to "arrest" a judgment.133 "If all these 
resources fail," Blackstone wrote, "the court must pronounce that judg-
ment, which the law hath annexed to the crime, and which hath been con-
stantly mentioned, together with the crime itself, in some or other of the 
former chapters." 134 As he explained: "Of these some are capital, which 
extend to the life of the offender, and consist generally in being hanged by 
the neck till dead; though in very atrocious crimes other circumstances of 
terror, pain, or disgrace are superadded: as, in treasons of all kinds, being 
drawn or dragged to the place of execution; in high treason affecting the 
or to rob a park; and one of them kills a man; it is murder in them all, because of the 
unlawful act, the malitia praecogitata, or evil intended beforehand." Id. (italics in 
original). 
127 Id. at 199. 
128 I d. at 200. 
129 Id. 
13o Id. 
131 I d. Blackstone thus contrasted deadly beatings carried out in a "cruel and unusual 
manner" -which would constitute murder by express malice-with deadly beatings 
carried out only with the intent to "chastise," with the latter beatings only constituting 
manslaughter. Id. at 199-200. 
132 Id. at 372. 
133 I d. at 368-69. 
134 I d. at 369-70. 
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king's person or government, embowelling alive, beheading, and quarter-
ing; and in murder, a public dissection." 135 
Though English law once allowed such horrific punishments, Black-
stone was quick to note that the severity of these punishments was, in prac-
tice, often mitigated. "[T]he humanity of the English nation," Blackstone 
qualified, "has authorized, by a tacit consent, an almost general mitigation 
of such part of these judgments as favour of torture or cruelty: a sledge or 
hurdle being usually allowed to such traitors as are condemned to be 
drawn; and there being very few instances (and those accidental or by neg-
ligence) of any person's being emboweled or burned, till previously de-
prived of sensation by strangling." 136 "Some punishments," he wrote, 
"consist in exile or punishment, by abjuration of the realm, or transporta-
tion to the American colonies: others in loss of liberty, by perpetual or 
temporary imprisonment." 137 "Some, though rarely," he added, "occasion 
a mutilation or dismembering, by cutting off the hand or ears: others fix a 
lasting stigma on the offender, by slitting the nostrils, or branding in the 
hand or face." 138 Blackstone also noted the availability of "discretionary 
135 !d. at 370. "And," Blackstone added, "in case of any treason committed by a female, 
the judgment is to be burned alive." !d. 
136 !d. at 370. Another commentator on English law specifically equated torture with 
cruelty, wrote that England did not use torture, and saw the "cruel and unusual 
punishments" prohibition as a restriction on acts if torture. J. L. DE LOLME, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND; OR, AN ACCOUNT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 383-85 
(Corrected ed., 1789) ("the use of Torture, that method of administering Justice in which 
folly may be said to be added to cruelty"; "the use of Torture has, from the earliest times, 
been utterly unknown in England" and "all attempts to introduce it, whatever might be the 
power of those who made them, or the circumstances in which they renewed their 
endeavors, have been strenuously opposed and defeated"; "From the same cause also 
arose that remarkable forbearance of the English Laws, to use any cruel severity in the 
punishments which experience shewed it was necessary for the preservation of Society to 
establish: and the utmost vengeance of those laws, even against the most enormous 
Offenders, never extends beyond the simple deprivation of life"). As that commentator 
wrote: "[S]o anxious has the English Legislature been to establish mercy, even to 
convicted offenders, as a fundamental principle of the Government of England, that they 
made it an express article of that great public Compact which was framed at the important 
era of the Revolution, that 'no cruel and unusual punishments should be used."' !d. at 
385-86 (citing English Bill of Rights, art. X). The same language also appears in an earlier 
edition of that treatise. J. L. DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND, OR, AN ACCOUNT 
OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 340-41 (1777). 
137 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at 370. 
138 !d. In one section, on the punishment of theft for those "who have no property 
themselves," Blackstone wrote: "Sir Thomas More, and the marquis Beccaria, at the 
distance of more than two centuries, have very sensibly proposed that kind of corporal 
punishment, which approaches the nearest to a pecuniary satisfaction; viz. a temporary 
imprisonment, with an obligation to labour, first for the party robbed, and afterwards for 
the public, in works of the most slavish kind: in order to oblige the offender to repair, by 
his industry and diligence, the depredations he has committed upon private property and 
public order." !d. at 238. "But," Blackstone added, "notwithstanding all the remonstrances 
of speculative politicians and moralists, the punishment of theft still continues, throughout 
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fines" and punishments involving the infliction of "corporal pain" such as 
"whipping, hard labour in the house of correction, the pillory, the stocks, 
and the ducking-stool." 139 A ducking stool was a chair connected to a pul-
ley system where slanderers and women, among others, "were restrained 
and then repeatedly plunged into a convenient body of water." 140 
Blackstone, the Oxford scholar, felt strongly that English law-
though harsh-was still enlightened compared to the laws of other coun-
tries.141 "Disgusting as this catalogue may seem," Blackstone wrote of pun-
ishments authorized by English law, "it will afford pleasure to an English 
the greatest part of Europe, to be capital: and Puffendorf, together with Sir Matthew Hale, 
are of opinion that this must always be referred to the prudence of the legislature; who are 
to judge, say they, when crimes are become so enormous as to require such sanguinary 
restrictions." Id. 
139 !d. at 370. Judicial discretion-and the ability to inflict a wide array of corporal 
punishments short of death-was a hallmark of the English legal system. See 3 THE 
WORKS OF SIR WILLIAM TEMPLE, BART 56 (1757): 
[I]t may seem probable, that the more natural and effectual way in our nation, to prevent 
or suppress thefts and robberies, were to change the usual punishment by short and easy 
deaths, into some others of painful and uneasy lives, which they will find much harder to 
bear, and be more unwilling and afraid to suffer than the other. Therefore a liberty might 
at least be left to the judges and the bench, according to the difference of persons, crimes, 
and circumstances, to inflict either death, or some notorious mark, by slitting the nose, or 
such brands upon the cheeks, which can never be effaced by time or art; and such persons 
to be condemned either to slavery in our plantations abroad, or labour in work-houses at 
home; and this either for their lives, or certain numbers of years, according to the degrees 
of their crimes. 
Accord 3 THE HISTORY OF THE WORKS OF THE LEARNED: OR, AN IMPARTIAL ACCOUNT OF 
BOOKS LATELY PRINTED IN ALL PARTS OF EUROPE 636 (1701) ("That for the more 
Effectual suppression of Thefts and Robberies, it would be proper to change the usual 
Punishment by short and easie Deaths, into some others of painful and uneasie Lives, 
which they will find much harder to bear, and be more unwilling and afraid to suffer than 
the other."). 
140 Matthew W. Meskell, The History of Prisons in the United States from 1777 to 1877, 
51 STAN. L. REv. 839, 841-42 (1999). InA Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, 
Englishmen William Hawkins-under the heading "Cucking Stool"-wrote: "Sometimes 
called Ducking Stool, the usual punishment for a common scold." 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A 
TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN; OR, A SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS 
RELATING TO THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER PROPER HEADS 624 (Thomas Leached., 
6th ed. 1777) (italics in original); see also id. at 352 n.3 (in another section of his treatise, 
Hawkins also made reference to a "usual" punishment, writing in that unrelated context: 
"The usual mode of punishment at present is by pillory, fine, imprisonment, and surety for 
the good behaviour."). While men were traditionally punished in the stocks in earlier 
times, ducking-stools had been used extensively in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
to punish women. ALFRED CREIGH, HISTORY OF WASHINGTON COUNTY: FROM ITS FIRST 
SETTLEMENT TO THE PRESENT TIME, ch. 1 (1870). 
141 William Blackstone (1723-1780) was the Vinerian Professor of Civil Law who, in the 
1760s, arranged for Oxford University Press to print his Commentaries. Lionel Bently & 
Jane C. Ginsburg, "The Sole Right ... Shall Return to the Authors": Anglo-American 
Authors' Reversion Rights from the Statute of Anne to Contemporary U.S. Copyright, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1475, 1499 (2010). 
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reader, and do honour to the English law, to compare it with that shocking 
apparatus of death and torment, to be met with in the criminal codes of 
almost every other nation in Europe." 142 "[I]t is moreover," Blackstone 
explained, "one of the glories of our English law, that the nature, though 
not always the quantity or degree, of punishment is ascertained for every 
offence; and that it is not left in the breast of any judge, nor even of a jury, 
to alter that judgment, which the law has beforehand ordained, for every 
subject alike, without respect of persons." 143 "[W]here an established pen-
alty is annexed to crimes," Blackstone offered, "the criminal may read their 
certain consequence in that law, which ought to be the unvaried rule, as it 
is the inflexible judgment, of his actions." 144 
It was after this discussion that Blackstone cited the "cruel and unu-
sual punishments" clause of the English Bill of Rights. "The discretionary 
fines and discretionary length of imprisonment, which our courts are ena-
bled to impose," Blackstone first explained, "may seem an exception to 
this rule." 145 "But," he noted, "the general nature of the punishment, viz. 
by fine or imprisonment, is in these cases fixed and determinate: though the 
duration and quantity of each must frequently vary, from the aggravations 
or otherwise of the offence, the quality and condition of the parties, and 
from innumerable other circumstances." 146 As Blackstone wrote: "Our 
statute law has not therefore often ascertained the quantity of fines, nor the 
common law ever; it directing such an offence to be punishment by fine, in 
general, without specifying the certain sum: which is fully sufficient, when 
we consider, that however unlimited the power of the court may seem, it is 
far from being wholly arbitrary; but it's discretion is regulated by law." 147 
"For the bill of rights," Blackstone emphasized, "has particularly declared, 
that excessive fines ought not to be imposed, nor cruel and unusual pun-
ishments inflicted. "148 
By the time James Madison drafted the U.S. Bill of Rights, he would 
have been quite familiar with William Blackstone's Commentaries. Madi-
son never became a lawyer, but he did intermittently study law.149 After 
graduating from the College of New Jersey in 1771, he stayed on "employ-
ing his times in miscellaneous studies; but not without a reference to the 
142 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at 370-71. 
143 !d. at 371 (italics in original). Death sentences at that time, of course, were mandatory. 
Scott W. Howe, Furman's Mythical Mandate, 40 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 435, 472 (2007) 
("mandatory death sentences were allowed at the time of the founding"). 
144 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at 371. 
145 !d. 
146 !d. (italics in original). 
147 !d. at 372. 
148 !d. Blackstone wrote that the English Bill of Rights "had a retrospect to some 
unprecedented proceedings in the court ofking's bench, in the reign of king James the 
second." Id. He also stated that "the bill of rights was only declaratory, throughout, of the 
old constitutional law ofthe land." Id. 
149 Mary Sarah Bilder, James Madison, Law Student and Demi-Lawyer, 28 LAW & HrsT. 
REv. 389, 390-93 (2010). 
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profession of the Law." 150 Upon returning to Virginia, he studied law for 
long stretches as he contemplated becoming a member of the Bar .151 The 
law books Madison read is not clear, but in 1773 Madison wrote that he 
intended "to read Law occasionally and have procured books for that pur-
pose."152 Madison even asked William Bradford, his closest college friend, 
to send him a list of the books Bradford planned to read to become a law-
yer.153 In Pennsylvania, Bradford-a penal reformer-would personally 
lead efforts to restrict that state's death penalty to first-degree murderers. 
And Bradford was even willing to contemplate that evidence might show 
one day that executions were unnecessary for those murderers, too.154 
Blackstone's Commentaries, which also communicated Cesare Becca-
ria's ideas to a much wider audience/55 were highly influential in the Amer-
ican colonies and early America.156 Bradford-who later became the Attor-
ney General of the United States and who greatly admired Beccaria's trea-
tise157-specifically wrote of Blackstone's Commentaries, telling Madison 
of that title: "I am most pleased with & find but little of that disagreeable 
dryness I was taught to expect." 158 In 1783, Madison recommended that 
Congress acquire a copy of Blackstone's Commentaries; in 1785, while 
trying to gain passage of Jefferson's Virginia bill to proportion crimes and 
punishments, a bill that would have severely curtailed capital punishment, 
Madison took notes on Blackstone's treatise; and at the 1787 Constitu-
tional Convention in Philadelphia, in a debate over an ex post facto provi-
sion, Madison recorded a reference to Blackstone's Commentaries made by 
John Dickinson.159 
150 !d. at 393-94. 
151 Id. at 394, 396-98, 402-03. 
152 Id. at 394. 
153 Id. at 394-95. 
154 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 84-91. 
155 See Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria's Vision, supra note 9 (describing Cesare Beccaria's 
influence on American penal reform). 
156 Kathryn Preyer, "Cesare Beccaria and the Founding Fathers," in BLACKSTONE IN 
AMERICA: SELECTED ESSAYS OF KATHRYN PREYER 241 (Mary Sarah Bilder, Maeva 
Marcus & R. Kent Newmyer eds., 2009)("Blackstone's references to Beccaria in his 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, published between 1765 and 1769 and widely 
available in the colonies, may have communicated Beccaria's theories to a wider audience 
than read the original."). 
157 Letter from William Bradford, Jr. to Luigi Castiglioni (Aug. 10, 1786), reprinted in 
LUIGI CASTIGLIONI'S VIAGGIO: TRAVELS IN THE UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA 1785-
1787, 313-14 (Antonio Pace ed., 1983) ("The name of Beccaria has become familiar in 
Pennsylvania, his authority has become great, and his principles have spread among all 
classes of persons and impressed themselves deeply in the hearts of our citizens."). 
158 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at 399. 
159 Id. at 395, 399. Thomas Jefferson also recommended that aspiring lawyers read 
Blackstone's Commentaries. !d. at 398; BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 
54. 
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Blackstone's Commentaries-as with early American legal treatises 
such as Zephaniah Swift's System of the Laws of the State of Connecti-
cut160 and Tucker's Blackstone161-not only acknowledged the use of death 
160 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 105-106 
(1795) ("The power of justices of the peace, is not so expressly defined respecting 
corporal punishments, as pecuniary penalty; they can however, inflict no corporal 
punishment, but whipping, setting in the stocks, and imprisonment."); id. at 181 ("Action 
of debt, will not lie upon a statute where the consequence of a conviction, is to subject the 
party to a corporal punishment."); id. at 184 (noting "cases where corporal punishment is 
to be inflicted"); id. at 185 ("where corporal punishment is to be inflicted, debt, assumpsit, 
or action on statute will not lie"); id. at 232 ("A juror who has been convicted of ... any 
other infamous corporal punishment, may be challenged."); id. at 239 (noting that a 
person who "has stood ... in the pillory, or has been stigmatized or cropped" as a result of 
a conviction associated with an "infamous judgment" shall be excluded from testifYing); 
id. at 295 ("For a few of the most enormous crimes, the punishment was death, and for the 
rest, corporal pains and pecuniary penalties were inflicted, according to the nature of the 
offense."); id. at 296 (noting that "corporal and pecuniary punishments are inflicted" for 
crimes not punishable by death or imprisonment in "New-Gate"); id. at 297 ("corporal 
pains and pecuniary penalties may be proportioned in such a manner as to subserve the 
interest of society: that corporal punishment is proper for those crimes which are 
infamous and bad in their own nature"); id. at 318 ("If the offender is unable to pay the 
forfeiture of twenty pounds, he shall be set in the pillory for one hour, in the county town 
where the offense was committed or next adjoining to the place, and have both his ears 
nailed."); id. at 320-211 (noting that the punishments for "Blasphemy by the Statute" are 
"whipping not exceeding forty stripes, and setting in the pillory one hour" and that 
"Blasphemy at common law" is a crime "punishable by fine and imprisonment, and other 
infamous corporal punishment"); id. at 330 (noting the "corporal punishment not 
exceeding ten stripes" was a punishment for fornication); id. at 347 (noting that libel is 
punishable by "fine, imprisonment, and pillory at the discretion of the court"); id. at 352 
(noting that cheating is "punishable by fine, imprisonment and pillory"); id. at 356 (noting 
that conspiracy "is punished by fine, imprisonment, and pillory"); id. at 365 (noting that 
the punishment of misdemeanors "must be fine, imprisonment and pillory, which are the 
common law punishments"); id. at 392 (referring to cases "where corporal punishment 
must be inflicted"); id. at 405 ("Whenever a statute creates a crime, it inflicts some 
specific punishment. The punishments at common law are fine, imprisonment and 
pillory."). 
161 2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARY: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE 
(1803), ch. 14 ("Of Master and Servant") ("A master may by law correct his apprentice or 
servant for negligence or other misbehavior, so it be done with moderation: though, if the 
master's wife beats him, it is good cause of departure. But if any servant, workman, or 
laborer assaults his master or dame, he shall suffer one year's imprisonment, and other 
open corporal punishment, not extending to life or limb."); id. at Note H ("wherever the 
benefit of clergy is allowed to a slave, the court, besides burning him in the hand (the 
usual punishment inflicted on free persons) may inflict such further corporal punishment 
as they may think fit"); id. ("A slave convicted of hog-stealing, shall, for the first offense, 
receive thirty-nine lashes: any other person twenty-five ... The punishment for the second 
and third offense, of this kind, is the same in the case of a free person, as of a slave, 
namely, by the pillory and loss of ears, for the second offense ... "); id. ("we must not 
forget, that many actions, which are either not punishable at all, when perpetrated by a 
white person, or at most, by fine and imprisonment, only, are liable to severe corporal 
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as a punishment, but also described in multiple instances how corporal 
punishments were-or had been-used to punish crimes.162 In Blackstone's 
Commentaries, one finds specific references to "corporal punishment," 163 
including the pillory/64 whipping/65 and ear cropping.166 "[I]t is usual to 
punishment, when done by a slave; nay, even to death itself, in some cases"); id. 
("Resistance to a white person, in any case, was, formerly, and now, in any case, except a 
wanton assault on the negroe or mulattoe, is punishable by whipping."); id. ("Slaves, by 
these and other acts, are prohibited from going abroad without leave, in writing from their 
masters, and if they do, they may be whipped ... "); id. ("By the act of 1723, c. 4, it was 
enacted, that when any negroe or mulattoe shall be found, upon due proof made, or 
pregnant circumstances, to have given false testimony, every such offender shall, without 
further trial, have his ears successively nailed to the pillory for the space of an hour, and 
then cut off, and moreover receive thirty-nine lashes on his bare back, or such other 
punishment as the court shall think proper, not extending to life or limb. This act, with the 
exception of the words pregnant circumstances, was re-enacted in 1792."). 
162 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at 12 (referencing infliction of"corporal punishments" 
as punishment for offenders); id. at 123 ("for this species of contempt a man may not only 
be fined and imprisoned, but suffer the pillory or other infamous corporal punishment"); 
id. at 125-26 (noting the use of"corporal punishment" to punish those "guilty of a high 
misprison"); id. at 138 (noting that "corporal and pecuniary punishments, exile and 
perpetual infamy, are more suited to the genius of the English law"); id. at 151 (noting 
that the punishment for libel "is fine, and such corporal punishment as the court in their 
discretion shall inflict"); id. at 173 (noting that "corporal punishment" is inflicted "as in 
case of wilful perjury"); id. at 175 (noting that "corporal and pecuniary" punishments are 
assigned for killing game "at unseasonable times of the year"); id. at 217 (noting that 
"ignominious corporal penalties" may be imposed for "a breach of the king's peace"); id. 
at 237 (noting that "corporal punishment" had "been found necessary" to punish theft 
where the offender has no property, though stating that "how far this corporal punishment 
ought to extend, is what has occasioned the doubt"). 
163 Id. at 59 (in a section on offenses "against God and religion" and "blasphemy," stating 
that "[t]hese are offenses punishable at common law by fine and imprisonment, or other 
infamous corporal punishment"); id. at 61-62 (in a section on offenders who are "religious 
impostors," noting that such offenses "are punishable by the temporal courts with fme, 
imprisonment, and infamous corporal punishment"); id. at 65 (stating that the "temporal 
punishment for having bastard children" was not specified in the statute of Elizabeth but 
"that a corporal punishment was intended"); id. at 70-71 (noting that "corporal 
punishment" shall be inflicted upon offenders convicted of violating the rights of 
ambassadors). 
164 Id. at 61 ("persons pretending to use witchcraft, tell fortunes, or discover stolen goods 
by skill in the occult sciences, is still deservedly punished with a year's imprisonment, 
and standing four times in the pillory"); id. at 137 (in a section on the punishment of 
perjury, noting that the punishment by statute was "to stand with both ears nailed to the 
pillory"); id. at 158 ("any deceitful practice, in cozening another by artful means, whether 
in matters of trade or otherwise, as by playing with false dice, or the like, is punishable 
with fine, imprisonment, and pillory"); id. (anyone defrauding another of valuable chattels 
"shall suffer such punishment by imprisonment, fine, pillory, transportation, whipping, or 
other corporal pain, as the court shall direct"); id. at 158-59 (the third offense of 
"ENGROSSING"-that is, "getting into one's possession, or buying up, of com or other 
dead victuals, with intent to sell them again"-is a forfeiture of "all his goods" and to be 
"set in the pillory, and imprisoned at the king's pleasure"). 
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award judgment of the pillory," Blackstone noted in one instance.167 Simi-
lar references to corporal punishments are also found in early American 
legal commentaries.168 In the founding era, both corporal and capital pun-
ishments were thus woven into the fabric of English and American law. 
And at that time, both kinds of punishments-at least in certain forms-
were considered usual or customary. 
C. The Eighth Amendment and Its Equivalents 
The "cruel and unusual punishments" phrase first found its way into 
American law through the Virginia Declaration of Rights. 169 Drafted in 
1776 by Virginia plantation owner George Mason, the applicable provi-
sion of that natural rights-oriented legal document read in full: "That ex-
cessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted."170 Before the Revolutionary War, Ma-
son himself had expressed the belief that Americans should be afforded the 
same rights as Englishmen, 171 so it is hardly surprising that he looked to 
English law when he did his own legal drafting. Mason later explicitly con-
tended that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments was 
intended to prohibit "torture"172-a concept now explicitly defined by in-
165 Id. at 238 ("the inferior species of theft, or petit larceny, is only punished by whipping 
at common law"). 
166 Id. at 159-60 (noting the use of the pillory and "loss of one ear" as punishments for 
monopolists). 
167 !d. at 217. 
168 6 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAWS 667 
(1824) (citing a "July, 1795, Lincoln County" case known as "Avery's case" in which 
Avery was prosecuted for the crime of blasphemy and "sentenced to be set on the gallows 
one hour, and to be whipped twenty stripes"); id. at 676 (noting that, "[i]n 1785, the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts passed a law" providing that "if any man or woman 
shall commit adultery," the offender "shall be set on the gallows with a rope &c. one 
hour" and "be publicly whipped, not exceeding thirty-nine stripes"); id. at 677 (noting that 
"in 1642, the Colony legislature passed an act" making fornication a crime and permitting 
"corporal punishment" and that a Massachusetts act of March 15, 1786, provided for a 
fine for fornication but further provided that if the offender failed to pay his fine "he may 
be whipped, not exceeding ten stripes"); id. at 719 (referencing "Mass. Act, July 4, 1786, 
revised, in substance, March 15, 1805," and noting, "This act provides, (among many 
other things,) that if any person 'shall forge or counterfeit any silver or gold money, or 
coin, that is or shall be current in this Commonwealth,' he shall be fined, set in the pillory, 
have an ear cut off, set on the gallows, be whipped, and sentenced to hard labour, not 
above seven years."). 
169 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § IX (June 12, 1776). 
170 !d. 
171 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 177 ("[A]s early as 1766, Mason 
himself had asserted that American colonists 'clainl Nothing but the Liberty & Privileges 
of Englishmen, in the same degree, as if we had still continued among or Brethren in 
Great Britain."'). 
172 Id. at 187-88. Mason expressed this view at Virginia's ratification convention when the 
Constitution itself was being considered. Mason-who vehemently believed that a 
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ternationallaw,173 what the Founding Fathers called the "Law of Nations" 
in the U.S. Constitution.174 
After the Virginia Declaration of Rights was approved on June 12, 
1776,175 other states soon followed suit. In August 1776, Maryland dele-
gates approved their own declaration, with two clauses specifically address-
ing cruel punishments.176 Clause 14 read: "That sanguinary laws ought to 
be avoided, as far as is consistent with the safety of the State; and no law, 
to inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties, 177 ought to be made in any 
national bill of rights was necessary-said of his handiwork, the Virginia Declaration of 
Rights, that a "clause of the bill of rights provided that no cruel and unusual punishments 
shall be inflicted; therefore, torture was included in the prohibition." Id. 
173 The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment provides as follows: 
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe 
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions. 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, art. 1, G.A. res. 39/45 [armex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. 
Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 1987]. The last line of that definition of 
torture, of course, begs the question of whether the physical or mental "pain or suffering" 
arising from, inherent in, and incidental to the death penalty is itself"lawful" under the 
Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. If death sentences and 
executions are found to be both cruel and unusual, they are-plain and simple-
unconstitutional. 
174 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (giving Congress the power "[t]o define and punish 
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of 
Nations"). 
175 ROGER L. KEMP, ED., DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: A COLLECTION OF 
ESSENTIAL WORKS 52 (2010). 
176 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 178. 
177 The U.S. Constitution prohibited bills of attainder, legislative acts that in earlier times 
inflicted the punishment of death-either directly or conditionally-without a judicial 
trial. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9; Cunrmings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 323-24 (1866); see also 
Nixon v. Administrator for General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 473 (1977) ("In England a 
bill of attainder originally connoted a parliamentary Act sentencing a named individual or 
identifiable members of a group to death."). If the punishment were to be less than death, 
the act was termed "a bill of pains and penalties." Cummings, 71 U.S. at 323; see also 
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317 n.6 (1946) ("Originally a judgment of death 
was necessary to attaint and the consequences of attainder were forfeiture and corruption 
of blood. If the judgment was lesser punishment than death there was no attaint and the 
bill was one of pains and penalties. Practically all the American precedents are bills of 
pains and penalties.") (citations omitted); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474 ("Generally addressed to 
persons considered disloyal to the Crown or State, 'pains and penalties' historically 
consisted of a wide array of punishments: commonly included were imprisonment, 
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case, or at any time hereafter." 178 Clause 22 further provided: "That exces-
sive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or 
unusual punishments inflicted, by the courts of law." 179 Likewise, in Sep-
tember 1776, Delaware adopted a declaration of rights providing "[t]hat 
excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel or unusual punishments inflicted." 180 Similar provisions were also 
soon put in place in North Carolina,181 Massachusetts,182 New Hamp-
shire,183 and New York.184 
By the time of the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, 
there was already a division among the states between provisions prohibit-
ing "cruel and unusual punishments" and those barring "cruel or unusual 
punishments." 185 While Virginia and New York forbade "cruel and unusu-
al" punishments, other states chose to prohibit "cruel or unusual" punish-
ments. There was also a division among American states as to whether 
such provisions were absolute prohibitions or something less. Some provi-
sions used the mandatory language of "shall" and restricted the actions of 
all branches of government, while others seemed more hortatory or less 
restrictive, using "ought" or only restricting the actions of courts and mag-
istrates.186 The way in which individual states adopted such protections and 
banishment, and the punitive confiscation of property by the sovereign."). The Supreme 
Court has ruled that "[w]ithin the meaning of the [U.S.] Constitution, bills of attainder 
include bills of pains and penalties." Cummings, 71 U.S. at 323; see also Lovett, 328 U.S. 
at 317 n.6 ("The Constitution in prohibiting bills of attainder undoubtedly included bills 
of pains and penalties as the majority in the Cummings case held."); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 
473-74 ("Article I, § 9, however, also proscribes enactments originally characterized as 
bills of pains and penalties, that is, legislative Acts inflicting punishment other than 
execution."). 
178 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 178. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § X (1776) ("That excessive bail should not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted."). 
182 MAss. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XXVI (1780) ("No magistrate or court of law 
shall demand excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual 
punishments."). 
183 N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS, art. XXXIII (1784) ("No magistrate or court of law shall demand 
excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual 
punishments."). 
184 N.Y. BILL OF RIGHTS (1787) ("That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). 
185 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991). 
186 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 180, 184. The following excerpt from 
a Massachusetts author's book-a guide for youth, looking at Massachusetts' 
constitution-illustrates how restraints on legislatures were viewed separate from those on 
magistrates and courts: 
Q. What restraint does the constitution lay upon the Legislature, respecting the 
declaration of crimes? 
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in which lawmakers spoke of them, with seemingly little attention paid to 
whether a disjunctive or conjunctive word was used between "cruel" and 
"unusual," has led some scholars to label them "boilerplate" provisions.187 
There were, in fact, many different language variants employed in the 
late eighteenth century to express disdain for cruel or out-of-the-ordinary 
punishments.188 Virginia's provision counseled that "cruel and unusual" 
punishments "ought not" be inflicted, without any indication of whether 
the clause applied only to certain branches of government.189 In contrast, 
Maryland's provision barring "cruel or unusual punishments"-but also 
using the words "ought not"-only restricted "the courts of law." 190 
A. That no subject ought, in any case, or in any time, to be declared guilty of treason 
or felony by the Legislature. 
Q. Under what restraint, also, are our magistrates and courts oflaw? 
A. The constitution declares that they shall not demand excessive bail or sureties, 
impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual punishment. 
JOSEPH RICHARDSON, THE AMERICAN READER: A SELECTION OF LESSONS FOR READING 
AND SPEAKING WHOLLY FROM AMERICAN AUTHORS 41 (1810). 
187 See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The 
Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839, 840 (1969) (arguing "cruel and unusual" was a 
kind of"constitutional 'boilerplate"'); see also Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth 
Amendment, supra note 11, at 129 ("For many in the founding generation, it had become 
the verbiage of civility, and they were intent on employing it for whatever it was worth. 
Like the Latin Mass, it was valued by those for whom it was cultural heritage, whether 
understood or not."). 
188 Some commentators and judges have suggested that, in light of the lack of historical 
evidence surrounding its adoption, the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual" verbiage 
should not necessarily be read conjunctively. See Ved P. Nanda, Recent Developments in 
the United States and Internationally Regarding Capital Punishment-An Appraisal, 67 
ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 523, 549 (1993) ("As to the Court's interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment, opponents of capital punishment have argued that the Court should read the 
words 'cruel and unusual' disjunctively rather than conjunctively since there is no 
authoritative record of what the first Congress meant in using the phrase.") (quoting 
Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Capital Punishment: A Critique of the Political and Philosophical 
Thought Supporting the Justices' Positions, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. I, 100-101 (1992)). One 
law professor points out that the inherited "cruel and unusual punishments" language 
"was copied into the Eighth Amendment without extensive discussion of whether the 
'and' was conjunctive or disjunctive." Donnelly, supra, at 100 n.532. The Justices of the 
Supreme Court have themselves reached very different conclusions on the import of the 
words. Compare Furman, 408 U.S. at 242-47 (Douglas, J., concurring) and id. at 258-64 
(Brennan, J., concurring) with id. at 316-22 (Marshall, J., concurring) and id. at 376-83 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Constitution's use of the word "and" has also been debated 
in another context, that of the Necessary and Proper Clause. See Robert G. Natelson, The 
Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 243, 
265 ("At first glance, 'and' appears to be a conjunctive-a law must be 'necessary plus 
proper.' Bus as Professor Scott Burnham has pointed out, 'and' can have a disjunctive 
meaning as well. One might read the Necessary and Proper Clause as saying that a law 
must be necessary or proper.") (citing SCOTT J. BURNHAM, DRAFTING AND ANALYZING 
CONTRACTS 95 (3d ed. 2003)). 
189 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § IX (June 12, 1776) (emphasis added). 
190 MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 2 (1776) (emphasis added). 
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Whereas North Carolina's declaration proclaimed without reservation that 
"cruel or unusual" punishments "should not" be required,191 the Massa-
chusetts and New Hampshire provisions-barring "cruel or unusual pun-
ishments"-limited their applicability to magistrates and courts of law.192 
The Massachusetts and New Hampshire clauses instead provided that 
"[n]o magistrate or court of law shall ... inflict cruel or unusual punish-
ments."193 
Other states took their own approaches, with language variants-
whether subtle or otherwise-emerging in the eighteenth century. New 
York's Bill of Rights-approved on January 26, 1787-used more hortato-
ry language, reading "[t]hat excessive bail ought not to be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 194 
For its part, Pennsylvania's 1776 constitution-which lasted until 1790, 
when a new constitution took effect barring "cruel punishments" 195-chose 
to bar sanguinary and disproportionate punishments. Pennsylvania's 1776 
constitution specifically provided that "[t]he penal laws as heretofore used 
shall be reformed by the legislature of this state, as soon as may be, and 
punishments made in some cases less sanguinary, and in general more pro-
portionate to the crimes." 196 In the founding era, the term "sanguinary" 
was often used interchangeably with, or as a synonym for, "cruel."197 
191 N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, §X (1776) (emphasis added). 
192 MAss. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XXVI (1780) (emphasis added); N.H. BILL OF 
RIGHTS, art. XXXIII (1784) (emphasis added). 
193 !d. 
194 N.Y. BILL OF RIGHTS (1787). There was even internal division in Maryland's 1776 
Declaration of Rights as it prohibited both "cruel and unusual pains and penalties" while 
simultaneously barring "cruel or unusual punishments." MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §§ 
XIV, XXII (Aug. 14, 1776). The U.S. Constitution-which explicitly outlaws bills of 
attainder-has consistently been read to bar bills of pains and penalties, too, even though 
the Constitution itself makes no reference to "bills of pains and penalties." Selective Serv. 
Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984) ("At common 
law, bills of attainder often imposed the death penalty; lesser punishments were imposed 
by bills of pains and penalties. The Constitution proscribes these less penalties as well as 
those imposing death."). 
195 PA. CONST., art. IX, §XIII (1790). 
196 PA. CONST., § 38 (1776) (emphasis added); id. at§ 38 (calling for prisons to be 
constructed "to make sanguinary punishments less necessary"). South Carolina's 1778 
constitution also indicated that penal laws were to be reformed so that punishments would 
be "made in some cases less sanguinary, and in general more proportionate to the crime." 
S.C. CONST., art. XL (1778). 
197 See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 157 (C. C. Va. 1807) (the infamous English 
judge George Jeffreys is described as "bloodthirsty," with Jeffreys further characterized as 
"[t]hat sanguinary and cruel judge" who "treated every man who came to be tried before 
him as a traitor"); Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 924, 946 (C.C. Pa. 1800) (a reference to 
"[ c ]rue! measures" follows a sentence containing the phrase "sanguinary bosom"). The 
word "murderous," according to Webster's New International Dicitionary, is itself 
"characterized by, or causing murder or bloodshed; having the purpose or quality of 
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The First Congress actually voted to approve both the "cruel and unu-
sual" and "cruel or unusual" language variants within weeks of one anoth-
er.198 The Northwest Ordinance, first adopted by the Continental Congress 
on July 13, 1787, then re-approved by the First Congress on July 14, 1789, 
contained the following provision: "All fines shall be moderate; and no 
cruel or unusual punishments shall be inflicted." 199 The Northwest Ordi-
nance, adopted to govern territory "northwest of the river Ohio," was 
drafted by Massachusetts lawyer Nathan Dane and its "cruel or unusual" 
provision was-not surprisingly-based in part on the language in Massa-
chusetts' 1780 constitution.200 That constitution-still in effect to this day, 
making it America's oldest operating constitution-was largely the handi-
work of John Adams, later the second President of the United States.201 
Adams passionately quoted Beccaria's treatise in 1770 in his defense of 
British soldiers accused of murder following the Boston Massacre, and in 
1786 he also copied the following Beccaria quotation into his diary: "Every 
Act of Authority, of one Man over another for which there is not an abso-
lute Necessity, is tyrannical."202 
The Eighth Amendment text itself, crafted by James Madison and in-
troduced to the First Congress on June 8, 1789, borrowed the "cruel and 
unusual punishments" language from the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 
his home state.203 Because executions were then the standard punishment 
for various crimes, it is unsurprising that members of Congress adopted the 
Eighth Amendment language with little debate. As death sentences were 
then mandatory for certain crimes, the founders certainly had little reason 
to engage in extended debate about whether executions were unusual. At 
that time, they clearly weren't. Some early Americans, such as Dr. Benja-
min Rush, plainly thought executions cruel,204 but it was not realistic to 
then argue that executions were unusual. The record reflects that Congress 
approved the language of the Eighth Amendment in September 1789205 by 
a "considerable majority," having previously adopted "without issue" the 
"cruel or unusual punishments" provision of Northwest Ordinance just 
weeks earlier.206 
murder; bloody; sanguinary, bloodthirsty, fell savage, cruel." Savannah News-Press, Inc. 
v. J. R. Harley, Ill S.E.2 259, 263 (Ga. Ct. App. 1959). 
198 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 118-19. 
199 Id.; Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. II, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789). 
200 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 118. 
201 Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania's 
Radica/1776 Constitution and Its Influences on American Constitutionalism, 62 TEMP. L. 
REv. 541, 569 (1989). 
202 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 50. 
203 !d. at 119. 
204 !d. at 66-84. 
205 The flrst ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution were submitted to the states by 
Congress on September 25, 1789. 1 Stat. 97 (1789). 
206 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 119. A more detailed history of the 
adoption of the Northwest Ordinance and the debate surrounding the Eighth 
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The "cruel and unusual" catchphrase was not limited to its use in the 
Eighth Amendment. That language also came to be used extensively in le-
gal proceedings relating to whether slaves or seamen had been mistreated, 
indicating that the "cruel and unusual" terminology carried with it an ele-
ment of adjudicatory fact-finding, whether for judge or jury.207 Alabama, 
Florida and Mississippi laws, to protect slave owners' interests, prohibited 
the infliction of "cruel or unusual punishments"208 while other laws pro-
hibited "cruel treatment" or "cruel punishment" or barred chastisements 
carried out with "unusual rigor."209 In Mann v. Trabue,210 for instance, the 
Missouri Supreme Court wrote in 1827 that a slave's death was brought 
about by "cruel and unusual treatment."211 And in State v. Maner,212 an 
1834 case, the South Carolina Court of Appeals-in construing that state's 
1740 prohibition of "cruel punishment"-wrote that the state's law 
"makes any unusual and cruel treatment of a slave an indictable of-
fense."213 
Early American laws, in fact, frequently regulated the treatment of 
slaves, with the concept of cruelty-and sometimes unusualness-present 
in such laws.214 For example, an early South Carolina law-known as "the 
negro Act of 1740"-expressly forbade anyone from "willfilly" cutting out 
a slave's tongue; putting out a slave's eye; castrating or "cruelly" scalding, 
burning or depriving a slave "of any limb, or member"; or from inflicting 
"any other cruel punishment, other than by whipping, or beating with a 
horse-whip, cow-skin, switch, or small stick, or by putting irons on, or 
Amendment's ratification can be found in my recent book, Cruel and Unusual: The 
American Death Penalty and the Founders' Eighth Amendment. !d. at 118-19, 162-71. 
207 Ryan, supra note 67, at 557 ("Historically, juries have been trusted to decide issues 
like Eighth Amendment cruelty that we might today consider questions of law."). 
208 "An Act respecting slaves," ch. 1, § 16 (passed Mar. 6, 1805), reprinted in HARRY 
TOULMIN, ED., A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA: CONTAINING THE 
STATUTES AND RESOLUTIONS IN FORCE AT THE END OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN 
JANUARY, 1823, at 631 (1823); "An act, to reduce into one, the several acts, concerning 
slaves, free negroes, and mulattoes," ch. 73, § 44 (passed June 18, 1822), reprinted in THE 
REVISED CODE OF THE LAWS OF MISSISSIPPI 379 (1824); "An Act relating to Crimes and 
Misdemeanors committed by Slaves, free Negroes, and Mulattoes,"§ 31 (approved Nov. 
21, 1828), reprinted in JOHN P. DuvAL, ED., COMPILATION OF THE PuBLIC ACTS OF THE 
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE TERRITORY OF FLORIDA, PASSED PRIOR TO 1840, at 223 
(1839); ANDREW FEDE, PEOPLE WITHOUT RIGHTS: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE 
FUNDAMENTALS OF THELAWOF SLAVERY IN THE U.S. SOUTH 111 (1992) (discussing 
Alabama's law); see also id. at 112 ("There are several cases in which masters were 
indicted for cruel and unusual punishment."); id. ("The only reported conviction for a 
master for cruel punishment is reported in the 1843 Alabama case of Turnipseed v. State. 
The master was fined the minimum sum-fifty dollars."). 
209 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 217. 
210 1 Mo. 709, 1827 WL 1987 (1827). 
211 !d. at * 1. 
212 2 Hill453, 1834 WL 1528 (S.C. App. 1834). 
213 !d. at * 1. 
214 THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860, at 182-91 (1999). 
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confining, or imprisoning such slave."215 In enacting that law, South Caro-
lina's legislature recited that "cruelty is not only highly unbecoming those 
who profess themselves Christians, but is odious in the eyes of all men who 
have any sense of virtue or humanity. "216 
Seamen, too, were expressly protected from "cruel and unusual pun-
ishment." Thus, a federal law, passed by Congress and approved on March 
3, 1835, provided in pertinent part: 
[I]f any master or other officer, of any American ship or vessel on the high 
seas ... shall, from malice, hatred, or revenge, and without justifiable 
cause, beat, wound, or imprison any one or more of the crew of such ship 
or vessel, or withhold from them suitable food or nourishment, or inflict 
upon them any cruel and unusual punishment, every such person so of-
fending shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine, not exceeding 
one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding five years, or by 
both, according to the nature and aggravation of the offence.217 
Five years later, Congress added another provision respecting mari-
ners that spoke of "unusual or cruel treatment. "218 One mid-nineteenth-
century American pleading guide, reflecting the sentiment of the time, dedi-
cated an entire section to the topic that was titled: "For inflicting cruel and 
unusual punishment on one of the crew of a vessel, &c. "219 
In Southern states, the "unusual" language was often seen as a way to 
validate then-prevailing customs in relation to the treatment and punish-
ment of slaves. In discussing Louisiana's prohibition on chastising slaves 
with "unusual rigor," anti-slavery activist William Goodell-a journalist 
215 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 217. 
216 GEORGE M. STROUD, SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL 
STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 39 (1827), reprinted in PAUL FINKELMAN, ED., 
SLAVERY, RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1700-1872, at 195 (2007). 
217 "An Act in amendment of the acts for the punishment of offenses against the United 
States," Public Law No. 28, § 3, reprinted in GEORGE SHARSWOOD, ED., THE PUBLIC AND 
GENERAL STATUTES PASSED BY THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (FROM 
1828 TO 1836 INCLUSIVE) 2417 (1837) & 5 THE MILITARY AND NAVAL MAGAZINE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, FROM MARCH, 1835, TO SEPTEMBER, 1835, at 316 (1835). 
218 That law provided as follows: 
In all cases where deserters are apprehended, the consul or commercial agent shall inquire 
into the facts; and, if satisfied that the desertion was caused by unusual or cruel treatment, 
the mariner shall be discharged, and receive, in addition to his wages to the time of the 
discharge, three months' pay; and the officer discharging him shall enter upon the crew-
list and shipping articles the cause of discharge, and the particulars in which the cruelty or 
unusual treatment consisted, and subscribe his name thereto officially. 
"An Act in addition to the several acts regulating the shipment and discharge of seamen, 
and the duties of consuls," 26th Cong., Sess. 1, ch. XL VIII, § 17, reprinted in RICHARD 
PETERS, ED., THE PUBLIC STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FROM 
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN 1789, TO MARCH 3, 1845, at 396-97 (1846). 
219 FRANCIS WHARTON, PRECEDENTS OF INDICTMENTS AND PLEAS, ADAPTED TO THE USE 
BOTH OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THOSE OF ALL THE SEVERAL STATES 540 
(1849) (italics in original). 
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who wrote extensively about slavery220-saw "something in this singular 
phraseology that requires study. "221 "Such a law, instead of correcting pre-
vailing usages," Goodell lamented, "receives its definition from them. "222 
As Goodell explained: "That which is 'usual' is authorized, whatever it 
may be, short of maiming mutilation, and murder. And the more rigorous, 
severe, and cruel may be the prevailing usages of a community, the more 
rigorous, severe, and cruel they are expressly authorized to be. "223 In other 
words, even apart from their use by judges in criminal cases and in ordi-
nary parlance by the public at-large, the cruel and unusual concepts-by 
virtue of their placement in various laws-would have been familiar to 
masters and slave overseers in the context of legal proceedings. 
In England and the United States, the concepts of cruelty and unusu-
alness have, in fact, long been associated with both the criminal law and 
the institution of slavery.224 "The individual is referred, as a standard of 
lawful action," Goodell emphasized in his book, "to the common practices 
of his neighbors around him. What is 'usual' among them is lawful for 
him.'ms "'Unusual rigor,"' Goodell added, "must be defined in the light of 
220 Biography ofWilliam Goodell, RG 30/29 -William Goodell Family Papers, Oberlin 
College Archives, available at 
http://www.oberlin.edu/archive!holdings/finding/RG30/SG29/biography.html. 
221 WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: ITS 
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND ILLUSTRATIVE 
FACTS 161 (2d ed. 1853). 
222 !d. at 161-62 (italics in original). 
223 !d. at 162 (italics in original). 
224 THE MIGHTY DESTROYER DISPLAYED, IN SOME ACCOUNT OF THE DREADFUL HA VOCK 
MADE BY THE MISTAKEN USE AS WELL AS ABUSE OF DISTILLED SPIRITUOUS LIQUORS 26 
(1774) ("Sir I Dalrymple in his memoirs says that the Parliament in the declaration of 
right asserted, that pitying and respecting human nature, no cruel and unusual punishment 
should be inflicted. How Britons can so readily admit of a change in their disposition and 
sentiments, as to practice in America what they abhor and detested in Britain, can be 
accounted for on no other principle, but as being the natural effect of slave-keeping, 
which as the celebrated Montesquieu observes, 'insensibly accustoms those who are in the 
practice of it, to want all moral virtues, to become haughty, hasty hard hearted, passionate, 
voluptuous and cruel."') (italics in original); Trials of Major Bonnet and others, 5 George 
1 (Nov. 10, 1718) ("May it please your honours, and you gentlemen of the Jury; the 
prisoner who now stands arraigned at the bar, has been guilty of many piracies, committed 
many robberies, ruined many families, and been the occasion of many most cruel and 
inhuman murders .... "), reprinted in XV T. B. HOWELL, COMP., A COMPLETE COLLECTION 
OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND 
MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, at 1291 (1816). 
225 WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: ITS 
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND ILLUSTRATIVE 
FACTS 162 (2d ed. 1853) (italics in original). Writing at a time before the Fourteenth 
Amendment's ratification, William Goodell elaborated further in this vein: 
If it is "usuar' to "chastise" a slave by inflicting on him a hundred lashes, it is lawful to do 
so. If it is "usuar' to add five hundred lashes more, it is equally lawful! In short, the 
current usages of the fraternity of slaveholders (with the exceptions specified) are 
proclaimed, by the Civil Code of Louisiana, to constitute the law. This approximates 
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what is usual."226 "We may infer," he said, considering what was usually 
done in places like Louisiana and South Carolina, "that 'cruel punishment' 
by 'whipping or beating with a horsewhip, cowskin, switch, or small stick, 
or by putting irons on, or confining or imprisoning,' was not 'unusual' and 
consequently not forbidden by the new Civil Code. "227 Not only were exe-
cutions used in places such as Virginia to quell slave rebellions, but the use 
of the lash to punish slaves was extraordinarily common, too.228 
Some legal commentators, noting their close proximity in codes, even 
saw the "cruel" and "unusual" terms as synonymous. In 1827, Pennsylva-
closely to the abrogation oflaw, so far as slaveholders are concerned, or the abdication of 
supremacy by the civil government in their favor. The condition of this great nation of 
twenty millions of people, controlled by a little more than one hundred thousand 
slaveholders, seem but an expansion of this idea. 
Id. (italics in original). 
226 Id. (italics in original). 
227 /d. at 162-63. In discussing North Carolina's 1798 law that exempted from the state's 
murder statute situations in which the slave was resisting "his lawful owner or master" or 
in which any slave died through the use of"moderate correction," Goodell also argued: 
"In the light of this, we may understand also the prohibition of 'unusual punishment.' It 
does not always reach the case of those who die under the lash, for even this may be 
'moderate correction,' and consequently not 'unusual."' !d. at 180-82 (italics in original). 
Elsewhere, Goodell emphasized as follows: 
If any further light is wanted on that feature of the Slave Code that insultingly proffers 
to the slave its protection from "unusuar' punishments, the inquirer might see what 
punishments are "usuar' by looking over the advertisements and paragraphs of a dozen 
leading Southern journals, from as many different States, for twelve months. Cut out, 
arranged, and pasted in a scrap-book, with an index, they would furnish him with a 
copious and authentic commentary on the slave laws .... 
He will find there numerous advertisements of runaway slaves, and of jailers' notices 
of apprehension and commitments of them, in which the descriptions specifY scars from 
whipping, from iron collars, from gun-shots, from brandings, &c., &c .... All this, as the 
reader now knows, is authorized by law-not prohibited as "unusual." 
Then comes another class, which, if not expressly authorized, are found by their 
frequency to be outside of the prohibited pale of"unusual." ... 
One case, on page 15 of Mr. Weld's book, is doubtless a specimen of tens, if not 
hundreds of thousands; assuredly it does not come under the condemnation of being 
"unusual." The "owner" of a female slave, who was a Methodist, proposed a criminal 
intercourse with her: she refused. He sent her to the "overseer" to be flogged. Again he 
made advances-again she refused, and again she was flogged! Afterwards she yielded to 
his adulterous wishes! And now, the attentive reader of the preceding pages will have 
learned that all this was strictly within the protection of the law! 
!d. at 218-20 (italics in original); see also CLAYTON E. JEWETT& JOHN 0. ALLEN, 
SLAVERY IN THE SOUTH: A STATE-BY-STATE HISTORY 245 (2004) ("Though slaves in 
theory were protected from cruel and unusual punishment, practice reveals uncountable 
instances of physical abuse through whipping. Most owners did not view this method of 
punishment as cruel or unusual."). 
228 DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, GABRIEL'S REBELLION: THE VIRGINIA SLAVE CONSPIRACIES OF 
1800 AND 1802, at 111-12, 187 (1993); KENNETH S. GREENBERG, ED., NAT TURNER: A 
SLAVEREBELLIONINHISTORY AND MEMORY 3, 71, 73, 146, 195 (2003). 
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nia lawyer George M. Stroud,229 in commenting on Mississippi's law pro-
hibiting the "cruel or unusual punishment" of slaves, wrote: '"Cruel' and 
'unusual,' connected as they are by the disjunctive 'or,' mean precisely the 
same thing, and will be so construed by the court. And what horrible bar-
barities may be exposed under the name of usual punishments, the reader 
will be enabled to judge by recurring to the laws of South Carolina and 
Louisiana, contained on the preceding pages. "230 Stroud also emphasized 
that, as a practical matter, such anti-cruelty laws "cannot be enforced" 
because of "the exclusion of the testimony" of "those who are not white" 
during "the trial of a white person. "231 
229 An 1817 graduate of Princeton College, George Stroud served in the Pennsylvania 
legislature in 1824, published his book on the laws of slavery in 1827, and later became a 
judge in Philadelphia. 8 WAYNE CUTLER, ED., CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES K. POLK 7 
(1993). 
230 GEORGE M. STROUD, SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL 
STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 42 (1827), reprinted in PAUL FINKELMAN, ED., 
SLAVERY, RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1700-1872, at 198 (2007). In 
commenting on that same law, Charles Elliott-an opponent of slavery-said much the 
same thing in 1850, writing: "Besides, cruel or unusual mean precisely the same thing, 
and will be so construed by the court." 1 CHARLES ELLIOTT, SINFULNESS OF AMERICAN 
SLAVERY 194 (1850) (italics in original). As Elliot, paraphrasing Stroud's earlier work, 
wrote: "And what horrible cruelties may be inflicted under the name of usual 
punishments," that writer lamented, "may be gathered from the laws of South Carolina 
and Louisiana." Id. at 194-95 (italics in original). 
In construing Mississippi's "cruel or unusual punishment" prohibition, William 
Goodell emphasized that a slave was treated as "a 'chattel'-a 'thing'-not a person." 
WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: ITS 
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES SHOWN BY ITS STATUTES, JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND ILLUSTRATIVE 
FACTS 165 (2d ed. 1853). "And it is only an 'unusual' punishment that is forbidden!" 
Goodell recorded, adding: "The masters and overseers have only to repeat their excessive 
punishments so frequently that they become 'usual,' and the statute does not apply to 
them! In this view it holds out an inducement to render the most cruel inflictions usual." 
Id. (italics in original). "It is incredible," Goodell concluded, "that owners and overseers 
should be much restrained by the provisions of this act." !d. 
231 GEORGE M. STROUD, SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL 
STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 36 (1827), reprinted in PAUL FINKELMAN, ED., 
SLAVERY, RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1700-1872, at 192 (2007)). This 
comment was made under the following heading: "Prop. III. THE MASTER MAY, AT HIS 
DISCRETION, INFLICT ANY SPECIES OF PUNISHMENT UPON THE PERSON OF HIS SLAVE." !d. at 
35. In that section, Stroud added that at least "so far as regards the pages of the statute 
book:' were concerned "the life at least of the slave, is safe from the authorized violence 
of the master." !d. at 36 (italics in original). Stroud then added: "There was a time in 
many, if not in all the slave-holding districts of our country, when the murder of a slave 
was followed by a pecuniary fine only. In one state, a change of the law in this respect has 
been very recent. At the present date, I am happy to say, the wilful, malicious and 
deliberate murder of a slave, by whomsoever perpetrated, is declared to be punishable 
with death in every state." Id. As Stroud concluded that section of his book: 
Upon a fair review of what has been written on the subject of this proposition, the result is 
found to be-That the master's power to inflict corporal punishments to any extent, short 
of life and limb, is fully sanctioned by law, in all the slave-holding states-that the 
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D. "Cruel" and "Unusual" Homicides and Beatings 
The "cruel and unusual" and "cruel or unusual" terminology has of-
ten likewise been used to describe beatings or assess the severity-or 
blameworthiness-of a killing.232 For example, in State v. Norris,233 the 
defendant Norris quarreled with a man and was beaten up, but then left 
the scene, got a deadly weapon, and returned to kill his antagonist, Na-
thaniel Daves.234 Just a few days later, Norris was charged and tried for the 
master, in at least two states, is expressly protected in using the horsewhip and cows kin, as 
instruments for beating his slave-that he may, with entire impunity, in the same states, 
load his slave with irons, or subject him to perpetual imprisonment whenever he may so 
choose-that for cruelly scalding, wilfully cutting out the tongue, putting out an eye, and 
for any other dismemberment, if proved, a fine of one hundred pounds currency only is 
incurred in South Carolina-that though in all the states the wilful, deliberate and 
malicious murder of the slave is now directed to be punished with death, yet, as in the 
case of a white offender, none except whites can give evidence, a conviction can seldom, 
if ever, take place. 
!d. at 43-44 (italics in original). 
232 State v. Norris, 2 N.C. 429, 1796 WL 327 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1796); see also In re 
Kottman, 2 Hill (SC) 363, 1834 WL 1576 * 1 ("[T]o shew that the Court ought not to 
interpose in favor of the father, affidavits were read, that the father had beaten this son in 
a cruel and unusual manner without any just cause."); People v. Rector, 19 Wend. 569 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Judicature 1838) ("Where there is no intent to kill, the offense may be 
either murder or manslaughter; the graduation of the crime depending on the manner in 
which it was committed and the other attending circumstances. When the act is done in 
committing, or attempting to commit a misdemeanor below the grade of felony, and the 
deceased is killed by misadventure; and when the killing is in a heat of passion, but in a 
cruel or unusual manner, or by a dangerous weapon, the crime may be only manslaughter: 
(2 R. S. 661, § 6, 10, 12;) but when perpetrated by an act imminently dangerous to others, 
and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, it will be murder. (!d. p. 657, § 
5.)."); "Court of Oyer and Terminer," NEW-YORKDAILYTRIBUNE (New-York, N.Y.), 
Sept. 24, 1850, at 3 (noting that Robert Moffat was "found guilty of manslaughter in the 
second degree" in causing the death of his wife where "the Court and Jury considered it 
taking life in a cruel and unusual manner, but not intending to take life"); see also Jacob 
v. State, 22 Tenn. 493, 1842 WL 1984 *2 (Tenn. 1842) (using the "cruel and unusual 
manner" phrase as regards a beating); Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 515, 551, 1822 
WL 1507 *22 (Mass. 1822) ("The man, with whose murder the prisoner is charged, was 
found beaten and mangled in a cruel manner."); Eckart v. Wilson, 1823 WL 2203 *4 (Pa. 
1823) (referring to "cruel, deliberate murder"); "An Outrage at Fort McHenry," THE 
JEFFERSONIAN (Stroudsburg, Pa.), July 19, 1855, at 2 (referring to "the most cruel and 
unusual chastisement" of a soldier). 
233 2 N.C. 429, 1796 WL 327 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1796). 
234 !d. at *5. The quarrel started on a Saturday night in a piazza after Norris and another 
man went to the house of a Mrs. Ramsay, where Daves and others were gathered. Though 
what happened and what led up to the fight was disputed, it was clear that Norris and 
Daves exchanged words, Daves called Norris "a damned liar," and Norris-in tum-call 
Daves "a damned liar" for accusing Norris of trying "to breed a riot." In the ensuing 
fistacuffs, Daves gave Norris "three or four blows, upon which Norris ran off towards his 
own house." After Norris ran to his house, which was several yards away, he returned and 
stabbed Daves in the belly, a three- or four inch wound that proved lethal. /d. at *3-5. 
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victim's murder.235 The solicitor general-in the context of discussing the 
difference between murder and manslaughter236 just five years after the 
U.S. Bill of Rights was ratified-told a North Carolina court in 1796 that 
the beating that led to the death was done in a "cruel or unusual man-
ner. "237 
The solicitor general's use of the "cruel or unusual" terminology sheds 
light on how that phrase was commonly understood in the late eighteenth 
century. "The grand distinction between murder and manslaughter is," he 
emphasized, "that murder is accompanied with the circumstances of malice 
aforethought. '0238 "The true legal idea of malice, as applied to the case of 
killing," he said, is where "the fact of killing is attended with such circum-
stances" as show "the slayer to have a cruel and diabolical temper and dis-
position, above what is ordinarily found amongst mankind. "239 The solici-
235 /d. at * 1-2. 
236 The solicitor general was of the view that the homicide at issue was "either murder or 
manslaughter." !d. at *5. 
237 /d. 
238 /d. A similar statement is found in State v. Weaver, 3 N.C. 54, 1798 WL 102 (N.C. 
Super. L. & Eq., 1797). The North Carolina judge, using cruel and punishments in the 
same context, instructed in that case: 
Murder is where the homicide with malice aforethought, which means not what is 
commonly understood, but a doing the act under such circumstances as shews the heart to 
be exceedingly malignant and cruel, above what is ordinarily found amongst mankind; & 
the wickedness of heart is collected either from the express words and conduct of the 
party, or from the manner in which the deed is done-in the first instance, by threatening 
expressions, former grounds, or schemes to do him mischief, as by lying in wait for him 
and the like; in the latter instance, by the excessiveness of punishment or dangerous 
weapon, or means made use of to punish; as if for a slight offense which deserved only 
moderate correction, any man should take up his servant and beat him so excessively as to 
... cause his death; if in such a case for such an offense, he should beat out his brains with 
an axe, shoot him with a gun, or kill him with a sword; from all these circumstances, it is 
allowed that the heart is exceedingly depraved and cruel, and that the killing has not 
proceeded from the frailty of human nature, and therefore the offense is deemed murder. 
!d. at *1; compare State v. Boon, Tay. 246, 1801 WL 701 *5 (N.C. Conf. 1801) 
(Johnston, J.) ("The murder of a slave appears to me a crime of the most atrocious and 
barbarous nature; much more so than killing a person who is free, and on an equal footing. 
It is an evidence of a most depraved and cruel disposition to murder one so much in your 
power that he is incapable of making resistance, even in his own defense ... ") 
239 Norris, 1796 WL 327 at *5; see also id. ("It is the cruelty of the action, and the 
malignity of heart the action discovers, to which the law attributes the crime of murder."); 
id. ("This cruelty and malignity of heart is discoverable from the action itself, and the 
causes that lead to it."); id. ("The law deems it proper he should answer for all the 
consequences of his cruelty, to their utmost extent; and that one who has behaved himself 
with so much obduracy and perverseness, should no longer be regarded as entitled to that 
compassion which the frailties of human nature may justly claim. He has acted not from 
the frailty of his nature, but from the unfeeling ferocity of a savage heart; and this 
circumstance causes the law to impute to him the crime of murder."). 
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tor general thus argued that a murder-as opposed to a manslaughter-
had been committed.240 
The solicitor general's argument-reported in some detail-thus 
shows the prototypical context in which the "cruel or unusual" language 
was used. In his argument, North Carolina's solicitor general repeatedly 
referred to the legal distinction between murder and manslaughter. 
"Whenever this excess of cruelty appears, this disposition of the mind to 
enormous revenge," he argued, "the crime of homicide amounts to mur-
der."241 "Disputes, and fighting in consequence of them, happen every day 
in the streets and elsewhere," he emphasized, asking the following ques-
tion: "will the law say, when one is worsted he may quit the affray, go 
home, provide himself with a knife, return and plunge it into the body of 
his adversary, and that he shall be guilty of no more than manslaugh-
ter?"242 "Would other men in general in his situation have taken up the 
cruel, purpose of seeking so deadly a revenge?" the solicitor general 
asked.243 His reply: "I think they would not; and it seems to me the act can 
appear no otherwise that as the effect of a cruel disposition, not of human 
weakness deserving of our compassion; and if it be the effect of cruelty it 
amounts to murder. "244 
In other words, the solicitor general viewed the defendant's cruelty as 
indicative of the defendant's relative blameworthiness. After noting that 
Norris had gone eighty or a hundred yards before returning to stab his ad-
240 !d. As the solicitor general argued: 
If the cause that lead to it be such a conduct on the part of the person slain, as would in 
ordinary tempers have produced only a slight resentment, not rising so high as to aim at 
the life of the offender, but only to a punishment proportionable to the offense, and yet the 
person offended has attacked and beaten the other, in such a manner or with such a 
weapon as shews an intent to kill, and not only to chastise; and in beating he has killed the 
other, the law will deem it murder: because the beating in a cruel or unusual manner, or 
with such a weapon, are circumstances at ending the fact which shew the heart of the 
slayer to have been more than ordinarily cruel and regardless of another's woe. 
!d. (italics added) (citing Foster, p. 259). 
241 /d. "[I]t is murder," he said, where "a heart" is "excessively cruel and turned to inhu-
man revenge." !d. "What can be more cruel, more indicative of a malignant heart, than 
this deed of the prisoner?" !d. 
242 Id. at *5. 
243 !d. 
244 !d. One of the presiding judges agreed with this view, saying: 
I cannot think it an excuse to reduce the offense to manslaughter, where two persons 
quarrel and fight, and one goes some distance, gets a knife, returns and kills the other with 
it-such disputes happen every day. If we say it is not murder to kill shortly after, under 
such circumstances as this man was killed, much blood will be spilt in a very short time-
it will be establishing a dreadful precedent. Norris ran off from the first combat and went 
home, he got into his house, his castle of refuge and defense, where no one would have 
offered to molest him-why did he not remain there? Why take his knife and return back 
eighty or an hundred yards to an enraged man? Did not this show a murderous intent, and 
that his heart was bent upon cruelty? 
!d. at *7 (Williams, J.). 
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versary, the solicitor general again characterized the killing as a murder.245 
"The heart that could so long entertain the hideous fiend," he argued, 
"must have been familiarized to its lessons-the cruelty of the act demon-
strates it murder; and here is that cruelty in its most heightened colours. "246 
"Any circumstance of deliberation accompanying the fact of killing, though 
the falling out is sudden and the killing a short time after," he contended, 
"will cause the slayer to fall under the imputation of murder. "247 By con-
trast, defense counsel made an effective appeal to the jury,248 seeking an 
acquittal of the murder charge by citing Rowley's Case as a precedent. In 
that case, two boys fought, one bloodying the nose of the other, before one 
of the boys ran three quarters of a mile to his father, who came back and 
killed the other boy with a staff-a crime "adjudged manslaughter only, 
owing to the heat of the passions at the time the blow was given. "249 
In other words, the "cruel and unusual" terminology became, among 
other things, a means to distinguish between types of homicides.250 To this 
245 The report of the solicitor general's arguments reads as follows: 
If two persons suddenly fall out and fight, and in the contest one kills the other, that is 
manslaughter: the blood is heated, the passions boil, rage dictates his conduct, and whilst 
the blows are passing, there is no leisure for reflection, nor time for reason to assume its 
empire. Keeling 56. That is not like the case before us: here the combatants were 
separated, and the fatal blow not given till three or four minutes afterwards; not until the 
slayer had gone eighty or an hundred yards, and returned after arming himself with a 
deadly weapon. 
!d. at *5. 
246 !d. 
247 /d. 
248 Norris was ultimately acquitted of the murder charge. !d. at *8. An editorial note in the 
case reporter gives a flavor for public sentiment at the time. It reads: 
The cause of reporting this case with so much minuteness, is that the public opinion ran 
very high against the prisoner before and after his trial, and he was pronounced guilty of 
murder by many who were present at his trial. The jury who acquitted him, were highly 
censured. Perhaps the learned may be of opinion, when they meet with this case, that the 
jury gave a proper verdict. It is possible that may become the general opinion. If so, 
probably some of those who are to be hereafter concerned in trials of this sort, may be led 
to reflect on the rapidity with which a wrong opinion sometimes spreads its influence over 
the public mind, and to be cautioned, that a popular sentiment, however honest and well 
meaning it may be, may sometimes become current for want of sufficient consideration or 
information, and as frequently so respecting matters of judicial deliberation as any others. 
!d. 
249 !d. at *6 (citing Rowley's case, Cro. J. 296). 
250 6 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAWS 645 
(1824) ("Malice may be express or implied; express, as if one form a deliberate design to 
kill a man, and kills him; this is malice express, and murder, and is evidenced in many 
ways, as in duels, lying in wait, &c.; so it is express malice and murder, if A, even on a 
sudden provocation, beats B in a cruel and unusual manner, so that he dies, though he did 
not intend death; for here is an express evil design; as where the park keeper found a boy 
stealing wood, and tied him to a horse's tail, and he was killed; held, it was murder by 
express malice. So where a master corrected a servant with an iron bar, and killed him; 
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day, the "cruel and unusual" catchphrase-or variants thereof-remain on 
the books in many jurisdictions. Indeed, the "cruel and unusual" and "cru-
el or unusual" terminology is still found in federal statutes,251 state consti-
tutions/52 and state laws.253 For instance, the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice-in a provision associating the phrase "cruel or unusual" with non-
lethal corporal penalties-provides: "Punishment by flogging, or by brand-
ing, marking, or tattooing on the body, or any other cruel or unusual pun-
ishment, may not be adjudged by any court-martial or inflicted upon any 
person subject to this chapter."254 In short, particular acts-be they homi-
cides, manslaughters, or bodily punishments of a non-lethal nature-have 
long been associated with the "cruel" and "unusual" language. 
In state statutes, the "cruel" and "unusual" terminology is even still 
found in laws on the subject of homicide,255 manslaughter,256 and punish-
held, this was murder, because such excessive correction could but be attended probably 
by death or bloodshed, and could proceed but from a wicked heart.") (citations omitted). 
251 See 22 U.S. C. § 6912(a)(6) (a commission set up to monitor human rights in the 
People's Republic of China is charged with monitoring "the right to be free from torture 
and other forms of cruel or unusual punishment"); 25 U.S. C. § 1302(a)(7)(A) ("No Indian 
tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall ... inflict cruel and unusual 
punishments"); see also 42 U.S. C. § 2000dd(a) ("No individual in the custody or under 
the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical 
location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment."); 42 
U.S.C. § 2000dd(d) ("In this section, the term 'cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment' means the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited 
by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States 
... "); U.S. Ct. of App. 9th Cir. Rule 34-3 ("Civil appeals in the following categories will 
receive hearing or submission priority: ... (4) Appeals alleging deprivation of medical care 
to the incarcerated or other cruel or unusual punishment ... "). "Cruel and unusual 
punishments" are also specifically prohibited in Guam and the Virgin Islands. 48 U.S.C. § 
1421b(h); 48 u.s.c. § 1561. 
252 See Mary R. Falk & Eve Cary, Death-DefYing Feats: State Constitutional Challenges 
to New York's Death Penalty, 4 J.L. PoL'Y 161, 177-78 (1995). Some state-law provisions 
explicitly prohibit "corporal" punishments, too. S.C. CONST., art. I, § 15 ("Excessive bail 
shall not be required, nor shall excessive fines be imposed, nor shall cruel, nor corporal, 
nor unusual punishment be inflicted ... "); compare D.C. CODE, art. I, § 11 (the 
"Constitution of the State of New Columbia" reads in part: "The State shall not require 
excessive fines, nor impose cruel, corporal, or unusual punishment, or sentence of 
death."). 
253 ALA. CODE § 16-l-24.1(g) ("Except in the case of excessive force or cruel and unusual 
punishment, no certified or noncertified employee of the State Board of Education or any 
local board of education shall be civilly liable for any action carried out in conformity 
with state law and system or school rules regarding the control, discipline, suspension, 
and expulsion of students."). 
254 10 U.S.C. § 855 (emphasis added). 
255 CAL. PENAL CODE § 195 ("Homicide is excusable in the following cases ... 2. When 
committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and suffi-
cient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, when no undue advantage is taken, nor any 
dangerous weapon used, and when the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner."); 
Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-17 ("The killing of any human being by the act, procurement, or 
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ment.257 For example, in some places, the killing of a human being by "ac-
cident or misfortune" is considered "excusable" so long as the killing was 
not done in a "cruel or unusual manner."258 The "cruel" and "unusual" 
omission of another shall be excusable: ... (c) When committed upon any sudden combat, 
without undue advantage being taken, and without any dangerous weapon being used, and 
not done in a cruel or unusual manner."). 
256 Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-35 ("The killing of a human being, without malice, in the 
heat of passion, but in a cruel or unusual manner, or by the use of a dangerous weapon, 
without authority oflaw, and not in necessary self-defense, shall be manslaughter."); 21 
OKLA. STAT. ANN.§ 711 ("Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree in the following 
cases: ... 2. When perpetrated without a design to effect death, and in a heat of passion, 
but in a cruel and unusual manner, or by means of a dangerous weapon; unless it is 
committed under such circumstances as constitute excusable or justifiable homicide."); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-15 ("Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree if 
perpetrated: ... (2) Without any design to effect death, including an unborn child, and in a 
heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner ... "); Ward v. State, 935 So.2d 1047, 
1055 (Miss. App. 2005) ("The elements of manslaughter are laid out in Mississippi Code 
Annotated section 97-3-35, and include (1) the killing of a human being, (2) without 
malice, (3) in the heat of passion, ( 4) but in a cruel or unusual manner, or by the use of a 
dangerous weapon, (5) without authority oflaw, (6) and not in necessary self-defense."); 
compare Martin v. State, 818 So.2d 380, 382 (Miss. App. 2002) ("We conclude that the 
use of a knife to stab the victim to death, if found to have been done in the heat of passion 
without malice and not in necessary self-defense, would be sufficient evidence to convict 
of manslaughter through the use of a deadly weapon without the necessity of a specific 
finding that the stabbing was undertaken in a cruel or unusual manner."). 
257 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.43 ("When no punishment is provided by statute, the court 
shall sentence the convicted person to a term of imprisonment that, in view of the degree 
and aggravation of the offense, is not cruel, unusual, or repugnant to the person's 
constitutional rights."); 21 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 443a ("[A]ll prisoners who escape from 
either of the aforesaid prisons either while confined therein, or while at large as a trusty, 
when apprehended and returned to the prison, shall be punishable by the prison authorities 
in such manner as may be prescribed by the rules and regulations of the prison provided 
that such punishment shall not be cruel or unusual."): ORE. REv. STAT. § 138.040(2) ("If 
the appellate court determines the disposition imposed exceeds the maximum allowable 
by law or is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, the appellate court shall direct the court 
from which the appeal is taken to impose the disposition that should be imposed."). 
258 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.03 ("Homicide is excusable when committed by accident and 
misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means with usual ordinary caution, and 
without any unlawful intent, or by accident and misfortune in the heat of passion, upon 
any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, without any dangerous 
weapon being used and not done in a cruel or unusual manner."); IDAHO CODE§ 18-4012 
("Homicide is excusable in the following cases ... 2. When committed by accident and 
misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a 
sudden combat when no undue advantage is taken nor any dangerous weapon used, and 
when the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-5 
("Homicide is excusable in the following cases: ... B. when committed by accident or 
misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a 
sudden combat, if no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used and the 
killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner."); 21 OKLA. STAT. ANN.§ 731 
("Homicide is excusable in the following cases ... 2. When committed by accident and 
misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a 
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words are also currently employed to protect animals,259 students,260 juve-
nile inmates,261 prisoners,262 and the residents of treatment facilities263 and 
nursing homes.264 In California, such language also appears in laws forbid-
ding any "cruel, corporal or unusual punishment" in a jail or prison set-
sudden combat provided that no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon 
used, and that the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 22-16-31 ("Homicide is excusable if committed by accident and misfortune in the heat 
of passion, upon sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat. However, 
to be excusable, no undue advantage may be taken nor any dangerous weapon used and 
the killing may not be done in a cruel or unusual manner."); 14 V.I. CODE ANN. § 926 
("Homicide is excusable ... when committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of 
passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, when no 
undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used, and when the killing is not 
done in a cruel or unusual manner."). 
259 TEx. PENAL CODE§ 49.02(a) ("A person commits an offense if the person intentionally 
or knowingly: ... (4) transports or confines a livestock animal in a cruel and unusual 
manner ... "). 
26° FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.11 (2) ("Except in the case of excessive force or cruel and 
unusual punishment, a teacher or other member of the instructional staff, a principal or the 
principal's designated representative, or a school bus driver shall not be civilly or 
criminally liable for any action carried out in conformity with the State Board of 
Education and district school board rules regarding the control, discipline, suspension, and 
expulsion of students ... "); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 1012.75.11(1) ("Except in the case of 
excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment, a teacher or other member of the 
instructional staff, a principal or the principal's designated representative, or a bus driver 
shall not be civilly or criminally liable for any action carried out in conformity with State 
Board of Education and district school board rules regarding the control, discipline, 
suspension, and expulsion of students ... "); Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-11-57 ("Except in the 
case of excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment, a teacher, assistant teacher, 
principal, or an assistant principal acting within the course and scope of his employment 
shall not be liable for any action carried out in conformity with state or federal law or 
rules or regulations of the State Board of Education or the local school board regarding 
the control, discipline, suspension and expulsion of students."). 
261 ORE. REv. STAT. § 421.105(1) ("The superintendent may enforce obedience to the rules 
for the government of the inmates in the institution under the supervision of the 
superintendent by appropriate punishment but neither the superintendent nor any other 
prison official or employee may strike or inflict physical violence except in self-defense, 
or inflict any cruel or unusual punishment."). 
262 TEx. CODE CRIM. PRo., art. 16.21 ("Every sheriff shall keep safely a person committed 
to his custody. He shall use no cruel or unusual means to secure this end, but shall adopt 
all necessary measures to prevent the escape of a prisoner."). 
263 16 DEL. CODE ANN.§ 2220(18) ("Every patient shall be free from verbal, physical or 
mental abuse, cruel and unusual punishment, involuntary seclusion, withholding of mone-
tary allowance, withholding of food and deprivation of sleep."); 16 DEL. CODE ANN. § 
5182( 17) ("Every patient shall be free from verbal, physical or mental abuse, cruel and 
unusual punishment, involuntary seclusion, withholding of monetary allowance, withhold-
ing offood and deprivation of sleep."). 
264 16 DEL. CODE ANN.§ 1121(24) ("Every patient and resident shall be free from verbal, 
physical or mental abuse, cruel and unusual punishment, involuntary seclusion, withhold-
ing of monetary allowance, withholding of food and deprivation of sleep."). 
344 
The Anomaly of Executions 
ting.265 In each of those contexts, the fact-finder is expected to determine 
what so qualifies, just as judges are tasked on a daily basis with making 
bail determinations, their discretionary judgments constrained only, if 
found to be "excessive," by the Bail Clause.266 
E. Early American Cases 
i. An Overview: 1791 to 1830 
In the pre-1830 period, the Eighth Amendment and comparable state-
law provisions were considered only a minimal amount by American judg-
es. In 1799, Virginia's excessive fines clause was held to forbid the imposi-
tion of a joint fine on people jointly indicted for assaulting a magistrate.267 
In 1801, a North Carolina judge agreed with counsel that the common-law 
punishment of pressing to death-also known as peine forte et dure268-
265 CAL. PENAL CODE § 673 ("It shall be unlawful to use in the reformatories, institutions, 
jails, state hospitals or any other state, county, or city institution any cruel, corporal or 
unusual punishment or to inflict any treatment or allow any lack of care whatever which 
would injure or impair the health of the prisoner, inmate, or person confined; and 
punishment by the use of the strait jacket, gag, thumbscrew, shower bath or the tricing up 
of a prisoner, inmate or person confined is hereby prohibited."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 2652 
("It shall be unlawful to use in the prisons, any cruel, corporal or unusual punishment or 
to inflict any treatment or allow any lack of care whatever which would injure or impair 
the health of the prisoner, inmate or person confined; and punishment by the use of the 
strait-jacket, gag, thumb-screw, shower-bath or the tricing up of prisoners, inmates or 
persons confined is hereby prohibited."). 
266 Cf Evans v. Foster, 1 N.H. 374, 1819 WL 470 *3 (1819) (in interpreting New 
Hampshire's "cruel or unusual punishments" clause, the New Hampshire court ruled that 
"the determination of 'what bail shall be called excessive must be left to the courts on 
considering the circumstances of the case'") (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at 
297). As the Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire held in 1819 in interpreting 
its state constitutional provision: 
The constitution forbids all "courts of law" as well as single "magistrates" to require 
"excessive bail." If the members of a higher court therefore, violate this prohibition, they 
are equally liable with a justice of the peace: and an indictment or an impeachment would 
seem to be sufficient remedies. Any suffering to individuals, that may be apprehended 
from the great number and limited knowledge of single magistrates, can always be soon 
obviated; as the person, committed for a failure to procure bail, which appears excessive, 
possesses the right to be brought before a judge of this court by a Habeas Corpus, and to 
have the sum reduced, if under all the circumstances it is thought too large. 
Id. at *4. 
267 Jones v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. 555, 1799 WL 260 * 1 (Va. 1799). 
268 This form of torture, used on those who refused to plead to a crime, involved crushing 
the body with heavy loads of stones or iron. Douglas M. Coulson, Distorted Records in 
"Benito Cereno •• and the Slave Rebellion Tradition, 22 YALE J.L. & HUM. 1, 24 (2010); 
see also Frederick C. Millett, Will the United States Follow England (and the Rest of the 
World) in Abandoning Capital Punishment?, 6 PIERCE L. REv. 547, 587 n.295 (2008) 
("The effect of pressing on an uncooperative accused was, and was intended to be, fatal. 
As early as 1426, pressing was used in England, though it never seems to have enjoyed 
wide popularity with the courts. Its sole recorded use in this country seems to have been 
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could not be inflicted because North Carolina's bill of rights prohibited 
cruel and unusual punishments.269 And in 1810, in a challenge to a Virginia 
law requiring attorneys to take an anti-dueling oath before being admitted 
to the bar, an attorney in the case cited Virginia's cruel and unusual pun-
ishments clause. "If not against the WORD, is it not against the SPIRIT, 
which declares, 'that cruel and unusual punishments ought not to be in-
flicted?"' the attorney argued in challenging the state law.27° 
Other pre-1830 cases found a bail determination not "excessive" un-
der New Hampshire's "cruel or unusual punishments" clause;271 upheld the 
constitutionality of anti-gaming laws;272 and found that disenfranchisement 
imposed for dueling under a New York anti-dueling statute "is not an unu-
sual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment.273 In one case, In 
re Turner,274 a Maine court-in a decision issued in 1825-rejected a claim 
that it was a cruel and unusual punishment to chain a black seaman to the 
deck of a vessel.275 In that case, Isaac Turner had filed a petition for habeas 
corpus stating that he was a cook on board the brig Effort, then at the 
wharf in the port of Portland, Maine, and that he had been confined on 
board, with his leg chained, for several days and nights successively.276 
Corporal punishments-though their overuse had been questioned by 
the likes of Montesquieu277-were frequently authorized278 and used in co-
during the notorious Salem witchcraft trials, in 1692, when one Giles Cory was pressed to 
death for refusal to plead to the charge of witchcraft."). 
269 State v. Gainer, 3 N.C. 140, 1801 WL 710 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq., 1801). 
270 In re Leigh, 1 Munf. 468, 1810 WL 547 (Va. 1810). 
271 Evans v. Foster, 1 N.H. 374, 1819 WL 470 *2 (N.H. 1819). 
272 Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 6 Rand. 694, 1828 WL 860 (Va. 1828) (a Virginia act mak-
ing those convicted of gaming subject to stripes was held not to constitute a cruel and 
unusual punishment under state law); State v. Smith, 10 Tenn. 272, 1829 WL 501 *5 
(Tenn. Err. & App. 1829) (state law declaring those convicted of gaming disqualified 
from holding office was not unconstitutional). 
273 Barker v. People, 20 Johns. 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1823); see also Barker v. People, 3 
Cow. 686 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) ("Without inquiring whether disqualification to hold 
office, is a punishment either cruel or unusual, I consider this provision of the national 
constitution, inapplicable to offenses against a state."). 
274 1 Ware 83, 24 F. Cas. 340 (D.C. Me. 1825). 
275 !d. at 340-42. 
276 Id. In rejecting the seaman's claim, the court ruled: 
The chaining of a man to the deck of a vessel does indeed carry with it a harsh sound, and 
suggests to the imagination images of cruelty and suffering. But it does not appear that the 
mode of confinement was such as to give much bodily pain, for though some complaint of 
the kind is suggested now, none was made at the time, nor is there the smallest indication 
of a cruel and vindictive disposition on the part of the master. 
!d. at 342. 
277 1 CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 100 (3d ed. 1762) ("A 
good legislator takes a just medium; he ordains neither always pecuniary, nor always 
corporal punishments."); compare id. at 203 ("But as those who have no property are 
generally the readiest to attack the property of others, it has been found necessary, instead 
of a pecuniary, to substitute a corporal punishment."). 
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lonial America.279 "Through the colonies," write historian Caroline Cox, 
"corporal punishment not only reinforced the authority of the state but 
also aided in defining social status," as the slaves and the poor were gener-
ally the ones punished corporally.280 "When not resorting to capital sen-
tences," Cox explains, "colonial courts used fines, various forms of public 
humiliation," and corporal punishments such as whipping, often adhering 
to biblical injunctions.281 "Slaves, at the bottom of the social ladder, expe-
rienced only corporal punishment," she writes.282 
Indeed, corporal punishments, especially the lash, were regularly used 
by the military on enlisted soldiers, with George Washington and other 
commanders ordering such punishments.283 "For officers," however, Cox 
notes, "there was no corporal punishment," with "a private or public rep-
rimand from a superior officer" being the norm and "dismissal from the 
service being the harshest punishment."284 In the pre-Fourteenth Amend-
ment era, punishments were thus not meted out equally to offenders. Those 
with a higher social status might be sparred humiliating corporal punish-
ments; slaves, privates and seaman were not so fortunate. 
During and after the Revolutionary War, corporal punishments of 
varying types were consequently regularly handed out in criminal and 
courts-martial cases.285 "During the post Revolutionary period," writes 
historian Myra Glenn, "a series of regulations and statutes legitimized the 
practice of corporal punishment in the new republic. "286 "The United 
278 State v. Fleming, 1848 WL 2457 * 1 (S.C. App. Law 1848) ("manslaughter at the 
common law was punished by branding in the hand and imprisonment"); State v. Raines, 
3 McCord 533, 1826 WL 710 *6 (S.C. App. 1826) (noting that the common-law 
punishment of manslaughter is "branding in the hand and imprisonment"). 
279 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97-98 (2003) (noting the some colonial punishments were 
meant to inflict public disgrace and that "whipping, pillory, and branding inflicted 
physical pain"; "[a] murderer might be branded with an 'M,' and a thief with a 'T. "'). 
28° CAROLINE Cox, A PROPER SENSE OF HONOR: SERVICE AND SACRIFICE IN GEORGE 
WASHINGTON'S ARMY 154 (2004). 
281 /d. at 151. As Cox writes: "Deuteronomy 25:3 laid out the limit for whipping: 'Forty 
stripes he may give him, and not exceed ... Most colonies followed that example and only 
occasionally exceeded it, as in Pennsylvania, for example, where fifty lashes were 
sometimes given for third offenses." !d. at 151-52; compare id. at 152 (noting that in New 
York and the Carolinas, "lash punishments for whites regularly rose above 39 lashes, 
ranging as high as 150 in New York and to several hundred during the vigilante Regulator 
movements in the Carolina backcountry"). 
282 /d. at 154. 
283 /d. at 157, 187, 203-04, 451. 
284 /d. at 134. 
285 Fults v. State, 1854 WL 2165 * 1 (Tenn. 1854) (noting that "the judgment of the court 
in manslaughter" before "the Code of 1829" was "branding in the hand"); Van Buren v. 
State, 1852 WL 2044 * 1 (Miss. Err. App. 1852) (noting that a slave was indicted for 
burglary, tried and convicted, and sentenced to be branded in the hand and to receive 
twenty-five lashes each day for four successive days). 
286 MYRA C. GLENN, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PuNISHMENT: PRISONERS, SAILORS, 
WOMEN, AND CHILDREN IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 9 (1984). 
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States Congress, for example," she explains, "authorized flogging aboard 
American men-of-war," with the first of these regulations drawn up by 
John Adams in 1775 when he served on the Naval Committee of the Con-
tinental Congress.287 The "Rules for the Regulation of the Navy" permitted 
naval commanders to inflict up to twelve lashes on any enlisted man.288 In 
1797, the Congress would endorse those "Rules," and two years later 
Congress, in its "Articles for the Government of the Navy," authorized 
flogging for specific offenses such as swearing or drunkenness.289 "An Act 
for the better government of the navy of the Untied States," which gov-
erned naval operations from 1800 to 1850, also extended to a naval court 
martial the use of the lash as punishment.290 Congress did not abolish naval 
flogging until September 28, 1850.291 
In early America, legislatures experimented with doing away with 
corporal punishment of offenders. In 1786, for instance, the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania established a system of solitary confinement at hard 
labor and criminals who formerly might have been punished capitally or 
corporally were instead incarcerated.292 "In 1796," writes Myra Glenn, 
"New York State followed Pennsylvania's lead" by authorizing Newgate 
State Prison and by prohibiting the whipping of convicts.293 "These suc-
cesses in prison reform, however, were shortlived," Glenn notes.294 "Dur-
ing the first two decades of the nineteenth century," she explains, "there 
was a discernible trend toward the corporal punishment of criminals. "295 
For instance, after opening in 1805, the Massachusetts State Prison at 
Charlestown inflicted harsh corporal punishments, especially flogging.296 
Likewise, a mutiny in Newgate Prison prompted New York legislators in 
1819 to repeal their earlier prohibition on prison whippings.297 Thus, in the 
Founding Fathers' time, corporal punishment-then a relatively common, 
or usual, sanction-was a flash point of controversy. The use of corporal 
punishments ebbed and flowed, though in many places such punishments 




290 Id. at 9-10. 
291 !d. at 9 n.*. 




296 Id. at 11. 
297 Id. 
298 MATTHEW PATE & LAURIE A. GOULD, CORPORAL PuNISHMENT AROUND THE WORLD 94 
(2012). 
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ii. Early Jurists on Cruelty and Race 
The most interesting cases-at least in terms of understanding how 
early American jurists understood the prohibition against "cruel and unu-
sual punishments"-dealt with non-lethal corporal punishments and the 
issue of race. In james v. Commonwealth/99 an 1825 case, the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court specifically addressed the corporal punishment known 
as "ducking." In that case, a woman, Nancy James, had been convicted of 
being a common scold and, on October 29, 1824, was sentenced "to be 
placed in a certain engine of correction, called a cucking or ducking-stool, 
on Wednesday, the third day of November, then next ensuing, between the 
hours of ten and twelve o'clock in the morning, and being so placed there-
in, to be plunged three times into the water." 300 James' counsel argued the 
sentence was "illegal," alleging that it violated both the U.S. Constitution 
and Pennsylvania's constitution.301 
Finding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable to state cases, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court first found that state courts "are left at liberty to 
regulate their own criminal codes as they may deem proper, without refer-
ence to the laws or constitution of the United States."302 At the same time, 
Pennsylvania's highest court emphasized that Nancy James' sentence "has 
created much ferment and excitement in the public mind; it is considered as 
a cruel, unusual, unnatural and ludicrous judgment."303 "[B]ut whatever 
prejudices may exist against it," the court noted, "still, if it be the law of 
the land, the court must pronounce judgment for it. "304 "But," the court 
clarified, "as it is revolting to humanity, and is of that description that only 
could have been invented in an age of barbarism, we ought to be well per-
suaded, either that it is the appropriate judgment of the common law, or is 
299 1825 WL 1899 (Pa. 1825). 
300 !d. at * 1. As noted earlier, a ducking or "cucking" stool was a chair connected to a 
pulley system whereby offenders were plunged into the water. Meskell, supra note 140, at 
841-42. John Adams made notes pertaining to the crime of scolding in 1766---in particu-
lar, as regards its frequency-in the case of"Dus. Rex vs. Mary Gardiner, for a common 
Scold, Quarreller and Disturber of the Peace" in the Suffolk Court of General Sessions. 
Diary of John Adams, "Suffolk Sessions July 1766," available at 
http://www.masshist.org/publications/apde/portia.php?id=DJAOld426 ("Hawkins-a 
common Scold is punishable by putting into the Ducking Stool. Prosecutions rare, 'tho the 
offense frequent."). 
301 James, 1825 WL 1899 at* 1. Pennsylvania's 1790 constitution omitted any reference 
to "unusual," providing "[t]hat excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted." PA. CONST. art. IX, §XIII (1790). 
302 !d. at *2. Elsewhere in the James case report, it was noted: "Common scolding has 
been recognized as an indictable offense in two of our sister states, New York and 
Massachusetts; and though it was in both held to be punishable only by fine and 
imprisonment, that might be under peculiar provisions of their laws or constitutions, 
which would not affect a decision in Pennsylvania." Id. at *4 (italics in original). 
303 Id. at *5. 
304 !d. 
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inflicted by some positive law; and that that common law or statutory pro-
vision has been adopted here, and is now in force." 305 
Associate Justice Thomas Duncan306-who delivered the court's rul-
ing-noted at the outset how much time he had spent researching the pun-
ishment of ducking: "I have employed some time, not very pleasantly, cer-
tainly not very profitably, in tracing the punishment ad ludibrium, to its 
source, and have followed this stream until it has sunk in oblivion, in the 
general improvement of society, and the reformation of criminal punish-
ment, and been dried up by time, that great innovator. "307 In his lengthy 
opinion, Duncan emphasized the oddity of the scolding offense. "It must 
strike all, as a peculiar feature of this offence," he said, "that it is of the 
feminine gender, that it degraded woman to a mere thing, to a nuisance, 
and does not consider her as a person. "308 "But this is not to be wondered 
at," he added, "when we reflect on the general degraded state of woman, 
when this punishment was introduced; she was, in some respects, the serv-
ant or slave of the husband; so that he might correct her with a stick as 
thick as his own thumb." 309 
Before passing on James' sentence, Justice Duncan-very much con-
cerned, it seems, with human dignity-also gave an extensive history of the 
punishment being considered. After focusing on the varied and wide-
ranging instrumentalities that had been used to inflict the punishment,310 
3os Id. 
306 See 17 THOMAS SERGEANT & WILLIAM RA WLE, EDS., REPORTS OF CASES ADTIIDGED IN 
THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 459 (3d ed. 1874) (describing Thomas Duncan's 
legal career). 
307 James, 1825 WL 1899 at *5 (italics in original). 
308 !d. at *6 (italics in original). 
309 Id. "There is a tradition," Justice Duncan offered in his opinion, "that at the publication 
ofBracton's learned work, in which the dimension of this instrument of correction was 
first stated, the women of the town in which he lived, seized him and ducked him in a 
horse-pond." Id. Bracton, a thirteenth-century English jurist, wrote a long treatise, De 
legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of England) that attempted 
to describe the whole of English law. Bracton: De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, 
HARvARD LAw SCHOOL LIBRARY, http:/ /hlsl5 .law.harvard.edu/bracton! (last visited Nov. 
19, 2011). In it, Bracton spoke of the "ducking-stool." !d. (Thome ed., Vol. 2, pp. 290, 
299, 340). 
310 As Justice Duncan noted: 
The punishment of the ducking or cucking-stool, is from the cuckoo, qui odiosejurgat et 
rixatur, as Lord COKE has it, in 3 Inst. 219; or, as Jacob has it, in his dictionary, the 
gogen-stool, and by some thought to be corrupted from the choke-stool; and the 
instrunlent is called in Stat. 51 Hen. III., a trebucket, a pitfall, and in law, as Lord COKE 
says, signifies a stool that falls into a pit of water; whereas, the last instrument that was 
seen in England, as Morgan, an editor of Jacob's Dictionary mentions, consisted of a beam 
or rafter, moving on a fulcrum, and extending to the centre of a large pond, on which end 
the stool used to be placed; while, on the other hand, Daines Barrington, a learned 
antiquarian, in his Observations on the Statutes 40, says, it is a machine anciently used in 
the siege of towns, and the etymology is from the Celtic, tre, that is, ville, and our own 
bucket, and signifies a town-bucket. 
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Duncan-on behalf of the court, and in light of the many different kinds of 
ducking or cucking stools-noted: "Thus, in our very outset, we are in-
volved in doubt, and who shall decide, where there is such a difference 
among the learned? The officer would not know what to do, whether to fix 
Nancy James on a stool, or in a bucket, whether she is to be run into the 
river on wheels, or to be soused into a pond, from a beam or rafter." 311 
Justice Duncan then proceeded to recount how the punishment of ducking 
was so antiquated in England that examples of the instruments used to in-
flict it could not be readily located.312 Duncan referenced the repeal of 
"two bloody statutes ... by the voice of humanity," saying "that it seems 
most probable, that hanging of women as witches and gypsies, and ducking 
them as scolds, ceased about the same time, viz: the time of the restoration, 
and before the charter to William Penn."313 "Indeed," he concluded, "it 
appears, that at the same period, the race of witches and scolds became 
extinct, when the law ceased to hang the witches and duck the scolds." 314 
In his opinion, Justice Duncan next explained that "[t]he instances are 
numerous of statutes being repealed in fact-a kind of silent legislation. "315 
Duncan explained: "As to the abrogation of statutes by 'non user,' there 
may rest some doubt; for myself, I own, my opinion is, that 'non user' may 
be such as to render them obsolete, when their objects vanish or their rea-
son ceases."316 "The common law (and this is but a customary punish-
ment), what is it, but common usage?" Duncan offered. "The long disue-
James, 1825 WL 1899 at *6. 
311 /d. at *7. 
312 Justice Duncan, in discussing England's experience with the punishment, put it this 
way: 
From the country from which, it is suggested, we have borrowed it, we could obtain no 
information, nor expect a model, for not a vestige of it is there to be found; unless, 
perhaps, alongside of the rack (the Duke of Exeter's daughter), which is still shown as a 
curiosity, by a yeoman of the King's guard, as an instrument of punishment, which, like 
the trebucket, was once used in England (Barrington 366); for no poor woman, in that 
country, has suffered under the edge of a law so barbarous, for the last century; like 
unscoured armor, it is hung up by the wall; like the law of witchcraft, it has remained 
unused; for no one has suffered under that law, either at the stake or on the gibbet, since 
the reign of Charles II.; although the law stood unrepealed on the statute book, until 9 
Geo. II., as our own law against the same offense, until several years after the revolution; 
or, like the act against the gypsies, which punished those with death, without the benefit 
of clergy, who remained one month within the realm; and Lord HALE, in his Pleas of the 
Crown 671, says, "I have not known these statutes put much in execution, only about 
twenty years since, at the assizes at Bury, about thirteen were condemned and executed 
for this offense. On this judgment, BLACKSTONE, 4th vol. 166, remarks, "but to the 
honor of our national humanity, there are no instances more modem." 
James, 1825 WL 1899 at *7. 
313 !d. 
314 !d. 
315 Id. at *8. 
316 !d. (italics in original). 
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tude of any law," he said, "amounts to its repeal." 317 A "villeinous judg-
ment, by long disuse," he concluded of one species of punishment, "has 
become obsolete, it not having been pronounced for ages." 318 "The barba-
rous writ of attaint, which has as strong a foundation as any principle in 
common law," he added, "has been long banished." 319 
Justice Duncan-writing less than thirty-five years after the ratifica-
tion of the Bill of Rights-thus concluded that punishments, even those still 
on the statute books, could become improper through disuse. "That such 
crimes and punishments existed at the common law," he acknowledged of 
the prior punishments he referenced, "every treatise to the present day 
states; but this does not prove," he clarified, "that they now exist."320 
"They are nothing more," he emphasized, "than the memorials of times 
that are past, as the usages of our uncivilized ancestors; and in nothing is 
the gradual change of the common law more apparent, and in nothing does 
it accommodate itself more to the change of manners and effect of educa-
tion, than in the silent and gradual disuse of barbarous criminal punish-
ments."321 
In ruling on the illegality of the corporal punishment put before the 
court, fact-finding is evident in the discussion. After citing a treatise from 
317 Id. Duncan's opinion was as follows: 
Mr. Woodeson, in his second lecture (vol. 1st, 63) of civil, positive and instituted laws, 
observes, "that the last consideration is the period of their existence;" they may be 
repealed either expressly or by implication founded on disuse: he cites this passage from 
the Digest, "rectissime illud receptum est--ut magis non solus sujfragio legislatorum, sed 
etiam tacito consensu omnium, per desuetudinem abrogatur. It certainly requires very 
strong grounds to presume a law obsolete, yet as the whole community includes as well 
the legislative power as its subjects, total disuse of any civil institution for ages past, may 
afford just and rational objections against disrespected and superannuated ordinances. 
Judge WILSON (2d Wilson's Works 38, 39), observes, "that it is the characteristic of a 
system of common law, that it may be accommodated to the circumstances, the exigencies 
and the conveniences of the people by whom it is appointed. Now, as these circumstances, 
exigencies and conveniences silently change, a proportionate change in time and in degree 
must take place in the accommodated system. Time silently and gradually introduces; it 
silently and gradually withdraws its customary laws." 
James, 1825 WL 1899 at *8 (italics in original). 
318 Id. 
319 Id. The concept of"attainder" under English law was "the stain or corruption of blood 
which arises from being condemned" for a crime, while a "bill of attainder" was a bill 
brought into Parliament "for attainting persons condemned for high treason." 1 JoHN 
BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 102 (1839) (1993). Bills of attainder-once frequently used by 
legislators to sentence people to death in the absence of judicial proceedings-were 
outlawed by the U.S. Constitution. MARTIN J. WADE& WILLIAM F. RUSSELL, THE SHORT 
CONSTITUTION 153 (3d rev. ed. 1921 ). At common law, a person convicted of treason or a 
felony would be considered "attainted." 2 DAVID ROBERTSON, TRIAL OF AARON BURR FOR 
TREASON 92 (1875). 
320 James, 1825 WL 1899 at *8. 
321 !d. 
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1581 that distinguished between capital and non-capital corporal punish-
ments, Justice Duncan emphasized that corporal punishments were dimin-
ishing and that he could find no evidence of the punishment of ducking for 
scolding being lawfully inflicted for many decades.322 Duncan referenced 
both English authorities323 and the well-known Pennsylvania lawyer James 
Wilson-a Founding Father and an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme 
Court from 1789 to 1798-in support of his position that the ducking of 
scolds was an impermissible and antiquated punishment.324 Duncan noted 
322 The opinion in James stated as follows: 
Lambarde, who first published his Treatise on the Office of Justice of the Peace, in 1581, 
lib. i. ch. 12, states that corporal punishments are either capital, or not capital; that capital 
are inflicted "sundrie ways; as by hanging, burning, boiling, pressing: not capital, are of 
divers sorts, as cutting off the hand or ear, burning or branding the hand, face, shoulders, 
whipping, imprisonment, stocking, sitting in the pillory, or on the cucking-stool." Of this 
kind of punishment our old laws had more sorts than we now have; as pulling out the 
tongue for false rumors, cutting off the nose, and for adultery, taking away the privy parts. 
So they had more sorts of punishments, when Lambarde wrote, than we now have. 
Blessed be GOD! I feel a conviction (and I have examined every book upon which I could 
lay my hands), that there is no judicial record, certainly no report, of this punishment 
being inflicted for more than one hundred years. The case in 2 Strange 849, The King v. 
Taylor, was quashed generally; it was not against her as communis vexatrix, but as 
calumniatrix et communis perturbatrix; and in The King v. Margaret Cooper, id. 1246, 
the judgment was not rendered as for a common scold; and the last of them was as long 
ago as 19 Geo. II., nearly eighty years ago. 
James, 1825 WL 1899 at *8. 
323 James, 1825 WL 1899 at *9: 
In the Queen v. Foxby, 6 Mod. 11, in the second of Anne, the judgment was likewise 
arrested for mistake in the indictment. The note of the reporter is, the punishment of a 
scold is ducking, but the counsel for the prisoner said, "he knew no law for ducking of 
scolds." Lord HOLT did not give any opinion as to the judgment; he only mentioned that 
it was indictable in the Leet, "and that it was better ducking in a Trinity than a 
Michaelmas term;" better in warm than in cold weather. But it was too much even for the 
gravity of the grave and learned Chief Justice of the King's Bench, to treat the subject 
with any solemnity. In page 178, she was brought up again (for the sheriff had let her go 
at large), and the court let her run again until the next term. HOLT could not conceal his 
contempt for this farce of ducking; he sneered at the trebucket, declaring that ducking 
would only harden the criminal; and, if she were once ducked, she would scold all the 
days of her life. I think, that the trebucket then made its final exit, or afterwards was only 
heard of in the courts of justice, as John Doe and Richard Roe, pledges of prosecution; a 
mere nominal thing. 
324 James, 1825 WL 1899 at *9: 
Judge WILSON, certainly a learned and eminent person, to whom the state committed the 
revision of her laws, in his third volume, page 311, treats the trebucket with the same 
contempt with which Lord HOLT had done before him. After giving the judgment against 
a common scold, in a public lecture, he sneeringly says-"so she shall be plunged into the 
water, by way of punishment and prevention;" and thus scornfully winds up the 
trebucket-"our modem men of gallantry would not surely decline the honor of her 
company; I therefore humbly propose, that in future, the cucking-stool shall be made to 
hold double." And those only who knew that great man, can form an idea what that look 
of scorn was. This cucking-stool was a species of the tumbrellum; Lord COKE laments 
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that scolds were once "indictable in the sheriff's tourn," 325 but ultimately 
concluded that ducking was no longer an authorized punishment for such 
offenders. "There is no ground, whatever may be the antiquated theory of 
the law," Duncan explained, "that it now exists, in fact and in practice, as 
a legal punishment."326 
Justice Duncan-in delivering his opinion-noted that all the mem-
bers of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court might not agree on everything, but 
they were unanimous as to the question before the court. As Duncan ex-
plained: "I do not know that all the members of the court agree with me in 
the conclusion, as to the abrogation of this punishment in England, by dis-
use; but in the inquiry most important, there is no difference of opinion. 
We all agree in this, that this customary ancient punishment for ducking 
scolds, was never adopted, and therefore, is not the common law of Penn-
sylvania. "327 After emphasizing that "the ducking-stool, cucking-stool, or 
choking-stool," as well as "the pillory, the collisstrigium, or neck-stretch, 
are punishments ejusdem generis, of the same family," Duncan cited au-
thorities for the proposition that putting someone "in the pillory" was in-
tended to "disgrace" the offender.328 "[I]t is very certain," Duncan ex-
plained, "that the legislature never considered the ducking-stool a legal 
that there was no good Latin word for the dung-cart, and says, that the pillory and the 
trebucket were of the dung-cart family. 
325 James, 1825 WL 1899 at * 10. Duncan noted that a "cucking-stool" had been defined 
as "an engine, invented for the punishment of scolding and unquiet women." Id. He then 
proceeded to explain the rationale in earlier years for this instrument of punishment: 
Very possibly, as both men and women were, in those days, rude and disorderly, the 
women were put in the trebucket and the men in the pillory, for disturbing or making a 
noise in this great court; and Lord COKE, 3 Inst. 219, says, "furea, pillore et tumbrel 
appendant al view de frank-pledge, and every one who hath a leet or market, ought to 
have a pillory and trebucket to punish offenders; for want whereof, the lord may be fined, 
or his liberty seized." 
James, 1825 WL 1899 at *10. 
326 James, 1825 WL 1899 at * 10. In support of this proposition, Duncan gave the 
following recitation of authorities: 
Barrington says, it was a punishment formerly used in this country, for female offenders, 
and not confined to the offense of scolding; and Jacob says, the punishment is disused. 
Mr. Morgan, one of his editors, informs us, that he saw the remains of one, on a private 
estate, in Warwickshire; and Mr. Tomlins, in his last edition of this work, mentions there 
had been one, which had lately been removed, at Banbury, in Oxfordshire, but that was 
not a machine for legal punishment, but was used to make sport for the mob, in ducking 
common women; for this usage, this propensity to ducking women, was pretty inveterate. 
Old women were generally ducked by the common people, by way of primary or 
experimental trial, before they were delivered over to the civil magistrate to be hanged as 
witches; many of the accused died under the experiment. This does not depend on a work 
of fiction (many of which, in the present day, present the real manners and habits of the 
times in which they lay the scenes), but on authentic history. 
I d. 
327 Id. 
328 Id. (italics in original). 
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punishment, which could be inflicted by the sentence of the law, or when 
they abolished the pillory and whipping-post, &c., they would have in-
cluded it. "329 
In 1790, the Pennsylvania legislature had adopted "An Act to reform 
the Penal Laws of this state."330 Among other things, that law substituted 
prison sentences and hard labor for "whipping" and other previously au-
thorized punishments, listed in the act as "burning in the hand," "cutting 
off the ears," "nailing the ear or ears to the pillory," and "placing in and 
upon the pillory."331 "The object of the framers of the act of 1790," Justice 
Duncan opined, "was the abolition of all infamous, disgraceful, public 
punishments-all cruel and unnatural punishments-for all the classes of 
minor offences and misdemeanors, to which they had been before applied." 
"This was the object of the author of our humane penal code," Duncan 
said, adding, "I need not mention the name of Mr. Bradford, to whom the 
civilized world is so much indebted. "332 In 1793, William Bradford-a 
close friend of James Madison from their days together at the College of 
New Jersey-penned a lengthy and influential essay, An Enquiry How Far 
the Punishment of Death Is Necessary in Pennsylvania, advocating the cur-
329 !d. 
330 Act of Apr. 5, 1790, reprinted in 3 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
440-54 (1803). 
331 !d., § 4. Prior to 1790, ear cropping, public whipping, and the pillory were explicitly 
authorized by Pennsylvania law. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 21, 1772 (any person or persons 
breaking and entering a house at night "shall stand in the pillory during the space of one 
hour, have his, her or their ears cut off, and nailed to the pillory, be publicly whipped with 
thirty-nine lashes on the bare back, well laid on"), reprinted in 2 LAws OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 55-56 (1803); Act of Feb. 26, 1773 (counterfeiters 
"shall be sentenced to the pillory, and have both his or her ears cut off, and nailed to the 
pillory, and be publicly whipped on his or her bare back, with thirty-one lashes, well laid 
on"), reprinted in 2 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 82-83 ( 1803 ); Act 
of Mar. 10, 1780 (any person or persons guilty of stealing a horse "for the first offense, 
shall stand in the pillory for one hour, and shall be publicly whipped on his, her or their 
backs with thirty-nine lashes, well laid on, and at the same time shall have his, her or their 
ears cut off, and nailed to the pillory; and for the second offense shall be whipped and 
pillored in like manner, and be branded on the forehead, in a plain and visible manner, 
with the letters H. T."), reprinted in 2 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
255-56 (1803); Act of Mar. 16, 1785 (counterfeiters "shall be sentenced to the pillory, and 
to have both his or her ears cut off, and nailed to the pillory"), reprinted in 3 LAws OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 24-25 (1803). 
332 Justice Duncan noted: 
[T]he wisdom, humanity, and policy of our Pennsylvania plan, has crossed the Atlantic. 
England, attached as she is to her own system, has adopted ours; and very lately, by stat. 
56 Geo. III., has abolished pillory in all cases but perjury and subornation of perjury. 
Long before, to the honor of her humanity, in the case of punishments inflicted for 
clergyable offenses, she had extended the benefit of clergy to women, provided that the 
whipping should be in private, and in the presence of the female sex alone, 19 Geo. II., ch. 
26; and I believe the punishment of whipping, as to females, has been altogether 
abolished. 
James, 1825 WL 1899 at *10. 
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tailment of death sentences.333 
In addition to crediting the much-heralded work of William Bradford, 
Justice Duncan's opinion also mentioned the efforts of Jared Ingersoll, an-
other prominent local figure. 334 "The late Judge INGERSOLL," Duncan 
noted, "a name respected and honored, when attorney-general, in his re-
port to the legislature, in 1813, stated that by several acts of assembly, 
'cruel and unnatural punishments, which tended only to harden and con-
firm the criminal, had been abolished for all inferior offences."' 335 "It is 
apparent," Duncan emphasized, referring to Bradford and Ingersoll, "that 
those two distinguished men were of opinion that all infamous corporal 
punishments, and disgraceful public spectacles, ad ludibrium, were abol-
ished; and that the legislature so considered it when they passed the several 
acts reforming the penal laws, I think, we have the most conclusive evi-
dence."336 
In his analysis, Justice Duncan spent a lot of time recounting the his-
tory of laws punishing scolding, whether by fine, gagging, or confinement 
at hard labor.337 After referencing laws passed in 1682 and 1683 that pun-
ished scolding, Duncan emphasized that those laws "continued in force 
until 1700, when another act against scolding passed, inflicting the same 
penalty of imprisonment, five days at hard labor, or to be gagged and stand 
at some convenient place, at the discretion of the magistrate. "338 "The act 
of 1700 was repealed by the Queen in council, but I have not been able to 
find the repeal of the acts of 1682 and 1683," Duncan added.339 "Whatev-
er be the fact," he ruled, "the conclusion is the same-that the common-
law punishment of ducking was not received nor embodied by usage so as 
333 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 85. 
334 Jared Ingersoll served as Pennsylvania's attorney general from 1790 to 1799 and also 
from 1811 to 1817. In 1821, Ingersoll became the presiding judge of the District Court for 
the City and County of Philadelphia, but died a year later. Robert J. Lukens, Jared 
Ingersoll's Rejection of Appointment as One of the "Midnight Judges" of 1801: 
Foolhardy or Farsighted?, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 189, 203-205 (1997). 
335 James, 1825 WL 1899 at * 11. 
336 !d. Noting the Quaker heritage of Pennsylvania, Justice Duncan added: 
The sanguinary code of England could be no favorite with William Penn and his fol-
lowers, who fled from persecution. Cruel punishments were not likely to be introduced by 
a society who denied the right to touch the life of man, even for the most atrocious crime. 
For had they brought with them the whole body of the British criminal law, then we 
should have had the appeal of death, and the impious spectacle of a trial by battle in a 
Quaker colony; and it is worthy of remembrance, that the charter of William Penn em-
powered him with the advice and assent of the freemen, to make laws for their own gov-
ernment, and until this was done, the laws of England, in respect to real and personal 
property, and as to felonies were to continue the same. Thus, as to misdemeanors, the 
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to become a part of the common law of Pennsylvania."340 As Duncan em-
phasized: "It was rejected, as not accommodated to the circumstances of 
the country, and against all the notions of punishment entertained by this 
primitive and humane community; and, though they adopted the common-
law doctrines as to inferior offences, yet they did not follow their punish-
ment."341 
In making his ruling, Justice Duncan spoke of the common law and its 
evolving nature. "I do not find the rule on this subject," he noted, "more 
satisfactorily laid down than by the Chief Justice." 342 "Every country, he 
observed," Duncan wrote of the Chief Justice's prior decision in The 
Guardians of the Poor of Philadelphia v. Greene,343 "had its common 
law-ours is composed partly of the common law of England, and partly 
of our own usages." 344 As Duncan emphasized: "Our ancestors, when they 
emigrated, took with them such of the English principles as were conven-
ient for the situation in which they were about to place themselves. By de-
grees, as circumstances demanded, we adopted the English usages, or sub-
stituted others better suited to our wants; until, before the revolution, we 
had formed a system of our own, founded, in general, on the English con-
stitution, but not without considerable variation; and in nothing was the 
variation greater, than in the trial and punishment of crimes."345 
In considering the practice of ducking scolds, Duncan wrote that "all 
our legislation has been opposed to this punishment; judicial decisions 
there are none." 346 "I cannot give to the two precedents from the quarter 
sessions of Philadelphia," he said, "the weight of decisions." 347 As Duncan 
reasoned in rejecting reliance on those precedents: "The two instances in 
the quarter sessions, which are principally relied upon to sustain the judg-
ment, are too slight a foundation on which to rest a sentence, so hostile to 
all the policy and humanity of our penal code, and so much opposed to the 
340 Id. 
341 !d. "It is not true," Duncan held, "that our ancestors brought with them all the 
common-law offenses; for instance, that of champerty and maintenance, this court 
decided in Stoever v. Whitman's Lessee, 6 Binn. 416, did not exist here." !d. at * 12. 
342 !d. at * 12. 
343 5 Binn. 554, 558 (Pa. 1813). 
344 James, 1825 WL 1899 at* 12. 
345 !d.; see also id. (italics in original): 
Judge CHASE, in the United States v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384, on the same subject, thus 
expresses himself: "When the American colonies were first settled by our ancestors, it 
was held, as well among the settlers, as by the judges and lawyers of England, that they 
brought hither, as their birthright and inheritance, so much of the common law as was 
applicable to their local situation and change of circumstances; but each colony judged for 
itself what part of the common law was applicable to its new condition, and by various 
modes--by legislative acts, by judicial decisions, or by constant usage--adopted some 
parts and rejected others." 
346 James, 1825 WL 1899 at* 12. 
347 !d. 
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sense of the community."348 "Common-law rights," Duncan emphasized, 
"are to be found in the opinions of lawyers, delivered by axioms; or in ju-
dicial decisions, well considered and established; or to be collected from the 
universal usage through the country."349 
Justice Duncan thus took a practical, non-rigid approach to the ques-
tion before him, looking at the facts as any good judge is supposed to do. 
"What is the evidence here?" Duncan asked, before proceeding to recount 
the only instances he could locate of women being ordered ducked for the 
offense of scolding. 350 In one notorious case from the 1781-1782 time peri-
od, Duncan wrote, a sentence of ducking was only "most reluctantly" giv-
en before being "humanely" suspended.351 In that case, the court-
"doubtful of the sentence to be given"-instead ordered the woman, by 
agreement and with her consent, to simply leave the neighborhood in 
which she had committed her offense.352 The decisionmakers in that case, 
Justice Duncan editorialized, "were glad, as well as the neighborhood, to 
get rid of her." 353 "Mr. Bradford was then attorney-general," Duncan add-
ed, saying that "most probably, all was transacted under his advice; we can 
thus readily account for this unusual judgment."354 
348 !d. As Judge Duncan wrote of the work of the court of quarter sessions and the absence 
of ducking being inflicted as punishment: 
The court of quarter sessions was, when this judgment was given, composed entirely of 
men who (however high their standing in society, and however intelligent) were unversed 
in law. Since 1782, until the last case in the mayor's court, forty years ran round, and there 
has been no instance of this punishment. There has been one of an acquittal; that case, 
therefore, proves nothing. 
!d. 
349 !d. 
350 !d. Judge Duncan described what he found as follows: 
In 1769, eighty years after the settlement of the colony, in The King v. Mary Conway, the 
indictment was against her as a common scold; she pleaded guilty; the sentence was, that 
she should be publicly ducked at the end of Market street wharf, in the Delaware; all this 
passed without debate, and we may presume, without the assistance of counsel for the 
woman. In 1779, ten years after, there was a trial and conviction (The State v. Ann 
Maize), and the same sentence. In 1781, there was an indictment for the same offense, 
against Mary Swann; verdict guilty; continued for advisement; continued from March 
1781, to June 1782, when there is this most extraordinary entry: "defendant having 
demeaned herself peaceably, kept under further advisement; and in the next term, on 
motion of Mr. Bankson, the defendant was recognized, that she will, within one month, 





354 !d. William Bradford was Pennsylvania's attorney general from 1780 to 1791, when he 
was appointed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In 1794 Bradford become the 
Attorney General of the United States, serving in that position until his death in 1795. 
William Bradford (1755-1795), UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA UNIVERSITY ARCHIVES, 
http://www.archives.upenn.edu/people/1700s/bradford_ wm.html (last visited Nov. 15, 
2011). 
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While he discussed the common law in detail, Justice Duncan was not 
willing to blindly follow ideas laid down decades earlier. "I must confess," 
he said of the punishment of ducking, "I am not so idolatrous a worship-
per, as to tie myself to the tail of this dung-cart of the common law."355 "I 
am far from professing the same reverence for all the degrading and ludi-
crous punishments of the early days of the common law," he wrote, adding 
of ducking: "I am far from thinking, that this is an unbroken pillar of the 
common law, or that to remove this rubbish, would impair a structure, 
which no man can admire more than I do." 356 "In coming to the conclu-
sion, that the ducking-stool is not the punishment of scolds," Duncan 
wrote, "I do not take into consideration the humane provisions of the con-
stitutions of the United States and of this state, as to cruel and unusual 
punishments, further than they show the sense of the whole communi-
ty. "357 
In alluding to, but not relying on, the Eighth Amendment's language, 
Justice Duncan instead focused on the barbarous and undignified nature of 
the punishment of ducking. As Duncan reasoned: "If the reformation of the 
culprit, and prevention of the crime, be the just foundation and object of 
all punishments, nothing could be further removed from these salutary 
ends, than the infliction in question. "358 "It destroys all personal respect," 
he explained, emphasizing that "the women thus punished would scold on 
for life, and the exhibition would be far from being beneficial to the specta-
tors."359 "What a spectacle would it exhibit!" he emphasized, worrying 
about "a congregation of the idle" and the disorderly and the lack of any 
persuasive penological justification.360 "[T]he day would produce more 
scolding," he said, "in this polite city, than would otherwise take place in a 
year. ,361 
By ruling that the ducking-stool was an instrument of the past, not the 
present, Justice Duncan reversed the judgment of the court of quarter ses-
sions. 362 In so doing, Duncan recognized that the change in the law 
wrought over time was beneficial to society as a whole. "The city is rescued 
from this ignominious and odious show, and the state from the opprobri-
um of the continuance of so barbarous an institution," Duncan wrote, not-
ing that his ruling was in line with those of other states.363 "The courts of 
our sister states of New York and Massachusetts, governed by the same 
common law as we are," he emphasized, "have declared that this strange 







362 !d. at* 14. 
363 !d. at* 13. 
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and ludicrous punishment no longer exists with them." 364 "[T]he common 
law punishment of ducking not being received here," Duncan concluded of 
Pennsylvania law, "I join in the hope of a learned antiquarian and jurist of 
our own country, 'that we shall hereafter hear nothing of the ducking-
stool, or other remains of the customs of barbarous ages."' 365 
The James case dealt with a non-lethal corporal punishment, with the 
decision grounded in the humanitarian principle of human dignity. But two 
other cases from the pre-1830 period dealt with a thornier, much more 
common problem in antebellum America: the intersection of race and the 
prohibition on cruel punishments. In Ely v. Thompson,366 a "free person of 
color" brought "an action of trespass, assault, battery and imprisonment" 
against a justice of the peace and a constable.367 At issue was the legality of 
a Kentucky law that subjected "any negro or mulatto, or Indian" to "thirty 
lashes on his or her bare back, well laid on" for lifting "his or her hand in 
opposition to any person not being a negro, mulatto or Indian. "368 After 
the plaintiff, Rhody Ely, filed his lawsuit, the justice of the peace "pleaded 
his office" and the fact that "the plaintiff had lifted his hand in opposition 
to a white man. "369 The justice of the peace thus argued that the sentence 
he pronounced-that Ely be lashed thirty times on his bare back-was jus-
tified under state law.370 The constable likewise pled and interposed "his 
office" and "the execution of the warrant," saying that he was entitled to 
inflict stripes pursuant to the sentence of the justice of the peace.371 The 
lower court in the Kentucky case agreed, prompting Ely to argue on appeal 
that the state law "is contrary to the constitution of this state, and there-
fore void. "372 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, Ely specifically in-
voked the state constitution's prohibition against "cruel punishments." 
That prompted his adversaries-who conceded the cruelty of the law-to 
364 Id. 
365 !d. at * 14 (citing Duponceau on Jurisdiction 96). In a "NOTE" that followed the 
opinion itself, it was added that an act of Henry VIII had once been passed for the 
punishment of a cook who had poisoned a bishop's family members. !d. As the note 
stated: "[B]y an ex post facto law, this was made treason, and he was ordered to be thrown 
into boiling water; the idea of which punishment, as Barrington suggests, was because he 
was a cook." Id. (citation omitted; italics in original). "Such were the barbarous 
institutions of the age," the note concluded, adding: "This punishment accorded with the 
savage cruelty of the monarch, and was recommended by its quaintness; to boil a cook, 
was quite a royal joke; as the Duke of Clarence was drowned in a butt of Malmsey, a 
favor granted him by the King; a whimsical choice, says Hume, which implied that he had 
an extraordinary passion for that liquor." !d. (italics in original). 
366 3 A.K. Marsh. 70, 1820 WL 1161 *2-3 (Ky. App. 1820). 
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take a three-pronged approach. First, they argued that the law allowing 
non-whites to be lashed "is consistent with, and does not contravene any 
of, the provisions of the constitution, and that the legislature might adopt 
this punishment, notwithstanding its cruelty, with regard to white per-
sons."373 Second, the justice of the peace and the constable alternatively 
contended that even if the state law was found to violate the state's consti-
tution, "yet free persons of color are no parties to our political compact, 
and of course are not entitled to its privileges or shielded by its provisions, 
and that they are subject to any regulation which the legislature may adopt, 
although such regulations are contrary to the constitution in their 
terms." 374 Finally, the justice of the peace and the constable asserted that as 
"a judicial officer" and "a ministerial officer" who were "bound to execute 
process without enquiring into its validity, neither can be responsible." 375 
In Ely, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held in 1820 that the state 
law in dispute was unconstitutional under Kentucky's prohibition against 
"cruel punishments."376 In particular, the Kentucky law was found to be 
unconstitutional "in so far as it subjects the free person of color to corporal 
punishment for raising his hand in opposition to a white person, if it be 
done in self defense; and in so far as it infringes the privileges secured by 
the 10th section of the 10th article." 377 The appellate court-in reaching 
that decision-emphasized that a "remarkable feature" of the law was that 
"[t]he oath of the party complaining is conclusive, and the justice must 
inflict the punishment, although the proof may be untrue, and he disbe-
lieves it." 378 Noting "the extensive nature of the act" and that the law pre-
vented actions not only taken "in an angry or threatening manner but also 
those "done in self defense, or in warding off injury, or in repelling at-
tempts on the virtue of the female of color, by an intended ravisher," the 
court in Ely found itself forced to confront-in its own words-"the disa-
greeable necessity of deciding upon" the law's constitutionality "so far as it 
operates on free persons of color."379 
The court in Ely noted "the severity of the act" and lamented "its 
want of those mild features which characterize the rest of our code."380 
And the court seemed reluctant-as courts so often are-to invalidate the 
373 !d. In other words, they argued that a state law designed to protect whites could not 
contravene the state's prohibition against "cruel punishments". 
374 !d. 
375 !d. 
376 Kentucky's first, second and third constitutions all expressly prohibited "cruel 
punishments." BENNETT H. YOUNG, HISTORY AND TEXTS OF THE THREE CONSTITUTIONS OF 
KENTUCKY 31, 53, 88 (1890). 
377 Ely, 1820 WL 1161 at *2-3. Article X, section 10 of Kentucky's second constitution, 
adopted in 1799, gave the accused in criminal prosecutions "a right to be heard by himself 
and counsel" and "to meet the witnesses face to face," among other rights. Ky. Const., art. 
X,§ 10. 
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operation of the law. As the court's opinion stated: "[H]owever severe, 
cruel and rigorous its features, if it does not contravene the constitution, it 
must be executed, till the legislative power of the government shall see 
cause to change it." 381 Yet, the court found itself unwilling to ignore the 
state constitution's long-standing prohibition on "cruel punishments."382 
As the court noted: "It would, however, be difficult to exempt this section 
[of the code] from the imputation of cruelty, within the meaning of the 
15th section of the 10th article of the constitution, so far as the act subjects 
a free person of color to thirty lashes for lifting his hand in oppression to a 
white person who was attempting wantonly to violate his or her person, 
contrary to the peace and good order of society."383 The court concluded: 
"If a justice of the peace, or any other tribunal, should, under this act, in-
flict the stripes against a free person of color, who lifted his hand to save 
him or herself from death or severe bodily harm, all men must pronounce 
the punishment cruel indeed. "384 
As to the argument "that free persons of color are not parties to the 
political compact," the court in Ely thought that argument had been taken 
too far. 385 "This we can not admit, to the extent contended for," the court 
began, noting that free persons of color "are certainly, in some measure, 
parties."386 The court-aware of the political environment in which it op-
erated-walked a thin line. "Although they have not every benefit or privi-
lege which the constitution secures," the court ruled, "yet they have many 
secured by it."387 The court, in its very next sentence, then clarified, how-
ever: "We need not take the trouble of inquiring how far they are, or are 
not, parties. For, suppose the premises are admitted, the conclusion would 
not follow, that the legislature had a right to do with them as it chose, and 
that their acts on that subject could never be brought to a constitutional 
test." 388 "Although they are not parties to the compact," the court held of 
free persons of color, "yet they are entitled to repose under its shadow, and 
thus secure themselves from the heated vengeance of the organs of govern-
ment."389 
381 /d. 
382 !d. Article XII, section 15 of the Kentucky Constitution of 1792 provided: "That 
excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments 
inflicted." Kentucky's second constitution, adopted in 1799, contained an identical 
provision in Article X, section 15. 
383 Ely, 1820 WL 1161 at *4. 
384 !d. 




389 !d. The court in Ely then compared the rights of free persons of color to those of aliens, 
ruling as follows: "Aliens, who sojourn here, and belong to another, and claim nothing of 
our government, but the right of passage, could not be taken up and hung by a justice of 
the peace, without a hearing, without an opportunity of proving themselves innocent, and 
without a jury, even if the legislature, by a solemn act, should direct it to be done." !d. 
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By contrast, in Aldridge v. Commonwealth,390 the General Court of 
Virginia held in 1824 that Virginia's cruel and unusual punishments clause 
had no relevance whatsoever to a free person of color.391 In that case, the 
petitioner-"a free man of color"-was indicted for grand larceny of bank 
notes valued at one hundred and fifty dollars.392 The petitioner was con-
victed of the crime, and the jury determined that thirty-nine stripes should 
be inflicted upon him.393 Thereafter, the Superior Court-following the 
provisions of a new Virginia law-ordered that the petitioner "receive thir-
ty-nine stripes on his bare back on the 26th of June next, and that after 
that day, he be sold as a slave, and transported and banished beyond the 
limits of the United States, in the manner prescribed by Law." 394 
After the verdict, the petitioner in Aldridge then moved to have the 
judgment arrested, arguing to the Superior Court-which rejected all of his 
arguments-that the 1823 state law under which he was punished was un-
constitutional as a cruel and unusual punishment. 395 That Virginia law 
provided that in cases of grand larceny committed by "free negroes" or 
"mulattoes," the free person of color could be sold as a slave and trans-
ported and banished beyond the limits of the United States.396 The law al-
lowing such persons to be sold as slaves, the petitioner had argued, "is con-
trary to the Bill of Rights of Virginia, and therefore, unconstitutional and 
void." 397 Writing for the General Court of Virginia, Judge William Dade398 
"The tenth section of the constitution, which we have quoted," the court held, "restricts 
the powers of the legislature and every department of government." !d. As the court 
emphasized: "The powers which they are therein forbidden to exercise, they do not 
possess, and can not exercise over any man or class of men, be they aliens, free persons of 
color, or citizens." !d. "Although free persons of color are not parties to our social 
compact," the court concluded, "yet they have many privileges secured thereby, and have 
a right to its protection." !d. 
390 2 Va. Cas. 447, 1824 WL 1072 *3 (Va. Gen. 1824). 
391 Id. at *2-4. 






398 See Andrew T. Fede, Gender in the Law of Slavery in the Antebellum United States, 18 
CARDozo L. REv. 411, 420-21 (1996) (discussing another ruling of Judge William Dade, 
who held in Commonwealth v. Turner, 5 Rand. 678, 1827 WL 1087 (Va. Gen. 1827), that 
only the legislature-and not the common law--could declare a master's cruelty to a 
slave to be a criminal battery). In Turner, a master had been indicted for "wilfully and 
maliciously, violently, cruelly, immoderately, and excessively" beating, scourging and 
whipping his own slave "with certain rods, whips and sticks." Turner, 1827 WL 1087 at 
* 1. "It is said to be the boast of the common law," Judge Dade ruled for the court, "that it 
continually conforms itself to the ever-changing condition of society." !d. at *2. But after 
comparing the beating of a slave with the beating of a horse and tracing the origins of 
slavery itself, Dade called common-law prosecutions of masters for cruelty "a new idea" 
and a "contested" subject, noting that "great changes are not to be made by the Courts." 
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announced for the judges "that there is nothing in the Constitution or Bill 
of Rights, repugnant to the power which the Legislature has exercised in 
the punishment of this crime."399 
In analyzing Virginia's bill of rights, the General Court of Virginia be-
gan with the following observation: "Notwithstanding the general terms 
used in the Bill of Rights, it is undeniable that it never was contemplated, 
or considered, to extend to the whole population of the State."400 As Judge 
Dade ruled on the court's behalf: "Can it be doubted, that it not only was 
not intended to apply to our slave population, but that the free blacks and 
mulattoes were also not comprehended in it?"401 "The leading and most 
prominent feature" of Virginia's bill of rights, Dade acknowledged, "is the 
equality of civil rights and liberty."402 "And yet," he pointed out, "nobody 
!d. at *2-5. "It is greatly to be deplored fuat an offense so odious and revolting as fuis," he 
said, "should exist to fue reproach of humanity." "This Court," he wrote, however, "has 
little hesitation in saying that fue power of correction does not belong to it." !d. at *5 
(italics in original). Slaves in Virginia were not only then marginalized and powerless, but 
they were quite literally without constitutional rights and subject to an incredibly harsh 
state-law punishment regime. See, e.g., Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The 
"Law Only as an Enemy": The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness through the 
Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REv. 969, 977 (1992) 
("Slaves could receive the deafu penalty for at least sixty-eight offenses, whereas for 
whites the same conduct eifuer was at most punishable by imprisonment or was not a 
crime at all."). 
Only one judge, William Brockenbrough, dissented in Turner, opining that slaves 
should be protected under the common law from "all unnecessary, cruel, and inhuman 
punishments." Turner, 1827 WL 1087 at *6 (Brockenbrough, J., dissenting). "I admit," he 
wrote, "that whilst a statute existed which exempted a master from punishment for killing 
his slave, by reason of a blow given during his correction, or for the manslaughter of a 
slave, any beating, however cruel and severe, could not be fue subject of a prosecution." 
Id. "But," Brockenbrough added, "fuis ferocious and sanguinary system oflegislation was 
abolished by the act of November, 1788." !d. (citing 12 Hen. Stat. at Large, 681 ). "By that 
repeal," he explained, "the common law was expressly revived: by fuat repeal, fue law 
again extended its a:gis over the slave to protect him from all inhuman torture, though that 
torture should be inflicted by the hand of a master." !d. As Brockenbrough argued: 
I had not supposed that I was stretching the principles of the common law to an 
unreasonable and unprecedented extent. I had supposed that if, in England, the mere 
attempt, though ineffectual, to commit a felony, or the solicitation to commit one, be a 
misdemesnor, (3 Bac. Ab. 549;) if an Indictment will be allowed in Massachusetts for 
poisoning a cow, (1 Mass. T. Rep. 59;) or in Pennsylvania for killing a horse, (1 Dall. 
335.) an Indictment might be sustained in Virginia for maliciously and inhumanly beating 
a slave almost to death. In other words, I had supposed, that whilst the common law 
protected all persons in the just exercise of any authority or power conferred on them by 
the law; yet, for the abuse of that authority, or an excess in the exercise of it, they were 
liable to be prosecuted as delinquents. 
Turner, 1827 WL 1087 at *6 (italics in original). 
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has ever questioned the power of the Legislature, to deny to free blacks and 
mulattoes, one of the first privileges of a citizen; that of voting at elections, 
although they might in every particular, except color, be in precisely the 
same condition as those qualified to vote. "403 
In focusing on Virginia's cruel and unusual punishments prohibition 
in particular, the General Court of Virginia ruled that "we have no notion 
that it has any bearing on this case." As the court held: "That provision 
was never designed to control the Legislative right to determine ad libitum 
upon the adequacy of punishment, but is merely applicable to the modes of 
punishment. "404 As Judge Dade, emphasizing that "the best heads and 
hearts of the land of our ancestors" had "long and loudly declaimed 
against the wanton cruelty" of many punishments imposed "in other coun-
tries," ruled for a unanimous court: "[T]his section in the Bill of Rights, 
was framed effectually to exclude these, so that no future Legislature, in a 
moment perhaps of great and general excitement, should be tempted to 
disgrace our Code by the introduction of any of those odious modes of 
punishment. "405 Ultimately, the General Court of Virginia overruled the 
petitioner's request for a writ of error.406 
The two southern cases intersecting with race were both decided be-
fore the Civil War and the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments-
amendments that would fundamentally reshape American law. The Thir-
teenth Amendment, adopted in 1865, abolished slavery, providing: "Nei-
ther slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. "407 The Fourteenth 
Amendment, adopted in 1868, later conferred citizenship rights by provid-
ing in Section 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside."408 That section also provided: "No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immun-
ities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. "409 The Fif-
teenth Amendment, conferring the right of citizens to vote regardless "of 
403 !d. As Dade emphasized: "The numerous restrictions imposed on this class of people 
in our Statute Book, many of which are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution, both of this State and of the Untied States, as respects the free whites, 
demonstrate, that, here, those instruments have not been considered to extend equally to 
both classes of our population." !d. 
404 !d. (italics in original). 
405 !d. at * 3-4. 
406 Id. at *7. 
407 U.S. Const., amend. XIII. 
408 U.S. Const., amend. XIV. 
409 !d. 
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race, color, or previous condition of servitude,"410 would-like the other 
Reconstruction Amendments-change the course of American history and 
U.S. law. 
iii. The Supreme Court's Pre-1900 Cases 
Wilkerson v. Utah411 was the first case in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court wrestled with the Eighth Amendment's meaning. In that 1878 case, 
an Eighth Amendment challenge was lodged against a Utah law by a per-
son sentenced to be shot by a firing squad for pre-meditated murder. At the 
time, the Utah law-codified in 1876-provided that any person convicted 
of first-degree murder "shall suffer death. "412 Following the jury's guilty 
verdict, the presiding judge-in accordance with Utah's mandatory sen-
tencing scheme-had sentenced the prisoner as follows: "That 'you be tak-
en from hence to some place in this Territory, where you shall be safely 
kept until Friday, the fourteenth day of December next; that between the 
hours of ten o'clock in the forenoon and three o'clock in the afternoon of 
the last-named day you be taken from your place of confinement to some 
place within this district, and that you there be publicly shot until you are 
dead. "'413 
In deciding that the prisoner's death sentence was not unconstitution-
al, the Supreme Court in Wilkerson first pointed out that hanging and 
shooting were then common methods of execution.414 "Cruel and unusual 
410 U.S. Const., amend. XV (ratified Feb. 3, 1870). 
411 99 U.S. 130 (1878). 
412 !d. at 129. Utah's 1876law did provide that, upon recommendation of the jury, a 
person guilty of first-degree murder might be imprisoned at hard labor in the penitentiary 
for life at the discretion of the court. !d. at 132, 136. Utah's prior law, in force from 1852 
to 187 6, provided that "when any person shall be convicted of any crime the punishment 
of which is death, ... he shall suffer death by being shot, hung, or beheaded, as the court 
my direct," or as the convicted person may choose. !d. at 132 (quoting Comp. Laws Utah, 
1876, 564). 
413 !d. at 130-31. In that era, public executions were still common in some parts of the 
country. See JOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK: MIDNIGHT EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 
41-56 (1997). The last public execution took place in the United States in Kentucky in 
1936. !d. at 31-33. 
414 Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 133 ("the usages of the army to the present day are that sentences 
of the kind may in certain cases be executed by shooting, and in others by hanging"); id. 
at 134 ("[T]he custom of war, says a learned writer upon the subject, has, in the absence 
of statutory law, determined that capital punishment be inflicted by shooting or hanging; 
and the same author adds to the effect that mutiny, meaning mutiny not resulting in loss of 
life, desertion, or other military crime, if a capital offense, is commonly punished by 
shooting; that a spy is always hanged, and that mutiny, if accompanied by loss of life, is 
punished in the same manner,-that is, by hanging.") (citation omitted); id. ("Military laws, 
says another learned author, do not say how a criminal offending against such laws shall 
be put to death, but leave it entirely to the custom of war; and his statement is that 
shooting or hanging is the method determined by such custom. Like the preceding author, 
he also proceeds to state that a spy is generally hanged, and that mutiny unaccompanied 
with loss oflife is punished by the same means; and he also concurs with Benet, that 
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punishments are forbidden by the Constitution," it noted, but then held 
that "the authorities referred to are quite sufficient to show that the pun-
ishment of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime 
of murder in the first degree is not included in that category, within the 
meaning of the eighth amendment."415 As the Court explained: "Soldiers 
convicted of desertion or other capital military offences are in the great 
majority of cases sentenced to be shot, and the ceremony for such occa-
sions is given in great ful[l]ness by the writers upon the subject of courts-
martial."416 The Court further cited William Blackstone's treatise, Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England, for the proposition that capital offend-
ers are often "hanged by the neck till dead."417 
The Court in Wilkerson, though approving the prisoner's sentence to 
be shot, stated in dicta that the Eighth Amendment would prohibit certain 
cruel, painful or disgraceful punishments. "Difficulty," the Court wrote, 
"would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitu-
tional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall 
not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture, such as 
those mentioned by the commentator referred to, and all others in the same 
line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that [a]mendment to the Con-
stitution."418 Blackstone-the referenced commentator-had, in the Su-
preme Court's words, admitted "that in very atrocious crimes other cir-
cumstances of terror, pain, or disgrace were sometimes superadded."419 As 
the Court in Wilkerson elaborated: "Cases mentioned by the author are, 
where the prisoner was drawn or dragged to the place of execution, in trea-
son; or where he was embowelled alive, beheaded, and quartered, in high 
treason. "420 "Mention," the Court added, continuing its discussion of 
Blackstone's Commentaries, "is also made of public dissection in murder, 
and burning alive in treason committed by a female. "421 The Court in 
desertion, disobedience of orders, or other capital crimes are usually punished by 
shooting, adding, that the mode in all cases, that is, either shooting or hanging, may be 
declared in the sentence.") (citation omitted). 
415 !d. at 134-35. 
416 !d. at 135 (italics added). The italicized language seems to focus on the usualness or 
unusualness of the punishment in question. 
417 Id. (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at 377). 
418 !d. at 135-35 (citations omitted). 
419 Id. at 135. 
420 !d. 
421 !d. After recounting these cruel practices, the Court in Wilkerson editorialized: "Histo-
ry confirms the truth of these atrocities, but the commentator states that the humanity of 
the nation by tacit consent allowed the mitigation of such parts of those judgments as 
savored of torture or cruelty, and he states that they were seldom strictly carried into ef-
fect." !d. In the context of its decision ofhow the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
barred "punishments of torture," the Court further noted that another commentator, Chitty, 
had discussed "instances" in which "the ignominious or more painful parts of the punish-
ment of high treason have been remitted ... " !d. 
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Wilkerson thus looked backed and to the then-current frequency of the 
punishment's use as it made its ruling. 
In re Kemmler,422 the Supreme Court's next case to grapple with the 
Eighth Amendment's meaning, dealt with a completely novel method of 
execution, one not tried before and certainly not around in Blackstone's 
day. That case involved the fate of a man, William Kemmler, sentenced to 
be electrocuted in New York for first-degree murder.423 In 1886, a New 
York commission-led by New York City lawyer Elbridge Gerry-was 
created to investigate and report on "the most humane and practical meth-
od known to modern science of carrying into effect the sentence of death in 
capital cases. "424 As a result of its work, the New York legislature passed 
the Electrical Execution Act of 1888-a law that took effect on January 1, 
1889, with William Kemmler becoming the first person to die in New 
York's electric chair.425 But Kemmler would not be executed before a legal 
challenge was heard-a legal challenge that made it all the way to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
Before his execution, Kemmler had challenged his sentence as "a cruel 
and unusual punishment" under both New Y ark's constitution and the 
U.S. Constitution.426 That allegation was contested,427 so the trial judge 
decided to have a hearing on the issue and "[a] voluminous mass of evi-
dence was then taken as to the effect of electricity as an agent of death, and 
upon that evidence it was argued that the punishment in that form was 
cruel and unusual."428 As the lower court judge described it: "[I]t is in these 
circumstances that I am asked to discharge the prisoner from his present 
detention; it being contended in his behalf that the legislative enactment 
under consideration provides punishment both cruel and unusual, the in-
fliction whereof may well result in subjecting its unfortunate victim to the 
most extreme and protracted vigor and subtility of cruelty and torture. "429 
In response, the authorities contended that New Y ark's new law was 
"a step forward and in keeping with the scientific progress of the age" and 
that "the application of electricity as proposed will result in the immediate 
422 136 U.S. 436 (1890). 
423 !d. at 438-39. 
424 BESSLER, supra note 413, at 47. 
425 Id. at 48-49. William Kemmler was convicted of first-degree murder in the court of 
oyer and terminer in Buffalo, New York. In re Kemmler, 7 N.Y.S. 145, 146 (1889). 
426 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 439, 441. 
427 !d. at 440-41. 
428 !d. at 442. The appointment of a referee was agreed upon for the taking of testimony, 
and the referee, Tracy C. Becker, Esq., was accordingly named. Becker later made a 
report, transmitting the "large amount of testimony taken by him." In re Kemmler, 7 
N.Y.S. at 146-47; see also People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 24 N.E. 6 
(N.Y. 1890) ("[C]ounsel for the respective parties agreed that a referee be appointed for 
the purpose of taking the testimony in pursuance of the offer. In this way a mass of 
testimony was given upon both sides, certified by the referee to the county judge, and 
embraced in the extended record before us."). 
429 In re Kemmler, 7 N.Y.S. at 148. 
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and painless death of the culprit, so that the unsightly and horrifying spec-
tacles which now not infrequently attend executions by hanging will effec-
tually be prevented."430 Ultimately, the county judge-who saw the ques-
tion as "one largely of fact" 431-sided with the State of New York, holding 
that William Kemmler had not overcome the presumption of constitution-
ality afforded to the New York law.432 The county court ruled that certain 
methods of executions, including hanging, "death by gunshot," and elec-
trocution, were constitutional.433 He also found that the Eighth Amend-
430 !d. 
431 !d. at 149. As the lower court judge put it: "[I]t was because the burden of satisfying 
the judicial mind of the cruel and unusual, and therefore unconstitutional, character of the 
law in question was upon the defendant and to afford him opportunity to present the facts 
as he claimed them to be, that, as the better course, the reference was ordered ... " !d. The 
judge emphasized that because "scientific questions were involved ... an intelligent 
decision of the question would seem to require that there be furnished to those called upon 
to decide all the light that scientists, experts, and others having large experience in 
electrical matters should be able to give ... " !d. 
432 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 442. 
433 The lower court judge ruled as follows: 
Although the phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" has a history of 200 years, it is not 
an easy task to define it. It was said in Wilkerson v. Utall, 99 U.S. 130, that "difficulty 
would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision." 
Courts have rarely been called upon to construe it. Nor is it now at all needful, in the view 
which I entertain of the present case, and of my duty in regard to it, to attempt any 
accurate and comprehensive definition. Beyond doubt, many of the methods used for the 
infliction of the death penalty in other times and countries would to-day and in our land be 
held illegal. As among these may be mentioned crucifixion, boiling in water, oil, or lead, 
blowing from cannon's mouth, burning, breaking on the wheel, dismemberment, burying 
alive. But not death itself is a cruel and unusual punishment, nor is death by gunshot or by 
hanging, though there seems to be an element of cruelty inseparable from any taking of 
human life as punishment for crime; but it is clearly not against this that the constitutional 
prohibition is directed. It was held by the supreme court of the United States in the 
Wilkerson Case above cited, that a sentence to death by shooting was not illegal in Utah. 
Death was the penalty for murder at the common law, and of its infliction, Blackstone 
said: "If upon judgment to be hanged by the neck till he is dead the criminal be not 
thoroughly killed, but revives, the sheriff must hang him again; for the former hanging 
was no execution of the sentence. And if a false tenderness were to be indulged in such 
cases, a multitude of collusions might ensue. Nay, even while abjurations were in force, 
such a criminal, so reviving, was not allowed to take sanctuary, and abjure the realm, but 
his fleeing to sanctuary was held an escape in the officer." 4 Comm. 406. "Any 
punishment declared by statute for an offense which was punishable in the same way at 
the common law could not be regarded as cruel or unusual in the constitutional sense." 
Cooley, Const. Lim. 329. The common-law rule applied in this state when the 
constitutional provision under consideration was adopted, and long before and after, until 
the act of 1888 took effect; and no question was made as to the legality of death by 
hanging. That statute but changed the means whereby to produce death. And can it be said 
that in this case it has been plainly and beyond doubt established that electricity as a 
death-dealing agent is likely to prove less quick and sure in operation than the rope? I 
believe not. 
!d. at 149-50. 
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ment was of no concern in the case because it was "addressed solely to the 
national government" and "has no reference to punishments inflicted in 
state courts for crimes against the state. "434 
The New York appellate courts affirmed that order.435 While it was 
determined that the state constitution's prohibition against "cruel and unu-
sual punishments" imposed a restriction on the legislature436 and that cer-
tain methods of execution would be barred by it,437 New York's appellate 
judges-also seeing the issue as one of fact,438 though to be determined by 
434 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 442; In re Kemmler, 7 N.Y.S. at 148. In the lower court, 
the judge emphasized that "[t]he constitution of the United States and that of the state of 
New York, in language almost identical, provide against cruel and inhuman punishment 
... "!d. "[O]ur own state fundamental law," the lower court judge added, "is so benignant 
that not even he who cruelly murders can be cruelly punished." !d. 
435 People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 55 Hun 64, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 815 (1889) ("[T]hough 
the mode of death prescribed is conceded to be unusual, there is no common knowledge 
or consent that it is cruel; on the contrary, there is a belief, more or less common, that 
death by an electric current, under favorable circumstances, is instantaneous and without 
pain."); People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 577, 24 N.E. 6, 8 (N.Y. 
1890): 
We entertain no doubt in regard to the power of the legislature to change the manner of 
inflicting the penalty of death. The general power of the legislature over crimes, and its 
power to define and punish the crime of murder, is not and cannot be disputed. The 
amendments prescribed no new punishment for this offense. The punishment now, as 
before, is death. The only change made is in the mode of carrying out the sentence. The 
infliction of the death penalty in any manner must necessarily be accompanied with, what 
might be considered in this age, some degree of cruelty, and it is resorted to only because 
it is considered necessary for the protection of society. 
436 People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 55 Hun 64, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 815 (1889) ("it would 
seem that the provision in the state constitution against cruel and unusual punishments, if 
it were to have any practical operation,-if it was anything more than a mere glittering 
generality, calculated to please the popular fancy, and gratifY the popular taste for a 
'declaration ofrights,'-must have been intended as a restriction upon the legislative 
authority"). 
437 People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 55 Hun 64, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 815 (1889): 
We have no doubt that if the legislature of this state should undertake to prescribe, for any 
offense against its laws, the punishment of burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, 
disembowelling, or hanging in chains, to perish by exhaustion, it would be the duty of the 
courts to pronounce upon such attempt the condemnation of the constitution. In the case 
supposed, no doubt could exist, because the statute would be, on its face, repugnant to the 
provision of the constitution against cruel and unusual punishments. It is common 
knowledge that the punishments mentioned are unusual, and, by the common consent of 
mankind, they are cruel punishments, because they involve torture and a lingering death. 
438 People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 55 Hun 64, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 815-16 (1889) ("It was 
therefore a question of fact whether an electric current, of sufficient intensity, and 
skillfully applied, will produce death without unnecessary suffering."); People ex ref. 
Kemmler v. Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 577, 24 N.E. 6, 8 (N.Y. 1890) ("we think that its 
presence in the constitution of this state confers power upon the courts to declare void 
legislative acts prescribing punishments for crime in fact cruel and unusual"). 
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New York's legislature439-concluded that death by electrocution was not 
among them.440 As the New York Court of Appeals ruled in 1890: 
"Whether the use of electricity, as an agency for producing death, consti-
tuted a more humane method of executing the judgment of the court in 
capital cases, was a question for the determination of the legislature." 441 As 
that court emphasized: "It was a question peculiarly within its province, 
and the means at its command for ascertaining whether such a mode of 
producing death involved cruelty, within the meaning of the constitutional 
prohibition, were certainly as satisfactory and reliable as any that are con-
sistent with the limited functions of an appellate court." 442 
The New York Court of Appeals, after examining the testimony taken 
in the case, concluded that it "can find but little in it to warrant the belief 
that this new mode of execution is cruel, within the meaning of the consti-
tution, though it is certainly unusual. "443 The appellate court thus rejected 
439 Both of New York's appellate courts deferred to the legislative fact-finding that led to 
the adoption of electrocution as the new means of execution, seeing the court's own role 
as extremely limited. People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 55 Hun 64, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 816 
(1889) ("There is nothing in the constitution of our government, or in the nature of things, 
which gives any color to the proposition that, upon a mere question of fact involved in 
legislation, the judgment of the court is superior to that of the legislature itself; nor is there 
any authority for the proposition that, in respect to such question, relating either to the 
manner or the matter oflegislation the decision of the legislature can be reviewed by the 
court."); id. at 817 ("It is not merely upon principles of comity between co-ordinate 
branches of the government of the state, but because of the separate province and respon-
sibility of the legislature from that of the courts, that we hold that the latter are not permit-
ted to inquire whether the former was ignorant of the facts necessary to determine the 
meaning and effect of the laws which it has enacted; and, in respect to the particular stat-
ute in question, that the presumption that the legislature had ascertained the facts neces-
sary to determine that death by the mode prescribed was not a cruel punishment is conclu-
sive upon the court."); see also id. at 816-17: 
In the case of In re Railroad Co., supra, it was said that the courts cannot take proofs 
aliunde for the purpose of ascertaining whether a statute, valid and regular on its face, is 
unconstitutional; that they cannot go behind the statute itself; that they cannot assume to 
know that facts necessary to the constitutionality of the legislative act did not exist, but, 
on the contrary, may assume that the legislature found that those facts did exist. So, too, in 
respect to the manner of the passage of a bill, whether the constitutional quorum was 
present, and a vote of a constitutional majority was given in its favor, the statute must be 
its own evidence, and cannot be rebutted. The question is not one of fact, but oflaw, to be 
determined by the record. 
440 People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 579, 24 N.E. 6, 8 (N.Y. 1890) 
("The amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure, changing the mode of inflicting the 
death penalty, does not, upon its face nor in its general purpose and intent, violate any 
provision of the constitution."). 
441 People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 579, 24 N.E. 6, 8 (N.Y. 1890). 
"The determination of the legislature of this question," the New York Court of Appeals 
ruled, "is conclusive upon this court." Id. 
442 Id. 
443 People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 579, 24 N.E. 6, 9 (N.Y. 1890) 
(quoted inln re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 443). 
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the notion that electrocution-admittedly a novel means of execution-was 
cruel. "On the contrary," that court noted, "we agree with the court below 
that it removes every reasonable doubt that the application of electricity to 
the vital parts of the human body, under such conditions and in the man-
ner contemplated by the statute, must result in instantaneous, and conse-
quently in painless, death."444 "It would be a strange result, indeed," that 
court emphasized, speaking of the efforts of the New York legislature, "if it 
could now be held that its efforts to devise a more humane method of car-
rying out the sentence of death in capital cases have culminated in the en-
actment of a law in conflict with the provisions of the constitution prohib-
iting cruel and unusual punishments. "445 
In affirming the constitutionality of electrocution as a mode of execu-
tion, the U.S. Supreme Court in In re Kemmler emphasized that the New 
York legislature had appointed a commission to inquire into "the most 
humane and practical method known to modern science of carrying into 
effect the sentence of death in capital cases. "446 The Supreme Court further 
noted that New York's governor had said this in an annual message in call-
ing for the law change: "The present mode of executing criminals by hang-
ing has come down to us from the dark ages, and it may well be questioned 
whether the science of the present day cannot provide a means for taking 
the life of such as are condemned to die in a less barbarous manner. I 
commend this suggestion to the consideration of the legislature. "447 
In its 1890 decision in In re Kemmler, the U.S. Supreme Court wres-
tled with the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to the dispute. 
The Court summarized the condemned inmate's argument as follows: "It is 
not contended, as it could not be, that the eighth amendment was intended 
to apply to the states, but it is urged that the provision of the fourteenth 
amendment, which forbids a state to make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, is a 
prohibition on the state from the imposition of cruel and unusual punish-
ments, and that such punishments are also prohibited by inclusion in the 
term 'due process of law."'448 Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court-many 
decades later-determined that the Fourteenth Amendment did make the 
444 !d. The New York Court of Appeals also ruled that "[t]he testimony of expert or other 
witnesses is not admissible to show that in carrying out a law enacted by the legislature 
some provision of the constitution may possibly be violated." People ex ref. Kemmler v. 
Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 578, 24 N.E. 6, 8 (N.Y. 1890). "If the act upon its face is not in 
conflict with the constitution," the court ruled, "then extraneous proof cannot be used to 
condemn it." !d.; see also People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 579, 24 
N.E. 6, 8-9 (N.Y. 1890) ("The testimony taken by the referee, while not available to 
impeach the validity of the legislation, may, we think, be regarded as a valuable collection 
of facts and opinions touching the use of electricity as a means of producing death, and 
for that reason as part of the argument for the relator, but nothing more."). 
445 People ex ref. Kemmler v. Durston, 74 Sickels 569, 579, 24 N.E. 6, 8 (N.Y. 1890). 
446 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 444. 
447 !d. 
448 !d. at 446. 
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Eighth Amendment applicable to the states-a fact that must be kept in 
mind as one analyzes the In re Kemmler ruling.449 
In In re Kemmler, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that New York's bar 
on "cruel and unusual punishments"450 "was intended particularly to oper-
ate upon the legislature of the state, to whose control the punishment of 
crime was almost wholly confided."451 In dicta, however, the Supreme 
Court did opine that the Eighth Amendment's language barred "burning at 
the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or the like. "452 "[I]f the pun-
ishment prescribed for an offense against the laws of the state were mani-
festly cruel and unusual," the Court concluded, "it would be the duty of 
the courts to adjudge such penalties to be within the constitutional prohibi-
tion."453 "And we think this is equally true" of the Eighth Amendment "in 
its application to [C]ongress," the Court emphasized.454 The Court-while 
seeing the Eighth Amendment as only constraining the federal government 
in the late nineteenth century-thus focused on particularly painful meth-
ods of executions when it thought about the Eighth Amendment. 
While approving electrocution as a means of execution, the Supreme 
Court in In re Kemmler specifically rejected the prisoner's Fourteenth 
Amendment argument,455 offered only limited guidance in determining 
what punishments are "cruel," and utterly deferred to the state court 
judgment.456 "The decision of the state courts sustaining the validity of the 
act under the state constitution is not re-examinable here," the Court de-
termined, saying that "nor was that decision against any title, right, privi-
lege, or immunity specially set up or claimed by the petitioner under the 
constitution of the United States. "457 The Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Court held, acknowledging the 1868 amendment was intended to forbid 
449 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
450 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 445. 
451 !d. at 446. 
452 Id. 
453 !d. 
454 !d. at 446-47. 
455 In speaking ofNew York's new law, the Court wrote: 
The enactment of this statute was, in itself, within the legitimate sphere of the legislative 
power of the state, and in the observance of those general rules prescribed by our systems 
of jurisprudence; and the legislature of the state ofNew York determined that it did not 
inflict cruel and unusual punishment, and its courts have sustained that determination. We 
cannot perceive that the state has thereby abridged the privileges or immunities of the 
petitioner, or deprived him of due process of law. 
!d. at 449. 
456 "In order to reverse the judgment of the highest court of the state of New York," the 
Court emphasized, "we should be compelled to hold that it had committed an error so 
gross as to amount in law to a denial by the state of due process of law to one accused of 
crime, or of some right secured to him by the constitution of the United States." Id. at 449. 
"We have no hesitation in saying that this we cannot do upon the record before us," the 
Court concluded. Id. 
457 !d. at 447. 
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any "arbitrary deprivation" of life,458 "did not radically change the whole 
theory of the relations of the state and federal governments to each other, 
and of both governments to the people. "459 
Still, the Court in In re Kemmler did grapple with the concept of cru-
elty, though it spoke of cruelty in its "constitutional" sense. "As to the cru-
elty of punishments, the Court ruled: "Punishments are cruel when they 
involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not 
cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies 
there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere 
extinguishment of life. "460 The Court, at a time when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was still not being read to apply the provisions of the U.S. Bill 
of Rights to the states, nonetheless gave an indication of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's purpose. The Court said that the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibited the "arbitrary" deprivation of life while disclaiming the Four-
teenth Amendment's relevance to the dispute. 
And more cases, in a similar vein, were to come. In 1891, the Supreme 
Court also rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to the imposition of 
solitary confinement. In McElvaine v. Brush,461 the prisoner, Charles 
McElvaine, was convicted in New York of first-degree murder and sen-
tenced to death.462 The prisoner then sought a writ of habeas corpus from 
the Court, challenging the portion of New York's penal code requiring the 
458 !d. at 448. In particular, the Court wrote: 
Undoubtedly the amendment forbids any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty, or property, 
and secures equal protection to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their 
rights; and, in the administration of criminal justice, requires that no different or higher 
punishment shall be imposed upon one than is imposed upon all for like offenses. But it 
was not designed to interfere with the power of the state to protect the lives, liberties, and 
property of its citizens, and to promote their health, peace, morals, education, and good 
order. 
Id. at 448-49. 
459 !d. at 448. The Court, relying in part on its highly questionable ruling in Slaughter-
House Cases, put it this way: 
The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a 
state. Protection to life, liberty, and property rests, primarily, with the states, and the 
amendment furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the states upon 
those fundamental rights which belong to citizenship, and which the state governments 
were created to secure. The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as 
distinguished from the privileges and immunities of citizens of the states, are indeed 
protected by it; but those are privileges and immunities arising out of the nature and 
essential character of the national government, and granted or secured by the constitution 
of the United States. 
!d. at 448 (citing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) & Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872)). 
460 Id. at 447. As to the New York state court finding that electrocution "might be said to 
be 'unusual,"' the Supreme Court did not delve into the propriety of that finding, the 
Court's finding of no cruelty making it unnecessary to reach that issue. Id. 
461 142 u.s. 155 (1891). 
462 !d. at 156-57. 
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warden at Sing Sing to keep inmates in solitary confinement prior to their 
execution.463 In rejecting the contention that solitary confinement consti-
tuted a "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment, the Court first emphasized that "[t]he first 10 articles of 
amendment were not intended to limit the powers of the states in respect of 
their own people, but to operate on the federal government only." 464 
In McElvaine, the Supreme Court summarized the prisoner's Four-
teenth Amendment contention as follows: "[T]he argument is that, so far 
as those amendments secure the fundamental rights of the individual, they 
make them his privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States, 
which cannot now, under the fourteenth amendment, be abridged by a 
state; that the prohibition of cruel and unsusual [sic] punishments is one of 
these; and that that prohibition is also included in that 'due process of law' 
without which no state can deprive any person of life, liberty, or proper-
ty."465 Finding no violation, the Supreme Court again deferred to the state's 
judgment.466 Again, the Court-in that late nineteenth-century case-gave 
short-shrift to important Fourteenth Amendment principles, finding that 
they did not apply at all. 
The last nineteenth-century Supreme Court case to discuss the Eighth 
Amendment was O'Neil v. State of Vermont.467 In that case, a New York-
er, John O'Neil, was convicted of 307 separate offenses against the Ver-
mont liquor laws and ordered to pay a fine of $6,638.72. If the fine was 
not paid by a certain date, the court ordered that O'Neil be imprisoned at 
hard labor for 19,914 days.468 After that ruling, O'Neil challenged Ver-
mont's law as imposing a "cruel and unusual punishment" under both 
Vermont's constitution and the U.S. Constitution.469 Before the case 
reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the Vermont Supreme Court rejected 
O'Neil's claims.470 The U.S. Supreme Court, for its part, deferred again, 
463 !d. at 157-58. 
464 !d. at 158. The Court found its decision in In re Kenunler "decisive" of the issue 
before it, noting that, in that ruling, "we were unable to perceive that the state had thereby 
abridged the privileges or inununities of petitioner, or deprived him of due process of 
law." !d. at 159. 
465 !d. at 158. 
466 !d. at 160. "The general rule of decision," the Court held, "is that this court will follow 
the adjudication of the highest court of a state in the construction of its own statutes, and 
there is nothing in this case to take it out of that rule." Id. at 160. The Supreme Court 
reached a similar result in Trezza v. Brush, 142 U.S. 160 (1891), another case in which a 
first-degree murderer in New York was sentenced to death and ordered to be held at Sing 
Sing in solitary confinement. !d. at 160-61. 
467 144 U.S. 323 (1892). 
468 Id at 327 330 
469 Id at331: . 
470 The Vermont Supreme Court ruled as follows: 
'The constitutional inhibition of cruel and unusual punishments, or excessive fines or bail, 
has no application. The punishment imposed by statute for the offense with which the 
respondent, O'Neil, is charged, cannot be said to be excessive or oppressive. If he has 
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holding that "so far as it is a question arising under the constitution of 
Vermont, it is not within our province."471 "[A]s a federal question," the 
Court continued, "it has always been ruled that the eighth amendment to 
the constitution of the United States does not apply to the states. "472 As a 
result, the nation's highest court dismissed the case for "want of jurisdic-
tion."473 
The O'Neil case, however, brought the Fourteenth Amendment-and 
its relationship to the Eighth Amendment-into starker relief than ever be-
fore. In a dissent, Justice Stephen Field-one of Abraham Lincoln's ap-
pointments-wrote that he was "compelled to disagree with my associates 
in their disposition of this case. "474 A pioneer of the concept of substantive 
due process, Justice Field wrote that "[t]he punishment imposed was one 
exceeding in severity ... anything which I have been able to find in the 
records of our courts for the present century."475 "Had he been found 
guilty of burglary or highway robbery," Field wrote of O'Neil, "he would 
have received less punishment than for the offenses of which he was con-
victed."476 "It was," he emphasized, "six times as great as any court in 
Vermont could have imposed for manslaughter, forgery, or perjury."477 "It 
was," Field concluded, "one which, in its severity, considering the offenses 
of which he was convicted, may justly be termed both 'unusual and cru-
el. "'478 
Before making that assessment, Justice Field noted that the cruel and 
unusual designation "is usually applied to punishments which inflict tor-
ture, such as the rack, the thumb-screw, the iron boot, the stretching of 
limbs, and the like, which are attended with acute pain and suffering. "479 
subjected himself to a severe penalty, it is simply because he has committed a great many 
such offenses. It would scarcely be competent for a person to assail the constitutionality 
of the statute prescribing a punishment for burglary on the ground that he had committed 
so many burglaries that, if punishment for each were inflicted on him, he might be kept in 
prison for life. The mere fact that cumulative punishments may be imposed for distinct 
offenses in the same prosecution is not material upon this question. If the penalty were 
unreasonably severe for a single offense, the constitutional question might be urged; but 
here the unreasonableness is only in the number of offenses which the respondent has 
committed.' 
!d. at 331 (citation omitted). 
471 Id. at 331-32. 
472 !d. at 332. 
473 Id. at 334-35. 
474 Id. at 337 (Field, J., dissenting). 
475 !d. at 338. 
476 !d. at 339. 
477 !d. 
478 !d. 
479 !d. As Justice Field wrote: 
Such punishments were at one time inflicted in England, but they were rendered 
impossible by the declaration of rights, adopted by parliament on the successful 
termination of the revolution of 1688, and subsequently confirmed in the bill of rights. It 
was there declared that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines 
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The concept of cruel and unusual punishments, Field explained, "is embod-
ied in the eighth amendment to the constitution of the United States, and in 
the constitutions of several of the states, though Mr. Justice Story states in 
his Commentaries on the Constitution 'that the provision would seem to be 
wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it is scarcely possible that 
any department of such a government should authorize or justify such 
atrocious conduct."'480 As Field wrote of the prohibition: 
The inhibition is directed, not only against punishments of the character 
mentioned, but against all punishments which by their excessive length or 
severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged. The whole 
inhibition is against that which is excessive either in the bail required, or 
fine imposed, or punishment inflicted. Fifty-four years' confinement at 
hard labor, away from one's home and relatives, and thereby prevented 
from giving assistance to them or receiving comfort from them, is a pun-
ishment at the severity of which, considering the offenses, it is hard to be-
lieve that any man of right feeling and heart can refrain from shuddering. 
It is no matter that by cumulative offenses, for each of which imprison-
ment may be lawfully imposed for a short time, the period prescribed by 
the sentence was reached, the punishment was greatly beyond anything 
required by any humane law for the offenses.481 
Justice Field saw the sentence under review as both cruel and unu-
sual482 and he was especially concerned about the large number of 
crimes O'Neil had been convicted of-as well as the resulting sentence. 
As Field's dissent emphasized: 
The state may, indeed, make the drinking of one drop of liquor an offense 
to be punished by imprisonment, but it would be an unheard-of cruelty if 
it should count the drops in a single glass, and make thereby a thousand 
offenses, and thus extend the punishment for drinking the single glass of 
liquor to an imprisonment of almost indefinite duration. The state has the 
power to inflict personal chastisement, by directing whipping for petty of-
fenses, repulsive as such mode of punishment is, and should it, for each of-
fense, inflict 20 stripes, it might not be considered, as applied to a single 
offense, a severe punishment, but yet, if there had been 307 offenses 
committed, the number of which the defendant was convicted in this case, 
and 6,140 stripes were to be inflicted for these accumulated offenses, the 
judgment of mankind would be that the punishment was not only an unu-
sual, but a cruel, one, and a cry of horror would rise from every civilized 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. From that period this doctrine has 
been the established law of England, intended as a perpetual security against the 
oppression of the subject from any of those causes. 
!d. 
480 !d. (citing Story, Commentaries on the Constitution§ 1903). 
481 !d. at 339-40. 
482 !d. at 360 (Field, J., dissenting) ("In opening the record in this case we not only see 
that the exclusive power of congress to regulate commerce was invaded, but we see that a 
cruel, as well as an unusual, punishment was inflicted upon the accused, and that the 
objection was taken in the court below, and immunity therefrom was specially claimed."). 
377 
2 Br. ]. Am. Leg. Studies (2013) 
and Christian community of the country against it. It does not alter its 
character as cruel and unusual that for each distinct offense there is a 
small punishment, if, when they are brought together, and one punish-
ment for the whole is inflicted, it becomes one of excessive severity. And 
the cruelty of it, in this case, by the imprisonment at hard labor, is further 
increased by the offenses being thus made infamous crimes.483 
Justice Field then turned his attention to whether there was a way to 
set aside O'Neil's draconian sentence. "I have stated these particulars of 
the proceedings and of the judgment of the state courts to show what great 
wrongs were inflicted," Field wrote.484 "If there is no remedy for them," he 
observed, "there is a defect in our laws or in their administration which 
cannot be too soon corrected."485 "I think there is a remedy," Field then 
clarified, noting that "it should be afforded by this court. "486 "The four-
teenth amendment," he wrote, "declares that no state shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States, and that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law."487 "I agree," Field wrote, "that 
those inhibitions do not invest congress with any power to legislate upon 
subjects which are within the domain of state legislation. "488 
Justice Field also commented on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process and Privileges or Immunities Clauses. "They only operate," he said, 
"as restraints upon state action, like the prohibitions upon legislation by 
the states impairing the obligation of contracts, or to pass a bill of attain-
der or an ex post facto law."489 "But in all cases touching life or liberty," 
Field emphasized, "I deem it the duty of this court, when once it has juris-
diction of a case, to enforce these restraints for the protection of the citizen 
where they have been disregarded in the court below, though called to its 
attention." This was necessary, Field wrote, so that "the life or liberty of 
the citizen is not wantonly sacrificed because of some imperfect statement 
of the party's rights. "490 
Justice Field's dissent also spoke presciently of how the Fourteenth 
Amendment had altered the scope of the Eighth Amendment protection. 
"The eighth amendment of the constitution of the United States, relating to 
punishments of this kind," he began, "was formerly held to be directed 
only against the authorities of the United States, and as not applicable to 
the states."491 As Field explained: "Such was undoubtedly the case previous 
to the fourteenth amendment, and such must be its limitation now, unless 
483 !d. at 339-40. 
484 !d. at 341. 
485 !d. 
486 !d. 




491 Id. at 360 (citing Barron v. Baltimore). 
378 
The Anomaly of Executions 
exemption from such punishment is one of the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States, which can be enforced under the clause declar-
ing that 'NO STATE SHALL MAKE OR ENFORCE ANY LAW Which 
shall abridge' those privileges or immunities. "492 
In his dissent, Field emphasized that the Supreme Court had previous-
ly held in Slaughter-House Cases493 that the Fourteenth Amendment only 
protected "against abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States as distinguished from privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the states."494 "Assuming such to be the case," Field wrote, "the question 
arises, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States which are thus protected?"495 Justice Field answered that question by 
concluding that the U.S. Constitution-including its Bill of Rights-set 
forth citizens' "privileges" and "immunities." "It may be difficult," Field 
wrote, "to define the terms so as to cover all the privileges and immunities 
of citizens of the United States, but, after much reflection, I think the defi-
nition given at one time before this court by a distinguished advocate-Mr. 
John Randolph Tucker, of Virginia-is correct, that the privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the United States are such as have their recognition 
in or guaranty from the constitution of the United States. "496 
In particular, Field referenced "the first 10 amendments to the consti-
tution" and "the amendments which followed the late civil war."497 "The 
rights thus recognized and declared," Field wrote of the Bill of Rights, "are 
rights of citizens of the United States under their constitution, which could 
not be violated by federal authority."498 The Fourteenth Amendment, Field 
added, made "freedmen" in "former slaveholding states" U.S. citizens and 
thus "entitled in the future to all the privileges and immunities of such citi-
zens."499 In Justice Field's view, the Fourteenth Amendment forbade any 
state from violating any citizens' "privileges" or "immunities."500 
492 !d. at 360-61. 
493 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
494 O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 361 (Field, J., dissenting). 
495 !d. In discussing "privileges" and "immunities," Justice Field emphasized that "[t]hese 
terms are not idle words, to be treated as meaningless," but "are of momentous import." 
!d. They provided, he wrote, "a great guaranty to the citizens of the United States of those 
privileges and immunities against any possible state invasion." Id. 
496 Id. 
497 Id. 
498 !d. at 362. 
499 !d. at 362-63. 
500 As Field wrote: 
While, therefore, the 10 amendments, as limitations on power, and, so far as they 
accomplish their purpose and find their fruition in such limitations, are applicable only to 
the federal government, and not to the states, yet so far as they declare or recognize the 
rights of persons they are rights belonging to them as citizens of the United States under 
the constitution; and the fourteenth amendment, as to all such rights, places a limit upon 
state power by ordaining that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
them. Ifl am right in this view, then every citizen of the United States is protected from 
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Given his reading of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Justice 
Field found the Vermont Supreme Court's ruling unsatisfactory.501 Speak-
ing of the Constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, 
Field wrote: 
The inhibition is directed against cruel and unusual punishments, whether 
inflicted for one or many offenses. A convict is not to be scourged until 
the flesh fall from his body, and he die under the lash, though he may 
have committed a hundred offenses, for each of which, separately, a 
whipping of 20 stripes might be inflicted. An imprisonment at hard labor 
for a few days or weeks for a minor offense may be within the direction of 
a humane government; but, if the minor offenses are numerous, no au-
thority exists to convert the imprisonment into one of perpetual confine-
ment at hard labor, such as would be appropriate only for felonies of an 
atrocious nature. It is against the excessive severity of the punishment, as 
applied to the offenses for which it is inflicted, that the inhibition is di-
rected.502 
In other words, Justice Field opined that severe and disproportionate 
corporal punishments, such as the lash, could be found to be unconstitu-
tional. 
Justice John Marshall Harlan also wrote a separate dissent endorsing 
Justice Field's views.503 Thus, Justice Harlan also found the punishment at 
issue "cruel and unusual," with Harlan writing: 
A judgment, therefore, of a state court, even if rendered pursuant to a 
statute, inflicting, or allowing the infliction of a cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, is inconsistent with the supreme law of the land. The judgment 
before us, by which the defendant is confined at hard labor in a house of 
correction for the term of 19,914 days, or 54 years and 204 days, inflicts 
punishment which, in view of the character of the offenses committed, 
must be deemed cruel and unusual.5°4 
punishments which are cruel and unusual. It is an immunity which belongs to him, against 
both state and federal action. The state cannot apply to him, any more than the United 
States, the torture, the rack, or thumb-screw, or any cruel and unusual punishment, or any 
more than it can deny to him security in his house, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, or compel him to be a witness against himself in a 
criminal prosecution. These rights, as those of citizens of the United States, find their 
recognition and guaranty against federal action in the constitution of the United States, 
and against state action in the fourteenth amendment. 
Id. at 363. 
501 !d. at 364. 
502 !d. Justice Field added that the denial ofreliefwas of the "gravest character, leaving 
the defendant to a life of misery, one of perpetual imprisonment and hard labor." !d. at 
364-65. 
503 Harlan's dissent added that "Mr. Justice BREWER authorizes me to say that in the 
main he concurs with the views expressed in this opinion." Id. at 371 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
504 Id. at 370-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting). On the issue of the Fourteenth Amendment, Jus-
tice Harlan added: 
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The dissents in O'Neil foreshadowed the U.S. Supreme Court later 
taking the Fourteenth Amendment-and its principles-more seriously. 
The Court, inexplicably, however, continues to look the other way when it 
encounters arbitrariness and racial bias in America's death penalty sys-
tem.sos 
III. THE STATE OF THE NATION 
A. The American Death Penalty 
America's death penalty has been in the news a lot lately along with 
state-by-state efforts to halt executions. In California, which has the coun-
try's largest death row population, Gov. Jerry Brown cancelled plans to 
build a new death row facility in that state in April 2011.506 Jeanne Wood-
ford-who, as San Quentin's warden, once oversaw executions-even led a 
referendum effort there to try to abolish capital punishment.507 A Califor-
nia ballot initiative to replace death sentences with life-without-parole sen-
tences was launched in 2011 and taken to voters in 2012, narrowly failing 
by a vote of 52 to 48 percent.508 The long-running legal challenge to Cali-
I fully concur with Mr. Justice FIELD that, since the adoption of the fourteenth 
amendment, no one of the fundamental rights of life, liberty, or property, recognized and 
guarantied by the constitution of the United States, can be denied or abridged by a state in 
respect to any person within its jurisdiction. These rights are principally enumerated in the 
earlier amendments of the constitution. They were deemed so vital to the safety and 
security of the people that the absence from the constitution, adopted by the convention of 
1 787, of express guaranties of them, came very near defeating the acceptance of that 
instrument by the requisite number of states. The constitution was ratified in the belief, 
and only because of the belief, encouraged by its leading advocates, that, immediately 
upon the organization of the government of the Union, articles of amendment would be 
submitted to the people recognizing those essential rights of life, liberty, and property 
which inhered in Anglo-Saxon freedom, and which our ancestors brought with them from 
the mother country. Among those rights is immunity from cruel and unusual punishments 
secured by the eighth amendment against federal action, and by the fourteenth amendment 
against denial or abridgment by the states. 
!d. at 370. 
505 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
506 California- Retentionist, HANDS OFF CAIN (AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE 
WORLD), 
http://www .handsoffcain.info/bancadati/schedastato. php?idstato= 1500013 8&idcontinente 
=26 (last visited Dec. 7, 2012) (Apr. 26, 2011 entry). 
507 Carol J. Williams, Former California Prisons Leader Joins Fight Against Death 
Penalty, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 2011. 
508 Howard Mintz, Defeat of Proposition 34: California's Death Penalty Battle Will 
Continue, Nov. 7, 2012, available athttp://www.mercurynews.com/crime-
courts/ ci_ 21951068/ defeat-proposition-34-califomias-death-penalty -battle-will; Franklin 
E. Zimring, Endgame for Death Penalty in California, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Dec. 8, 
2012, available at http://www.sfgate.com/opinion!article/Endgame-for-death-penalty-in-
Califomia-4101011.php; California Secretary of State Debra Brown, Initiatives and 
Referenda Cleared for Circulation, No. 1512 (11-0035) ("Death Penalty Repeal. Initiative 
Statute."), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/cleared-for-
38I 
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fornia's lethal-injection protocol, meanwhile, has led to a de facto morato-
rium on executions in that state.509 
Abolition and moratoria efforts have also been taking place elsewhere. 
In late November 2011, Gov. John Kitzhaber, of Oregon, declared a mora-
torium on executions in that state "for the duration" of his term, which 
doesn't end until January 2015.510 And in 2013, Gov. Martin O'Malley, of 
Maryland, testified before the state legislature to abolish the death penalty 
in that state. "The death penalty is expensive, and the overwhelming evi-
dence tells us that it does not work," O'Malley told the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. Also, as the Associated Press reported of Maryland's successful 
2013 repeal effort: "NAACP President and CEO Ben Jealous made the plea 
against the death penalty by highlighting a series of exonerations, including 
that of Kirk Bloodsworth, a Maryland man who spent two years on death 
row and was later released from prison because of DNA evidence."511 
In the last ten years, a number of other states had already repealed 
death penalty laws or declared executions-or particular lethal-injection 
procedures-unconstitutional. Connecticut abolished the death penalty in 
2012; Illinois did so in 2011; New Mexico abolished capital punishment in 
2009; and New Jersey did so in 2007, too.512 The New York Court of Ap-
peals declared that state's death penalty scheme to be facially invalid in 
2004,513 and judges in Arkansas and Montana recently ruled specific execu-
tion methods unconstitutional.514 Even before Gov. Martin O'Malley testi-
fied in favor of repealing Maryland's death penalty in 2012, an administra-
circulation.htm. More than 500,000 signatures were necessary for the ballot initiative to 
move forward. Kevin Fagan, Death Penalty Foes Launch Initiative Drive, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, Oct. 26, 2011. 
509 Howard Mintz, No California Executions in 2012 as Legal Battle Over Lethal 
Injection Continues, MercuryNews.com, available at 
http://www.mercurynews.com/crime-courts/ci_19249256. 
510 Helen Jung, Gov. John Kitzhaber Stops Executions in Oregon, Calls System 
"Compromised and Inequitable," OREGONIAN, Nov. 22, 2011. 
511 Associated Press, Gov. 0 'Malley Urges State Lawmakers to Repeal Death Penalty in 
Maryland, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-
govemor-to-testify-on-capital-punishment-ban/2013/02114112284114-767f-lle2-bl 02-
948929030e64_story.html. 
512 David Ariosto, Connecticut Becomes llh State to Abolish Death Penalty, CNN, Apr. 
25; State v. Hayes, No. CR070241859, 2010 WL 3328076 *4 n.3 (Conn. Super., July 28, 
2010); People v. Gomez, 2011 II. App. (1st 092,185, 2011 WL 4580559 *19 n.l (Ill. 
App., Sept. 30, 2011); Aaron Scherzer, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in New Jersey 
and Its Impact on Our Nation's "Evolving Standards of Decency," 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
223, 223 (2009). 
513 Parkerv. Phillips, 717 F. Supp. 2d 310,323 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). 
514 Associated Press, Judge Rules Montana Execution Method Unconstitutional, HELENA 
INDEPENDENT RECORD (Sept. 8, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://helenair.com/news/local!crime-
and-courts/judge-rules-montana-execution-method-unconstitutional!article_c7e713b8-
f94d-llel-ba67-001a4bcf887a.html; Hobbs v. Jones, 2012 Ark. 293, _ S.W.3d _(June 
22, 2012). 
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tive law argument in the case of Evans v. Maryland515 succeeded in halting 
the execution of a Maryland death row inmate and the state's death penal-
ty more broadly.516 
The legal profession is also beginning to take closer notice of execu-
tions and the haphazard way they are being carried out. On December 7, 
2011, the American Bar Association issued a report calling for a halt to 
executions in the State of Kentucky. That report, by the Kentucky Assess-
ment Team on the Death Penalty, was prepared by law professors, former 
state supreme court justices, and practicing lawyers. The review found an 
error rate of more than sixty percent in the trials of those sentenced to 
death. It also found that 10 of the 78 defendants sentenced to death had 
been represented by attorneys who were later disbarred.517 In 2011, the 
Chief Justice of Ohio's Supreme Court, Maureen O'Connor, also an-
nounced the formation of a Joint Task Force of the Supreme Court of Ohio 
and the Ohio State Bar Association to review the administration of Ohio's 
death penalty.518 
The public's growing ambivalence toward executions-as reflected in 
such actions and in a number of public opinion polls-has become increas-
ingly apparent. A 2011 Gallup Poll found that only 61% of respondents 
supported the death penalty in the abstract, down from 64% the prior year 
and down from 80% in 1994.519 Even more telling, a recent CNN poll 
showed that when given a choice between life-without-parole sentences or 
death sentences, more Americans (50%) opted for life-without-parole than 
death (48%) for murderers.520 This represents a significant shift, no doubt 
driven by the rise in popularity of life-without-parole sentences. All thirty-
two of the states that still retain capital punishment now offer life-without-
parole sentences as an alternative to the death penalty, making life-
without-possibility-of-parole a viable substitute for death sentences.521 
515 396 Md. 256, 914 A.2d 25 (2006). 
516 Arnold Rochvarg, How Administrative Law Halted the Death Penalty in Maryland, 37 
UNIV. BALT. L. F. 119 (2007). 
517 Press Release, "Two Year Assessment of Death Penalty Procedures Prompts Call for 
Suspension of Executions in Kentucky," American Bar Association, Dec. 7, 2011. 
518 Speech of Chief Justice Maureen O'Connor, First State of the Judiciary Address, THE 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (Sept. 8, 2011 ), 
http:/ /www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/PIO/Speeches/2011/SOJ _ 090811.asp. 
519 Frank Newport, In US., Support for Death Penalty Falls to 39-Year Low, GALLUP 
(Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150089/Support-Death-Penalty-Falls-Year-
Low.aspx. 
52° CNN Political Unit, CNN Poll: Number Who Prefor Death Penalty on Decline, 
POLITICAL TICKER (Oct. 12, 2011, 05:35PM), 
http:/ /politicalticker. blogs.cnn.com/20 1111 0/12/ cnn-poll-number-who-prefer-death-
penalty-on-decline/. 
521 Death Penalty States Offering Life Without Parole, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION 
CENTER, http:/ /www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/life-without-parole (last visited Dec. 8, 2011 ). 
The Supreme Court itself already requires, as a matter of due process, that jurors be 
instructed on the availability of life-without-parole where a defendant's future 
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Most troubling for America's death penalty, miscarriages of justice 
continue to occur, with concrete and mounting evidence that innocent peo-
ple are frequently convicted-and sometimes even executed.522 The Inno-
cence Project-started in 1992523-continues to draw attention to the court 
system's human fallibility through DNA exonerations,524 with various polls 
and statistics showing Americans' declining support for death sentences, 
especially when offered the viable alternative of life-without-parole sen-
tences.525 High-profile cases, such as Georgia's 2011 execution of Troy Da-
vis,S26 drew much of the media coverage, with future cases sure to draw 
even more as America's death penalty debate plays out.527 
dangerousness is at issue. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994); Shafter v. 
South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001). 
522 SISTER HELEN PREJEAN, THE DEATH OF INNOCENTS: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF 
WRONGFUL EXECUTIONS (2005); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael Radelet, Miscarriages of 
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21 (1987). 
523 E.g., Steven M. Pincus, It's Good to Be Free: An Essay about the Exoneration of 
Albert Burrell, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 27 (2001); James S. Liebman, Shawn Crowley, 
Andrew Markquart, Lauren Rosenberg, Lauren Gallo White & Daniel Zharkovsky, Los 
Tocayos Carlos, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 711 (2012). The Innocence Project 
continues to examine evidence in individual cases and its work will no doubt lead to 
further exonerations. 
524 The Innocence Project's website notes that "[t]here have been 302 post-conviction 
DNA exonerations in the United States," and that "18 of the 302 people exonerated 
through DNA served time on death row." "Another 16", the website notes, "were charged 
with capital crimes but not sentenced to death." Facts on Post-Conviction DNA 
Exonerations, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http:/ /www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts _on _PostConviction _DNA_ Exonerations. 
php (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). 
525 Facts about the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
http://www .deathpenaltyinfo.org/ documents/FactSheet. pdf (last updated Aug. 6, 2013) 
(citing polling data); Jonathan Simon, How Should We Punish Murder?, 94 MARQ. L. 
REv. 1241, 1280 n.136 (2011); see also Note, A Matter of Life and Death: The Effect of 
Life-Without-Parole Statutes on Capital Punishment, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1838, 1839 
(2006) ("Forty -eight states now have some form of life imprisonment without parole, with 
a great many of the statues enacted over the last two decades."). The number of death 
sentences and executions in the United States has fallen dramatically in the last decade. 
There were more than 300 death sentences per year in 1995 and 1996, but less than 80 in 
2011. Executions, which peaked at 98 in 1999, have not exceeded 60 per year since 2003. 
Facts about the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Washington, D.C., Aug. 6, 2013, 
at 1, 3, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. 
526 Davis v. Humphrey, 2011 WL 4386165 *1 (2011). The case of Cameron 
Willingham---executed in Texas in 2004 on the basis of highly suspect evidence-also 
drew a lot of media attention in 2009 after an investigative report published in 2009 in 
The New Yorker. David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, THE 
NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009. 
527 Meanwhile, Europe and all other Western nations have already abandoned executions, 
seeing them as clear-cut human rights violations. WILLIAM A. SCHAB AS, THE ABOLITION 
OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2002); Abolitionist and 
Retentionist Countries, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.amnesty.org/enldeath-
penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries (last visited Nov. 16, 2011 ). 
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The arbitrariness of executions-as well as the risk of innocent people 
being executed-has fueled much of the public's ambivalence. A study of 
death penalty cases done at Columbia University found a sixty-eight per-
cent error rate in capital cases, with eighty-two percent of all capital judg-
ments reversed on appeal later replaced on retrial with a sentence less than 
death or no sentence at all. That study also found that seven percent of the 
murder conviction reversals resulted in acquittals.528 Another study, pub-
lished in 2013, revealed that Pennsylvania's death penalty system is like-
wise riddled with error. 529 That report, which looked at Pennsylvania re-
sentencing proceedings, found that when capital cases were retried almost 
all defendants (95%) received a sentence less than death.530 The raw statis-
tics as regards America's death penalty only reinforce the conclusion that 
the death penalty is unfairly administered.531 
Not only do pronounced geographic disparities exist that are associat-
ed with executions,532 but racial prejudice is still found throughout Ameri-
ca's death penalty system.533 Only a small percentage of county prosecutors 
actively pursue death sentences,534 and when death sentences and execu-
tions do occur, studies show that the race of the victim often plays a deci-
528 James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in 
Capital Cases, 1973-1995 (2000). 
529 Robert Brett Dunham, comp., The First 100 Re-Sentencings: Subsequent Dispositions 
of Pennsylvania Capital Cases Reversed in Post-Conviction, DEATH PENALTY 
INFORMATION CENTER (Jan. 28, 2013), 
http://www .deathpenaltyinfo.org/ documents/RDunhamPaReversals. pdf. 
530 Arbitrariness: Pennsylvania's Costly and Broken Death Penalty System, DEATH 
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http:/ /www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/arbitrariness-
pennsylvanias-costly-and-broken-death-penalty-system (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). 
531 Erwin Chemerinsky, Evolving Standards of Decency in 2003: Is the Death Penalty on 
Life Support?, 29 U. DAYTONL. REv. 201, 207 (2004) (noting that law professor and liti-
gator Anthony Amsterdam has said the death penalty as administered is essentially a lot-
tery; "it's very much the luck of the draw in terms of the prosecutor, the judge, the jury"). 
532 Lindsey S. Vann, History Repeats Itself: The Post-Furman Return to Arbitrariness in 
Capital Punishment, 45 U. RICH. L. REv. 1255, 1288 (2011) ("History has repeated itself. 
The capital punishment system in America is as arbitrary as it was leading up to 
Furman."); Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 
92 B.U. L. REv. 227, 233 (2012) ("[J]ust 10% of counties in the United States account for 
all death sentences imposed from 2004 to 2009."); id. at 237 ("[S]ince 1976, only 15% of 
the counties in the United States have sentenced anyone to death who subsequently has 
been executed. Only fifty counties (1.6%) have sentenced five or more people to death 
whom their respective state ultimately executed."). 
533 See, e.g., Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic Divide: 
Racialized Decision Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REv. 573; David C. 
Baldus eta!., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An 
Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. 
REv. 1638, 1738 (1998) ("[T]he problem of arbitrariness and discrimination in the 
administration of the death penalty is a matter of continuing concern and is not confined 
to southern jurisdictions."). 
534 Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 
BOSTONUNIV. L. REv. 227 (2012). 
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sive role at sentencing.535 African Americans who kill whites, it is now 
clear, are much more likely to be sentenced to death than other capital de-
fendants.536 Meanwhile, America's condemned-at least the ones actually 
executed-are spending, on average, more than thirteen years on death row 
between conviction and execution.537 
Even American judges have begun publicly acknowledging the cruelty, 
racial bias and arbitrariness of America's error-laden system. In mid-
December of 2011, Ohio Supreme Court Justice Paul Pfeifer told a legisla-
tive committee that Ohio's death penalty "has become what I call a death 
lottery." "It's very difficult to conclude," he said, "that the death penalty, 
as it exists today, is anything but a bad gamble," with Pfeifer noting that 
only "four or five" of roughly one hundred capital indictments filed in 
Ohio each year result in conviction and a death sentence.538 On December 
19, 2011, Teresa Hawthorne, a state district court judge in Dallas, Texas, 
came to a similar conclusion, making a judicial ruling that Texas's death 
penalty was unconstitutional because it could lead to arbitrary death sen-
tences.539 In North Carolina, a judge there also found statistically signifi-
cant racial disparities in the administration of that state's death penalty.540 
In fact, Justice William O'Neill, of Ohio's Supreme Court, recently 
dissented in a case, issuing an opinion in which he explicitly found that the 
death penalty should be declared unconstitutional. In that dissent, he broke 
out his analysis into a discussion of whether the death penalty is cruel and 
whether it is unusual. "[D]eath, even by lethal injection," O'Neill wrote, 
"is a cruel punishment." "Capital punishment," he explained, "dates back 
to the days when decapitations, hangings, and brandings were also the 
norm." "Surely," he offered, "our society has evolved since those barbaric 
days." "It is clear," O'Neill also noted, "that the death penalty is becoming 
increasingly rare both around the world and in America." "By definition it 
is unusual," he emphasized. 
American judges are thus starting to assess the actual cruelty and unu-
sualness of executions. In his dissent, Justice O'Neill put it this way: "I 
535 Facts about the Death Penalty, supra note 48, at p. 2 (citing studies). 
536 David C. Baldus, Catherine M. Grosso, George Woodworth & Richard Newell, Racial 
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Experience of the United 
States Armed Forces (1984-2005), 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1227, 1300 (2011) 
("The data document white-victim and minority-accused/white-victim disparities in the 
imposition of death sentences among all death-eligible cases that are consistent with 
findings in numerous state systems on which comparable data are available."). 
537 Becky Purser, Warner Robins Inmate on Death Row among Longest Serving in 
Georgia, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 4, 2012), 
http://www .macon.com/20 12112/04/22731 0 1/warner-robins-inmate-on-death.html. 
538 Jim Provance, Ohio Justice Urges Repeal of Death Penalty, TOL. BLADE, Dec. 15, 
2011. 
539 Jennifer Emily, Dallas Criminal Courts Judge Rules Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 
DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Dec. 24, 2011. 
540 David Zucchino, North Carolina Judge Vacates Death Penalty under Racial Justice 
Law, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2012. 
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would hold that capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and Article 1, Section 9 of the Ohio Con-
stitution. The death penalty is inherently both cruel and unusual and there-
fore is unconstitutional."541 Multiple U.S. Supreme Court Justices have also 
expressed reservations about America's death penalty.542 For instance, be-
fore retiring, Justice John Paul Stevens specifically concluded that "the im-
position of the death penalty represents the pointless and needless extinc-
tion of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social or 
public purposes."543 "A penalty with such negligible returns to the State," 
he concluded, is "patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment 
violative of the Eighth Amendment. "544 
B. The Supreme Court's Jurisprudence 
i. A "Progressive" Approach 
The U.S. Supreme Court, as a body, has yet to hold executions uncon-
stitutional per se. But the Court has already materially winnowed thecate-
gories of death-eligible offenders and imposed some procedural safeguards 
in capital cases.545 And despite failing to declare executions unconstitution-
al, the Court did strike down a harsh, non-lethal corporal punishment 
more than 100 years ago. In that 1910 case, Weems v. United States,S46 the 
Court grappled extensively with the Eighth Amendment's history and pur-
pose. Ironically, it did so not in a case originating in the United States, but 
on its review of a "judgment of the supreme court of the Philippine Is-
lands" that affirmed the conviction of a man for falsifying a public docu-
ment.547 The Weems case made clear that the U.S. Supreme Court-the 
arbiter of the nation's laws-would not read the Eighth Amendment in a 
purely historical fashion. 
In that case, the criminal complaint, which started the prosecution, 
had charged the man-a disbursing officer of the Bureau of Coast Guard 
and Transportation of the U.S. Government of the Philippine Islands-with 
"corruptly, and with intent then and there to deceive and defraud the Unit-
ed States government of the Philippine Islands and its officials, falsify[ing] a 
public and official document. "548 The man's sentence-for a falsification of 
records involving wage payments-was "the penalty of fifteen years" of 
541 State v. Wogenstahl, 1/25/2013 Case Announcements #2, 2013-0hio-164 (O'Neill, J., 
dissenting), available at http:/ /www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/20 13ohio 164.pdf. 
542 John D. Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The Supreme Court's Death Penalty 
Jurisprudence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1913 (2012). 
543 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
544 Id. 
545 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 239-40. 
546 217 u.s. 349 (1910). 
547 Id. at 357. 
548 !d. 
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cadena549 together with a fine and the imposition of various civil penal-
ties.550 "The punishment of fifteen years' imprisonment," the man argued 
before the Supreme Court, "was a cruel and unusual punishment" under 
the Bill of Rights for the Philippine Islands.551 
In its ruling, the Court in Weems found that the corporal punishment 
imposed violated the bar on "cruel and unusual punishments."552 The law 
in the Philippine Islands, and the cadena sentence imposed under it, the 
Court stated, "excite wonder in minds accustomed to a more considerate 
adaptation of punishment to the degree of crime."553 As the Court ex-
plained: "In a sense the law in controversy seems to be independent of de-
grees. One may be an offender against it, as we have seen, though he gain 
nothing and injure nobody."554 The Court described the harsh conditions 
of confinement under a cadena sentence, 555 and emphasized the punish-
549 "The punishment of cadena temporal," the Supreme Court explained, "is from twelve 
years and one day to twenty years," to be served in "penal institutions." Id. at 364. The 
only two degrees of punishment higher in scale than cadena temporal were cadena 
perpetua and death. !d. at 363-64. Those sentenced to either cadena temporal or cadena 
perpetua were required by law to "labor for the benefit of the state." !d. at 364. According 
to the law, prisoners so sentenced "shall always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging from 
the wrists"; "be employed at hard and painful labor"; and "shall receive no assistance 
whatsoever from without the institution." Id. 
550 Id. at 358, 363. The "accessory penalties imposed" under cadena were noted to be (1) 
"civil interdiction"; (2) "perpetual absolute disqualification"; and (3) "subjection to 
surveillance during life." !d. at 364. Civil interdiction deprived the person punished of, 
among other things, the rights of parental authority and the right to dispose of one's own 
property. !d. The penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification "is the deprivation of 
office, even though it be held by popular election, the deprivation of the right to vote or to 
be elected to public office, the disqualification to acquire honors, etc., and the loss of 
retirement pay, etc." Id. at 364-65. The surveillance rule obligated the person punished to 
fix his domicile, not being allowed to change it without the knowledge and permission of 
the authority in charge of the surveillance. Id. at 364. 
551 Id. at 359, 365. 
552 !d. at377, 381-82. 
553 !d. at 365. 
554 !d.; see also id. ("The minimum term of imprisonment is twelve years, and that, 
therefore, must be imposed for 'perverting the truth' in a single item of a public record, 
though there be no one injured, though there be no fraud or purpose of it, no gain or desire 
of it."). 
555 The Supreme Court described a cadena sentence this way: 
Let us confine it to the minimum degree of the law, for it is with the law that we are most 
concerned. Its minimum degree is confinement in a penal institution for twelve years and 
one day, a chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and painful labor, no 
assistance from friend or relative, no marital authority or parental rights or rights of 
property, no participation even in the family council. These parts of his penalty endure for 
the term of imprisonment. From other parts there is no intermission. His prison bars and 
chains are removed, it is true, after twelve years, but he goes from them to a perpetual 
limitation of his liberty. He is forever kept under the shadow of his crime, forever kept 
within voice and view of the criminal magistrate, not being able to change his domicil 
without giving notice to the 'authority immediately in charge of his surveillance,' and 
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ment's disproportionality-one that encompassed "hard" and "painful 
labor" in chains-in relation to the crime.556 "Such penalties for such of-
fenses," the Court ruled, "amaze those who have formed their conception 
of the relation of a state to even its offending citizens from the practice of 
the American commonwealths, and believe that it is a precept of justice 
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to of-
fense."557 
In Weems, the Supreme Court described the prohibition against "cruel 
and unusual punishment" as "fundamental law," saying the provision of 
the Philippine Bill of Rights "was taken from the Constitution of the Unit-
ed States, and must have the same meaning." 558 While the proportionality 
principle had been articulated by Beccaria almost a century and a half be-
fore, the U.S. Supreme Court felt it was treading on new ground. "What 
constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment," the Court ruled, "has not 
been exactly decided."559 "It has been said," the Court noted, citing a Mas-
sachusetts case,560 "that ordinarily the terms imply something inhuman and 
barbarous-torture and the like. "561 Yet, the Court acknowledged, reflec-
tive of the record, the Eighth Amendment itself "received very little debate 
in Congress. "562 
The Congressional Register, in fact, revealed only two comments from 
the First Congress. Representative William Lougton Smith of South Caroli-
na "objected to the words 'nor cruel and unusual punishment,' the import 
of them being too indefinite." And a Representative Samuel Livermore, of 
New Hampshire, also opposed the language, though his comments were 
more extensive.563 The record reflects that Mr. Livermore opposed the 
adoption of the clause by arguing as follows: 
The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I 
have no objection to it; but, as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not 
think it necessary. What is meant by the terms "excessive bail"? Who are 
to be the judges? What is understood by "excessive fines"? It lays with the 
without permission in writing. He may not seek, even in other scenes and among other 
people, to retrieve his fall from rectitude. Even that hope is taken from him, and he is 
subject to tormenting regulations that, if not so tangible as iron bars and stone walls, 
oppress as much by their continuity, and deprive of essential liberty. No circumstance of 
degradation is omitted. It may be that even the cruelty of pain is not omitted. He must 
bear a chain night and day. He is condemned to painful as well as hard labor. What 
painful labor may mean we have no exact measure. It must be something more than hard 
labor. It may be hard labor pressed to the point of pain. 
!d. at 366-67. 
556 !d. 
557 !d. 
558 !d. at 367-68. 
559 !d. at 368. 
560 McDonald v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E. 874 (Mass. 1899). 
561 Weems, 217 U.S. at 368. 
562 !d. 
563 /d. at 368-69; BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 186. 
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court to determine. No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it 
is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, 
and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we, in future, to be prevent-
ed from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? If a more le-
nient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of 
it could be invented, it would be very prudent in the legislature to adopt it; 
but until we have some security that this will be done, we ought not to be 
restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of this kind. 564 
In spite of this token opposition, which expressly contemplated that 
corporal and capital punishments might one day be considered unlawful by 
the judiciary, the Eighth Amendment's text was agreed to by a "considera-
ble majority."565 
The Court in Weems first cited its 1866 decision in Pervear v. Massa-
chusetts,S66 where "it was decided that the clause did not apply to state but 
to national legislation." But in that case, the Court in Weems ruled, "we 
went further, and said that we perceive nothing excessive, or cruel, or unu-
sual in a fine of $50 and imprisonment at hard labor in the house of cor-
rection for three months, which was imposed for keeping and maintaining, 
without a license, a tenement for the illegal sale and illegal keeping of in-
toxicating liquors."567 The Court in Weems, in clarifying that point, also 
noted that in Wilkerson v. Utah568 "[t]he court pointed out that death was 
[a] usual punishment for murder, that it prevailed in the [Utah] territory 
for many years, and was inflicted by shooting; also that the mode of execu-
tion was usual under military law."569 The Court in Weems also comment-
ed on its prior decisions in In re Kemmler570 and O'Neil v. Vermont. 571 
564 Weems, 217 U.S. at 369; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789); see also Steven R. Manley, 
The Constitution, the Punishment of Death, and Misguided "Originalism," 1999 L. REv. 
MicH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 913, 930 n.76 ("While Representative Livermore's remarks are 
cited here for the proposition that the application of the Eighth Amendment has always 
been a matter of controversy, they also, of course, nicely illustrate for those bent on 
applying the Eighth Amendment according to contemporaneous perceptions that someone 
in government in 1791 saw the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as implicating 
capital, as well as corporal, punishments. Livermore seemed also to envision the operation 
of the Clause evolving over time.") (citations omitted; italics in original). 
565 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 369. 
566 5 Wall. 475, 18 L. Ed. 608 (1866). 
567 Weems, 217 U.S. at 369. 
568 99 u.s. 130 (1878). 
569 Weems, 217 U.S. at 369-70 (italics added). "It was hence concluded," the Court wrote, 
speaking of the firing squad, "that it was not forbidden by the Constitution of the United 
States." !d. at 370. 
570 136 U.S. 436 (1890). The Court in Weems emphasized that language in In re Kemmler 
"was not meant ... to give a comprehensive definition of cruel and unusual punishment, 
but only to explain the application of the provision to the punishment of death." Weems, 
217 U.S. at 370-71. As the Court stated: "In other words, to describe what might make the 
punishment of death cruel and unusual, though of itself it is not so. It was found as a fact 
by the state court that death by electricity was more humane than death by hanging." !d. at 
371. 
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After combing through its precedents, the Court in Weems turned to 
the history of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, citing a legal 
commentator who spoke of the "cruel and unusual" words in the U.S. 
Constitution in their "constitutional sense."572 "The law writers are indefi-
nite," the Court noted, citing Joseph Story and Thomas Cooley. Story-in 
his influential treatise on the Constitution-wrote that the provision "is an 
exact transcript of a clause in the Bill of Rights framed at the revolution of 
1688."573 The Eighth Amendment, he explained, "would seem to be wholly 
unnecessary in a free government, since it is scarcely possible that any de-
partment of such a government should authorize or justify such atrocious 
conduct."574 Cooley-in his treatise, Constitutional Limitations-had ex-
pressed the "difficulty of determining precisely what is meant by cruel and 
unusual punishment," but concluded, by contrast, that it was probable that 
"any punishment declared by statute for an offense which was punishable 
in the same way at common law could not be regarded as cruel or unusual, 
in a constitutional sense. "575 
Both Patrick Henry and James Wilson, the Court in Weems recount-
ed, had "referred to the tyranny of the Stuarts," with Henry and others 
insisting on the adoption of a Bill of Rights to guard against government 
excesses.576 The Court in Weems also focused on the views of those who 
pushed for the ratification of a U.S. Bill of Rights. "Their predominant po-
litical impulse was distrust of power, and they insisted on constitutional 
limitations against its abuse," the Court noted in Weems.577 "But surely," 
the Court emphasized, "they intended more than to register a fear of the 
forms of abuse that went out of practice with the Stuarts. "578 As the Court 
explained: 
571 144 U.S. 323 (1892); see also Weems, 217 U.S. at 371 (discussing 0 'Neil v. Vermont). 
572 The Court in Weems also discussed a number of state court decisions interpreting the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 375-80 (citing 
State v. Driver, 78 N.C. 423 (1878); Hobbs v. State, 32 N.E. 1019 (Ind. 1893); 
Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 6 Rand. 694 (Va. 1828); Foote v. State, 59 Md. 264 (1882); 
Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 447 (1824); Territory v. Ketchum, 65 P. 169 
(N.M. 1901)). 
573 Weems, 217 U.S. at 371. 
574 !d. (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 1903 (5th ed. 1905)). Story explained that it was "adopted as an admonition to 
all departments of the national government, to warn them against such violent 
proceedings as had taken place in England in the arbitrary reigns of some of the Stuarts." 
!d. 
575 !d. at 375. Cooley also doubted if the right existed "to establish the whipping post and 
the pillory in states where they were never recognized as instruments of punishment, or in 
states whose constitutions, revised since public opinion had banished them, have 
forbidden cruel and unusual punishments." !d. at 378 (citing THOMAS M. CooLEY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 472 (7th ed. 1903)). 
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Surely, their jealousy of power had a saner justification than that. They 
were men of action, practical and sagacious, not beset with vain imagin-
ing, and it must have come to them that there could be exercises of cru-
elty by laws other than those which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation. 
With power in a legislature great, if not unlimited, to give criminal char-
acter to the actions of men, with power unlimited to fix terms of impris-
onment with what accompaniments they might, what more potent in-
strument of cruelty could be put into the hands of power? And it was be-
lieved that power might be tempted to cruelty. This was the motive of 
the clause, and if we are to attribute an intelligent providence to its ad-
vocates we cannot think that it was intended to prohibit only practices 
like the Stuarts', or to prevent only an exact repetition of history.579 
The Court in Weems thus rejected an approach to the Eighth 
Amendment focused solely on an eighteenth-century historical analysis.580 
Indeed, the Court specifically noted that the writings of legal scholars es-
tablished the "progressive" nature of the prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishments.581 As the Court wrote of the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause, foreshadowing what would, in 1958, morph into its oft-
cited "evolving standards of decency" test: "The clause of the Constitution, 
in the opinion of the learned commentators, may be therefore progressive, 
and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public 
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice. "582 Although the Court 
in Weems conceded that legislatures generally possessed the power "to de-
fine crimes and their punishment,"583 it emphasized that such legislative 
579 !d. at372-73. 
580 In particular, the Court in Weems ruled as follows: 
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experience 
of evils but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form 
that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions 
and purposes. Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than 
the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not 
ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of 
Chief Justice Marshall, 'designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions 
can approach it.' The future is their care, and provision for events of good and bad 
tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the application of a constitution, there-
fore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be. Under any 
other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in 
efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value, and be converted by 
precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in 
reality. And this has been recognized. The meaning and vitality of the Constitution have 
developed against narrow and restrictive construction. 
Id. at 373. 
581 Id. at 378. 
582 Id. (citing Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 427 (1885); Mackin v. United States, 117 
u.s. 348, 350 (1886)). 
583 !d. at 378. 
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power had it limits-and that it was up to the judiciary to set those lim-
its.s84 
Ultimately, the Court in Weems determined that the law of the Philip-
pine Islands "has no fellow in American legislation"585 and that the sen-
tence imposed under it was "cruel and unusual."586 As the Court spoke of 
the harsh cadena sentence: 
Let us remember that it has come to us from a government of a different 
form and genius from ours. It is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and 
that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. It is unusual in its 
character. Its punishments come under the condemnation of the Bill of 
Rights, both on account of their degree and kind. And they would have 
those bad attributes even if they were found in a Federal enactment, and 
not taken from an alien source.587 
"[E]ven if the minimum penalty of cadena temporal had been im-
posed," the Court ruled in Weems, "it would have been repugnant to the 
Bill of Rights." 588 In short, a non-lethal corporal punishment was found to 
be unconstitutional. 
ii. The "Evolving Standards of Decency" Test 
It was in 1958, in Trap v. Dulles,589 that the U.S. Supreme Court first 
articulated its "evolving standards of decency" test.590 In that case, the peti-
tioner-a native-born American-was a private in the U.S. Army, serving 
584 As the Court in Weems explained: 
We concede the [legislative] power in most of its exercises. We disclaim the right to 
assert a judgment against that of the legislature, of the expediency of the laws, or the right 
to oppose the judicial power to the legislative power to define crimes and fix their 
punishment, unless that power encounters in its exercise a constitutional prohibition. In 
such case, not our discretion, but our legal duty, strictly defined and imperative in its 
direction, is invoked. Then the legislative power is brought to the judgment of a power 
superior to it for the instant. And for the proper exercise of such power there must be a 
comprehension of all that the legislature did or could take into account,-that is, a 
consideration of the mischief and the remedy. However, there is a certain subordination of 
the judiciary to the legislature. The function of the legislature is primary, its exercise 
fortified by presumptions of right and legality, and is not to be interfered with lightly, nor 
by any judicial conception of its wisdom or propriety. They have no limitation, we repeat, 
but constitutional ones, and what those are the judiciary must judge. We have expressed 
these elementary truths to avoid the misapprehension that we do not recognize to the 
fullest the wide range of power that the legislature possesses to adapt its penal laws to 
conditions as they may exist, and punish the crimes of men according to their forms and 
frequency. 
!d. at 378-79. 
585 !d. at 377. 
586 Id. at 381. 
587 Id. at 377. 
588 Id. at 382. 
589 356 u.s. 86 (1958). 
590 !d. at 101. 
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in French Morocco.591 He had escaped from a stockade at Casablanca, 
where he had been confined after being disciplined, and had been picked 
up the next day walking along a road towards Rabat.592 After being court-
martialed, the petitioner was convicted of desertion and was sentenced to 
three years at hard labor, forfeiture of pay, and a dishonorable dis-
charge.593 When the petitioner later applied for a passport, he was denied 
on the ground that under the Nationality Act of 1940, he had lost his U.S. 
citizenship by virtue of his conviction for wartime desertion, thus rendering 
him stateless.594 The issue in Trap was thus whether such a forfeiture of 
citizenship comported with the Constitution.595 
In Trap, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner's loss of citizen-
ship was an unlawful deprivation. "Citizenship," the Court ruled, "is not a 
license that expires upon misbehavior. "596 "[T]he deprivation of citizen-
ship," it held, "is not a weapon that the Government may use to express its 
displeasure at a citizen's conduct, however reprehensible that conduct may 
be."597 After concluding that the denationalization statute was a penal law 
that served to punish,598 the Court turned its attention to whether dena-
tionalization itself "is a cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning 
of the Eighth Amendment. "599 The Court framed the issue as follows: 
"Since wartime desertion is punishable by death, there can be no argument 
that the penalty of denationalization is excessive in relation to the gravity 
of the crime. The question is whether this penalty subjects the individual to 
a fate forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaranteed by the 
Eighth Amendment. "600 
Before answering that question, the Supreme Court tersely put the 
death penalty itself into a separate box. "At the outset," the Court wrote, 
"let us put to one side the death penalty as an index of the constitutional 
limit on punishment. "601 As the Court explained: "Whatever the arguments 
may be against capital punishment, both on moral grounds and in terms of 
accomplishing the purposes of punishment-and they are forceful-the 
death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day 
when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitu-
tional concept of cruelty."602 "But it is equally plain," the Court clarified, 
"that the existence of the death penalty is not a license to the Government 
591 Id. at 87. 
592 Id. 
593 Id. at 88. 
594 Id at 87-88 90 
595 Id at 87-88, 99. 
596 Id at 92. ' . 
597 !d. at 92-93. 
598 Id. at 97-99. 
599 Id. at 99. 
6oo Id. 
601 Id. 
602 !d. (italics added). 
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to devise any punishment short of death within the limit of its imagina-
tion."603 The Court did acknowledge, at the outset, that "[t]he exact scope 
of the constitutional phrase 'cruel and unusual' has not been detailed by 
this Court. "604 
The Supreme Court in Trap began its discussion of the Eighth 
Amendment issue before it by emphasizing the origins of the "cruel and 
unusual punishments" prohibition. "The phrase in our Constitution," it 
noted, "was taken directly from the English Declaration of Rights," noting 
that the principle it represents "can be traced back to the Magna Carta."605 
"The basic concept under the Eighth Amendment," the Court emphasized, 
"is nothing less than the dignity of man. "606 "While the State has the power 
to punish," it wrote, "the Amendment stands to assure that this power be 
exercised within the limits of civilized standards."607 "Fines, imprisonment 
and even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the 
crime," the Court ruled, "but any technique outside the bounds of these 
traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect. "608 
The Court then set forth its famous test. The Eighth Amendment's 
words "are not precise" and the scope of the "cruel and unusual punish-
ments" prohibition, the Court held, "is not static"; instead, the Eighth 
Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decen-
cy that mark the progress of a maturing society. "609 In analyzing the Eighth 
Amendment, the Court in Trap also stated that "[w]hether the word 'unu-
sual' has any qualitative meaning different from 'cruel' is not clear. "610 As 
the Court explained: "On the few occasions this Court has had to consider 
the meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions between cruelty and unusu-
alness do not seem to have been drawn." 611 After citing Weems, O'Neil, 
and Wilkerson, the Court emphasized: "These cases indicate that the Court 
simply examines the particular punishment involved in light of the basic 
prohibition against inhuman treatment, without regard to any subtleties of 
meaning that might be latent in the word 'unusual."' 612 "If the word 'unu-
sual' is to have any meaning apart from the word 'cruel,"' the Court wrote, 
"the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something different 
from that which is generally done." 613 
603 Id. 
604 !d. The Supreme Court stated, however, that "the basic policy reflected in these words 
is firmly established in the Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice." !d. at I 00. 




609 !d. at 100-10 I. 
610 !d. at 100 n.32. 
611 Id. 
612 !d. (citations omitted). 
613 !d. 
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On the specific issue before it, the Court in Trap ruled that denation-
alization "certainly" constituted a "cruel and unusual punishment."614 De-
nationalization, it emphasized in its 1958 decision, "was never explicitly 
sanctioned by this Government until 1940 and never tested against the 
Constitution until this day." 615 Holding that "use of denationalization as a 
punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment," the Court reasoned as 
follows: "There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive 
torture. There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status in 
organized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, 
for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in 
the development." 616 "The punishment," it wrote, "strips the citizen of his 
status in the national and international political community."617 "In short," 
it concluded, "the expatriate has lost the right to have rights." 618 
The concept of human dignity was at the core of the Court's ruling in 
Trap. In invalidating the punitive expatriation of persons with no other 
nationality, the Court's plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice Earl 
Warren, adopted this reasoning of a judge below: "In my faith, the Ameri-
can concept of man's dignity does not comport with making even those we 
would punish completely 'stateless'-fair game for the despoiler at home 
and the oppressor abroad, if indeed there is any place which will tolerate 
them at all." 619 "This punishment," Chief Justice Warren wrote, "is offen-
sive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands. "620 The pun-
ishment, he explained, "subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing 
fear and distress." 621 "The threat" itself, Warren added, referring to the 
"disastrous consequences" of banishment, "makes the punishment obnox-
ious. "622 In holding that the Eighth Amendment barred the punishment of 
denationalization, the Court-in striking down another non-lethal punish-
614 Id. at 100 n.32. 
615 !d. 
616 !d. at 101. 
617 !d. As the Court explained of the plight of anyone deprived of citizenship: "His very 
existence is at the sufferance of the country in which he happens to find himself. While 
any one country may accord him some rights, and presumably as long as he remained in 
this country he would enjoy the limited rights of an alien, no country need do so because 
he is stateless. Furthermore, his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an alien might be 
subject to termination at any time by reason of deportation." Id. 
618 !d. at 102. 
619 Jd. at 101 n.33 (citing 239 F.2d 527, 530). 
620 !d. at 102. 
621 !d. 
622 Id. "The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity," Warren wrote, "that 
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime." !d. As Warren explained: 
"The United Nations' survey of the nationality laws of 84 nations of the world reveals that 
only two countries, the Philippines and Turkey, impose denationalization as a penalty for 
desertion." !d. at 103. 
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ment-also emphasized that the Constitution had to be read as written and 
in light of its principles. 623 
iii. Existing Eighth Amendment Case Law 
The U.S. Supreme Court has decided scores of Eighth Amendment 
cases. Those cases fall into three broad categories, corresponding with the 
three clauses that make up the Eighth Amendment itself. While the Bail and 
Excessive Fines Clauses forbid "excessive" governmental action, the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause forbids punishments that are "cruel and 
unusual. "624 Central to the Supreme Court's interpretation of all three 
clauses is the concept of proportionality, that is, whether the fine or bail 
amount is excessive or whether the punishment is disproportionate in rela-
tion to the crime.625 For example, the Court-using the Eighth Amend-
ment-has declared the death penalty's use unconstitutional for those who 
rob or kidnap but do not kill the victim.626 Still, the Court-through the 
years-has permitted the death penalty in other contexts, with the Court 
continually hearing stay of execution requests.627 
The U.S. Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as re-
gards executions has, in actuality, been all over the map. In 1971, in 
McGautha v. California,628 the Supreme Court held that a defendant's due 
process rights were not infringed by the death penalty's imposition without 
governing standards.629 "In light of history, experience, and the present 
limitations of human knowledge," the Court ruled, "we find it quite im-
623 !d. at 103-104. The Court put it this way: 
The provisions of the Constitution are not time-worn adages or hollow shibboleths. 
They are vital, living principles that authorize and limit governmental powers in our Na-
tion. They are the rules of government. When the constitutionality of an Act of Congress 
is challenged in this Court, we must apply those rules. If we do not, the words of the Con-
stitution become little more than good advice. 
When it appears that an Act of Congress conflicts with one of these provisions, we 
have no choice but to enforce the paramount commands of the Constitution. We are sworn 
to do no less. We cannot push back the limits of the Constitution merely to accommodate 
challenged legislation. We must apply those limits as the Constitution prescribes them, 
bearing in mind both the broad scope oflegislative discretion and the ultimate 
responsibility of constitutional adjudication. We do well to approach this task cautiously, 
as all our predecessors have counseled. But the ordeal of judgment cannot be shirked. In 
some 81 instances since this Court was established it has determined that congressional 
action exceeded the bounds of the Constitution. It is so in this case. 
!d. 
624 U.S. CONST., amend. VIII. 
625 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012); Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leather-
man Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435 (2001); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 
321, 336-37 & n.lO (1998); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987). 
626 Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (per curiam); Hooks v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
917 (1977) (per curiam). 
627 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008). 
628 402 u.s. 183 (1971). 
629 !d. at 196. 
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possible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury 
the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to any-
thing in the Constitution."630 In 1972, in its landmark ruling in Furman v. 
Georgia,631 however, the Court struck down capital punishment laws as 
unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.632 While 
each Justice wrote separately, there were five votes to strike down then-
existing death penalty laws as they were being applied.633 
The Court's current stance, by contrast, derives from its 1976 decision 
in Gregg v. Georgia,634 in which the Court upheld death penalty laws pur-
porting to guide juror discretion.635 In that case, the Court stated: "We 
now hold that the punishment of death does not invariably violate the 
Constitution."636 Essentially, in interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause, the Court bowed to public sentiment as expressed by state 
legislation. In the wake of Furman, 35 states had reenacted death penalty 
laws.637 "Despite the continuing debate, dating back to the 19th century, 
over the morality and utility of capital punishment," the Court ruled in 
Gregg, "it is now evident that a large proportion of American society con-
tinues to regard it as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction. "638 
Still, the Court set new limits. In other cases decided in 1976, the Court 
explicitly refused to uphold statutes calling for mandatory death sentenc-
es-the very kind of sentences that had been used in the Founding Fathers' 
time.639 
In the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court has heard multiple 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to executions and various 
aspects of capital punishment laws.640 And since its 1958 decision in Trap 
v. Dulles,641 the "evolving standards of decency" test has remained the 
governing legal standard for assessing cruel and unusual punishment 
claims.642 In evaluating such claims, the Supreme Court thus continues to 
630 !d. at 207. 
631 408 u.s. 238 (1972). 
632 !d. 
633 !d. 
634 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
635 !d. at 197-98, 206-207. 
636 Id. at 169. 
637 Alice Lynd, Unfair and Can't Be Fixed: The Machinery of Death in Ohio, 44 U. ToL. 
L. REv. 1, 10 (2012). 
638 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179. In fact, the American debate over the morality and utility of 
capital punishment dates back even further, to America's founding period. BESSLER, 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 66-161. 
639 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 
(1976). 
640 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 236-41. 
641 356 u.s. 86 (1958). 
642 E.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010). A torrent of scholarship has 
been written about the Supreme Court's "evolving standards of decency" test, much of it 
focused on capital punishment. E.g., Jennifer Carter, Capital Punishment: A Struggle to 
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repeat that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."643 
In applying that test, the Court primarily examines legislative enact-
ments and jury verdicts.644 But it also looks to state practices on a collective 
scale, taking notice of how often states use a particular punishment. 645 The 
SatisfY Evolving Standards of Decency- Reviewing the Debate in the United States and 
Canada, 17 Sw. J. INT'LL. 237 (2011); Katheryn Klimko, Evolving Standards as a 
Judicial Mandate: Necessary or Superfluous?, 34 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 785 (2011); 
Michael D. Dean, State Legislation and the "Evolving Standards of Decency": Flaws in 
the Constitutional Review of Death Penalty Statutes, 35 U. DAYTONL. REv. 379 (2010); 
Jacob Lemon-Strauss, The States Are Right: Arguing for the Continued Use of State 
Legislatures in Farming a National Consensus for the Evolving Standards of Decency, 4 7 
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1319 (20 10); Corinna Barrett Lain, Lessons Learned from the 
Evolution of "Evolving Standards," 4 CHARLESTONL. REv. 661 (2010); Corinna Barrett 
Lain, The Unexceptionalism of "Evolving Standards, " 57 UCLA L. REv. 365 (2009); 
Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing the Nature and Logic of Capital 
Mitigation, 36 HOFS1RA L. REv. 835 (2008); Dwight Aarons, The Abolitionist's Dilemma: 
Establishing the Standards for the Evolving Standards of Decency, 6 PIERCE L. REv. 441 
(2008); William W. Berry III, Fallowing the Yellow Brick Road of Evolving Standards of 
Decency: The Ironic Consequences of "Death-Is-Different" Jurisprudence, 28 PACE L. 
REv. 15 (2007); Dr. Saby Ghoshray, Tracing the Moral Contours of the Evolving 
Standards of Decency: The Supreme Court's Capital Jurisprudence Post-Roper, 45 J. 
CATH. LEGAL STUD. 561 (2006); William C. Heffernan, Constitutional Historicism: An 
Examination of the Eighth Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Test, 54 AM. U. L. 
REv. 1355 (2005); Brian W. Varland, Marking the Progress of a Maturing Society: 
Reconsidering the Constitutionality of Death Penalty Application in Light of Evolving 
Standards of Decency, 28 HAMLINE L. REv. 311 (2005); Erwin Chemerinsky, Evolving 
Standards of Decency in 2003-Is the Death Penalty on Life Support?, 29 U. DAYTONL. 
REv. 201 (2004); Mark A. Godsey & Thomas Pulley, The Innocence Revolution and Our 
"Evolving Standards of Decency" in Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 29 U. DAYTON L. 
REv. 265 (2004); Denise LeBoeuf, Evolving Standards of Decency: Cracks in the 
Foundation, 29 U. DAYTON L. REv. 293 (2004); Mark Alan Ozimek, The Case for a More 
Workable Standard in Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Atkins v. Virginia and Categorical 
Exemptions under the Imprudent "Evolving Standards of Decency" Doctrine, 34 U. TOL. 
L. REv. 651 (2003); Candace Ada Mueller, The Evolving Standards in Prison Condition 
Cases: An Analysis ofWilson v. Seiter and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 
13 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 155 (1993); Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of 
Death: Evolving Standards of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. 
REv. 989 (1978). 
643 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
644 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 ("The Court first considers 'objective indicia of society's 
standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice' to determine whether 
there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue."); Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-89 (1982) ("[T]he Court [in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 
(1977)] looked to the historical development of the punishment at issue, legislative 
judgments, international opinion, and the sentencing decisions juries have made before 
bringing its own judgment to bear on the matter. We proceed to analyze the punishment at 
issue in this case in a similar manner."). 
645 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023 ("Actual sentencing practices are an important part of the 
Court's inquiry into consensus."). 
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Court considers the outcomes of jury verdicts even though it allows death 
penalty sentences to be imposed by more conviction-prone, "death-
qualified" juries.646 Such "death-qualified juries" are stripped in advance of 
death penalty opponents, thus skewing the Court's Eighth Amendment 
calculus.647 Obviously, juries stripped of death penalty opponents will re-
turn more death sentences, especially since-because of the American tradi-
tion of juror unanimity-all it takes is one hold-out juror to reject a death 
sentence.648 Although the Court says juries are supposed to express the 
"conscience of the community,"649 it is hard to see how they can when 
death penalty opponents are systematically excluded from sitting in judg-
ment in the first place.650 
In practice, the Supreme Court-in applying its "evolving standards" 
test-routinely does a nose-count of jurisdictions either prohibiting or 
permitting a specific punishment, also looking at how often it is inflicted in 
practice.651 For instance, the paucity of executions for juvenile offenders 
was a significant factor in the Court declaring such executions unconstitu-
tional in 2005.652 This tallying-of states and numbers-is expressly done 
for the purpose of identifying whether or not a "national consensus" has 
been reached as to a societal practice.653 The Court has also, at times, 
looked at the "consistency of the direction of change." 654 The Eighth 
Amendment, of course, nowhere mentions "evolving standards" or "con-
646 Margaret C. Stevenson, Bette L. Bottoms & Shari S. S. Diamond, Jurors' Discussions 
of a Defendant's History of Child Abuse and Alcohol Abuse in Capital Sentencing 
Deliberations, 16 PSYCHOL. PuB. POL'Y & L. 1, 8 (2010) (citing studies). 
647 See Wainwright v. Witt, 470 U.S. 1039 (1985); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 
(1986); Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007). 
648 Donald M. Houser, Reconciling Ring v. Arizona with the Current Structure of the 
Federal Capital Murder Trial: The Case for Trifurcation, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 349, 
356 (2007). 
649 Witherspoon v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968). 
650 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 84 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring): 
Of special concern to me are rules that deprive the defendant of a trial by jurors 
representing a fair cross section of the community. Litigation involving both challenges 
for cause and peremptory challenges has persuaded me that the process of obtaining a 
"death qualified jury" is really a procedure that has the purpose and effect of obtaining a 
jury that is biased in favor of conviction. 
651 See, e.g., Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 83, at 13 ("The Supreme Court in recent 
years has frequently done nose counts or tallies of state law to determine the evolving 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments."). 
652 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-65 ("[E]ven in the 20 States without a formal prohibition on 
executing juveniles, the practice is infrequent. Since Stanford, six States have executed 
prisoners for crimes committed as juveniles. In the past ten years, only three have done 
so: Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia."). 
653 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 ("The Court first considers 'objective indicia of society's 
standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice' to determine whether 
there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.") (citation omitted). 
654 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 ("It is not so much the number of these States that is 
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change."). 
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sensus," let alone trending public sentiment, but speaks of prohibiting 
"cruel and unusual punishments."655 
In resolving disputes over the meaning of the "cruel and unusual pun-
ishments" language, the Justices also focus, at times, on their own "inde-
pendent judgment"656 or the Eighth Amendment's general wording.657 This 
makes sense because judicial independence is a firmly rooted American 
value and life-tenured judges should be the ones to determine what the 
Constitution means. The power of judicial review has been established 
since Marbury v. Madison,658 and the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly 
asserted its judicial independence.659 That America's judiciary is independ-
ent-and must remain so-is thus a settled principle of law.660 As St. 
George Tucker, a professor of law at the College of William and Mary, 
wrote in the 1790s: "The American Constitutions appear to be the first in 
which this absolute Independence of the Judiciary has been carried into full 
Effect. "661 
655 U.S. CONST., amend. VIII. 
656 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 ("the Court must determine in the exercise of its own 
independent judgment whether the punishment in question violates the Constitution"). 
657 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) ("general language should not, 
therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken"); Joy M. 
Donham, Third Strike or Merely a Foul Tip?: The Gross Disproportionality ofLockyer v. 
Andrade, 38 AKRoNL. REv. 369, 395 n.166 (2005) ("[s]ince the Eighth Amendment 
contains such general language, the Framers intended future generations to define the 
clause"); compare J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKEL.J. 
1162, 1236 (1989) ("Judge Richard Posner has observed, while reading the general 
language of the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment, that 
'[p ]articularizing not only would have been time-consuming but might have sparked 
debilitating controversy, since it is easier to agree on generalities than on particulars."') 
(quoting RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 226-27 (1988)). 
658 1 Cranch 137, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
659 Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533,545 (2001); Millerv. French, 530 
U.S. 327, 350 (2000); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1994); Commodity 
Futures Trading Com'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986); Northern Pipeline Const. Co. 
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58-60 (1982); United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 
200, 217-21 (1980); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 356 (1871); Greely v. Thompson, 51 
U.S. 225, 240 (1850). 
660 NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 123-24 (1793) 
("To prevent both legislative and executive abuses, the intervention of an independent 
judiciary is of no small importance. To the judges, the ministers of this power it belongs 
to interpret all acts of the legislature, agreeably to the true principles of the constitution, as 
founded in the principles of natural law, and to make an impartial application, in all cases 
of disputed right. By this provision, the rights and interests of the legislative and executive 
branches will be kept in union with the rights and interests of the individual citizens."); id. 
at 160 ("The abilities, integrity, and independence of the Judges, is a shield, both to the 
rulers, and to the people. They give a steady nerve to the mild energy of government, and 
ultimate security to private rights."). 
661 St. George Tucker Notebook, Law Lectures (circa 1790s), Book 5, p. 201, available at 
https://digitalarchive.wm.edu/handle/10288/13361; see also St. George Tucker Notebook, 
Law Lectures (circa 1790s), Book 7, p. 55, available at 
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Because it is living judges who must decide what is cruel and what is 
unusual, it is only logical that present-day Supreme Court Justices should 
have the final say on what those terms mean. After all, the Founding Fa-
thers are no longer around to do so, and the words they chose-"cruel and 
unusual"-suggest a modern-day approach in any event. The concept of 
cruelty is in the eye of the beholder, and one cannot possibly determine if a 
punishment is unusual without performing some evaluation of modern-day 
practice. The Constitution itself certainly nowhere states that once tradi-
tional, eighteenth-century punishments are to remain forever constitution-
al. On the contrary, the death penalty is nowhere exempted from the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause, meaning that if current Justices find cap-
ital punishment both cruel and unusual, it must be declared unconstitu-
tional. 
Some Justices, attempting to divine the "original meaning" of the 
phrase "cruel and unusual punishments," continue to myopically examine 
eighteenth-century practices in death penalty cases.662 That emphasis on 
founding era mores is misguided. In America's pre-Fourteenth Amendment 
era, slavery was still being used, and in the founders' time harsh corporal 
punishments, such as branding, ear cropping, and the pillory, were also 
considered acceptable practices.663 To compare eighteenth-century society 
with twenty-first century America is to compare apples and oranges. Brutal 
corporal punishments, often associated with slavery, have long been aban-
doned and de-legitimized by America's criminal justice system,664 so other 
https:/ /digitalarchive. wm.edu/handle/1 0288/13361 ("The separation of the judiciary 
power from the legislative, & executive, & the perfect independence of the former, in 
every respect, seems to have been an Object of the particular Attention of the people of 
America, not only in their federal, but in their State Constitutions."). 
662 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 94 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition on the 'inflict[ion]' of 'cruel and unusual punishments' must be 
understood in light of the historical practices that led the Framers to include it in the Bill 
of Rights."); id. at 97 ("By the late 18th century, the more violent modes of execution had 
'dwindled away,' and would for that reason have been 'unusual' in the sense that they 
were no longer 'regularly or customarily employed."') (citations omitted). 
663 The U.S. Constitution itself forbade Congress to restrict the slave trade prior to 1808. 
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9. Branding, ear cropping, the pillory, and public whipping were also 
still in use when the Bill of Rights was ratified. Ryan J. Huschka, Sorry for the Jackass 
Sentence: A Critical Analysis of the Constitutionality of Contemporary Shaming 
Punishments, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 803, 823 (2006) ("The most convincing evidence that 
shaming was acceptable at the time of the Bill of Rights is that the punishment of standing 
in the pillory and whipping were not abolished untill839, well after the adoption of the 
Bill of Rights."); Ahmed A. White, A Different Kind of Labor Law: Vagrancy Law and 
the Regulation of Harvest Labor, 1913-1924,75 U. COLO. L. REv. 667,679 (2004) ("Most 
American colonies in the eighteenth century subjected vagrants to the same array of 
barbaric punishments as did the English at that time: whipping, branding, ear-cropping, 
commitment to the house of corrections, imprisonment, and even enslavement."). 
664 See, e.g., State v. Nipper, 81 S.E. 164, 165 (N.C. 1914) ("In view of the enlightenment 
of this age, and the progress which has been made in prison discipline, we have no diffi-
culty in coming to the conclusion that corporal punishment by flogging is not reasonable 
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eighteenth-century criminal justice practices-as some Justices point to-
should not be considered a legitimate benchmark with which to judge cur-
rent practices.665 
In attempting to justify executions, some Supreme Court Justices cite 
language in the U.S. Constitution that contemplates the death penalty's use. 
For example, Justice Scalia points to the Fifth Amendment, which requires 
a presentment or indictment of a grand jury to hold a person to answer for 
a "capital" crime, and which also prohibits deprivation of "life" without 
due process of law.666 "This," Scalia contends, "clearly permits the death 
penalty to be imposed, and establishes beyond doubt that the death penalty 
is not one of the 'cruel and unusual punishments' prohibited by the Eighth 
Amendment."667 Originalist Justices have likewise cited the Fifth Amend-
ment's Double Jeopardy Clause, prohibiting being "twice put in jeopardy 
of life" for the same offense,668 as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which enjoins the taking of "life" without due process of law.669 
Such reasoning is fallacious, however. To begin with, America's 
founders themselves would be appalled by the idea that a society should 
never advance or evolve or be forever locked into past practices.670 In 
Sketches of the Principles of Government, published in 1793, Nathaniel 
Chipman-who cited Beccaria's On Crimes and Punishments in his own 
treatise-wrote that punishment serves "the end of preventing crimes, and 
securing obedience to the laws" and that a society's limits on the right of 
punishment are not "permanent and invariable. "671 "The right of punishing 
is, in practice," Chipman wrote, "frequently limited, only by the will of the 
legislature, and the decisions of the judiciary."672 Chipman expressly em-
phasized that "the penalties, which, in one state of society and manners, 
are adequate to that end, may, in a different state, be wholly inade-
quate."673 
and cannot be sustained. That which degrades and imbrutes a man cannot be either neces-
sary or reasonable."). 
665 E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337, 340 348 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting; 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) ("The Court makes no pretense 
that execution of the mildly mentally retarded would have been considered 'cruel and 
unusual' in 1791."). 
666 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 88 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
667 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1141 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
668 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 380 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
669 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 350-51 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). 
670 The common law itself has always been subject to change. See Jacob v. State, 22 Tenn. 
493, 1842 WL 1984 *13 (Tenn. 1842) ("The common law of a country will, therefore, 
never be entirely stationary, but will be modified, and extended by analogy, construction 
and custom, so as to embrace new relations, springing up from time to time, from an ame-
lioration or change of society."). 
671 NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 193, 196 (1793). 
672 Id. at 196. 
673 !d. at 197. 
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In A General Abridgement and Digest of American Law, published in 
1824, Massachusetts lawyer Nathan Dane-who also cited Beccaria-
likewise included a section on punishment.674 In his treatise, Dane de-
scribed the way in which punishments had already changed from colonial 
days to his book's publication date. "When our country was first settled," 
Dane wrote, "there were many more capital and infamous punishments, 
than exist at present; probably because our ancestors came from a country 
in which these were very numerous. "675 After discussing the laws of Eng-
land, Massachusetts and elsewhere, Dane noted that "punishments have 
been varied in other respects; the pillory, gallows, whipping, and brand-
ing," he emphasized "have almost disappeared," with "solitary imprison-
ment, and hard labour in state prisons, having been generally substituted in 
their place. "676 By an act of Congress dated May 16, 1812, Dane wrote 
"[c]orporal punishment in the army of the United States, was abolished," 677 
with Dane referencing the "Act of Massachusetts of February 27, 1813," 
substituting-in the court's discretion-corporal punishments for terms of 
imprisonment and hard labor.678 
Indeed, what goes unstated by originalists is that the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments were plainly intended to protect rights, with both con-
stitutional amendments adopted when the death penalty itself was still the 
usual punishment for various crimes. Ironically, Justice Scalia-a self-
described "faint-hearted originalist"-concedes that no modern-day judge 
would any longer countenance public lashing or the branding of criminals' 
hands.679 In effect, while Justice Scalia insists that the punishment of death 
674 6 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAWS 636-37 
(1824). 
675 !d. at 637. 
676 !d. 
677 !d. (citing Act of Congress, May 16, 1812, sec. 7). 
678 !d. (citing Act of Massachusetts, Feb. 27, 1813). The Massachusetts law read as fol-
lows: 
That whenever any person or persons, shall or may be prosecuted to conviction, be-
fore the Supreme Judicial Court of this Commonwealth, for any crime or misdemeanour 
which is now by law punishable by whipping, standing in the pillory, sitting on the gal-
lows, or imprisonment in the common gaol of the county, such court may at their discre-
tion, in cases not already provided for, in lieu of the punishments aforesaid, order and 
sentence such convict or convicts to suffer solitary imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
three months, and to be confmed to hard labour for a term not exceeding five years, ac-
cording to the aggravation of the offense. 
!d. 
679 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 861 (1989) 
("What if some state should enact a new law providing public lashing, or branding on the 
right hand, as punishment for certain criminal offenses? Even if it could be demonstrated 
unequivocally that these were not cruel and unusual measures in 1791, and even though 
no prior Supreme Court decision has specifically disapproved them, I doubt whether any 
federal judge--even among the many who consider themselves originalists-would 
sustain them against an eighth amendment challenge."); id. ("I am confident that public 
flogging and handbranding would not be sustained by our courts, and any espousal of 
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should be allowed to persist680 in American law,681 he and other well-
known originalists-including Robert Bork-have freely acknowledged 
that harsh corporal punishments would be unconstitutional. 682 
Simple rhetorical questions forcefully rebut their entire line of argu-
ment: if American judges can no longer allow an offender's "limb" to be 
lopped off, how can U.S. judges continue to allow an offenders "life" to be 
taken? And if it is "cruel and unusual" to cut off an offender's ear or to 
brand his hand, how can it not be "cruel and unusual" to take that offend-
er's life? The fact that early Americans may not have viewed all executions 
as cruel does not mean that today's judges must reach the same conclusion. 
And the fact that capital punishment was not unusual in the founding era 
says nothing about its present status. Things have changed; the law itself 
has changed. A usual punishment, after all, can become unusual over time. 
Indeed, even a traditional punishment, if administered in an arbitrary and 
discriminatory manner, may become unusual in light of intervening legal 
principles, such as due process and equal protection. 
originalism as a practical theory of exegesis must somehow come to terms with that 
reality."); id. at 865 ("I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted 
originalist. I cannot imagine myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a 
statute that imposes the punishment of flogging."). 
680 In the first decade of the twenty-first century, executions took place every year in the 
United States. The annual number of executions in that decade ranged from a high of 85 
executions in 2000 to a low of37 executions in 2008. Facts about the Death Penalty, 
DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (Oct. 28, 2011). 
681 See Craig Haney & Richard L. Wiener, Death Is Different: An Editorial Introduction 
to the Theme Issue, 10 PSYCHOL. PuB. PoL'Y & L. 373, 375 (2004) ("[S]upporters of the 
death penalty view the legal issues in very different terms. Some, like Supreme Court 
Justice Antonin Scalia, complain loudly about the 'death is different jurisprudence' that 
they believe complicates capital punishment law unnecessarily, delays a capital 
defendant's final reckoning far too long, and renders this area oflaw unpredictable."); 
Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 74 
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1043, 1063 n.127 (2006) ("Justices Scalia and Thomas are 
consistently opposed to procedural protections in death penalty cases"). 
682 See Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different from All 
Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 781,823 n.173 (1994) ("Though the Court has not 
explicitly addressed the eighth amendment status of punishments such as whipping and 
limb amputation, even conservative scholars such as Judge Robert Bork have indicated 
their belief that such punishments would be unconstitutional."); MAY IT PLEASE THE 
COURT 234 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993) (during an oral argument before 
the Supreme Court, Justice Potter Stewart asked the following question: "What if a state 
said for the most heinous kind of first-degree murders we are going to inflict breaking a 
man on the wheel and then disemboweling him while he is still alive and then burning 
him up: What would you say to that?" Bark's response: "I would say that that practice is 
so out of step with modem morality and modem jurisprudence that the state cannot return 
to it. That kind of torture was precisely what the framers thought they were outlawing 
when they wrote the cruel and unusual punishments clause."). 
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iv. Excessive and Disproportionate Punishments 
The Supreme Court, in a series of cases, has already ruled that the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause bars some executions as excessive 
and disproportionate punishments.683 In 1977, in Coker v. Georgia, 684 the 
Court held that the death penalty could not be imposed for the non-
homicidal rape of an adult woman.685 That ruling was later extended to 
non-homicidal child rape in Kennedy v. Louisiana, a 2008 case.686 In 1982 
in Enmund v. Florida,687 the Court likewise held that the death penalty 
may not be imposed upon a person "who aids and abets a felony in the 
course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself 
kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force 
will be employed."688 In 1986, in Ford v. Wainwright,689 the Court further 
held that insane offenders could not be executed.690 
And the list goes on, with the Supreme Court already having ad-
dressed both juvenile offenders and those with profound intellectual disa-
bilities. In 1998, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,691 the Court held that Ameri-
ca's evolving standards no longer permitted the execution any offender 
under the age of sixteen.692 Then, in 2005, in Roper v. Simmons,693 the 
Court-overruling a 1989 decision, Stanford v. Kentucky694-outlawed the 
execution of juvenile offenders altogether, ruling that no offender under the 
683 Aside from restricting the death penalty's use for certain categories of offenders and 
crimes, the Supreme Court has also held that the Eighth Amendment safeguards the way 
in which capital trials are conducted. E.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 
(1980) (plurality opinion) (states must give narrow and precise definition to the 
"aggravating" factors that can result in a death sentence); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 
604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (in any capital prosecution a defendant has wide latitude to 
raise as a "mitigating" factor "any aspect" of his or her "character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than 
death"); accord Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982); Johnson v. Texas, 
509 U.S. 350, 359-62 (1993). 
684 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
685 !d. at 592. 
686 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
687 458 u.s. 782 (1982). 
688 Id. at 797. Compare Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 137-38, 157-58 (1987) (allowing 
the death penalty for certain accomplices who neither killed nor intended to kill so long as 
the accomplices are major participants in the underlying felony and act with reckless 
disregard for life). 
689 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
690 !d. at 410. 
691 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
692 Id. at 818-38. 
693 543 u.s. 551 (2005). 
694 492 U.S. 361 (1989). Stanford v. Kentucky had determined that the Eighth Amendment 
permitted the execution of offenders over the age of fifteen but under the age of eighteen. 
!d. at 370-71. 
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age of eighteen could be put to death.695 In the Court's 2002 decision in 
Atkins v. Virginia,696 the Court-employing similar logic-overruled an-
other 1989 case, Penry v. Lynaugh,697 and held that the mentally retarded 
could no longer be executed either. 698 Although a significant number of 
death row inmates have severe mental illnesses,699 the Court has yet to take 
up whether those inmates may be executed in a manner consistent with the 
U.S. Constitution.7°0 
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court-as well as lower-court judges-
have already indicated that the infliction of various corporal punishments 
would run afoul of the Eighth Amendment. 701 Thus, members of the Court 
have expressed the view that the following forms of torturous or degrading 
punishments are unconstitutional: the rack and the thumbscrew/02 cadena 
695 Roper, 543 U.S. at 577. The Supreme Court has yet to restrict the death penalty's 
imposition for the severely mentally ill, though many people believe it should do so. Lyn 
Entzeroth, The Challenge and Dilemma of Charting a Course to Constitutionally Protect 
the Severely Mentally Ill Capital Defendant from the Death Penalty, 44 AKRON L. REv. 
529, 530-31 (2011) ("The American Bar Association, the American Psychiatric 
Association, the American Psychological Association, and the National Alliance for the 
Mentally Ill all endorse a death penalty exemption for the severely mentally ill."). 
696 536 u.s. 304 (2002). 
697 492 u.s. 302 (1989). 
698 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. 
699 Lyn Suzam1e Entzeroth, The Illusion of Sanity: The Constitutional and Moral Danger 
of Medicating Condemned Prisoners in Order to Execute Them, 76 TENN. L. REv. 641, 
641 n.5 (2009). 
700 See Jean Mattimoe, The Death Penalty and the Mentally Ill: A Selected and Annotated 
Bibliography, 5 THE CRIT: CRITICAL STUD. J. 1 (2012) ("[!]ega! scholars have speculated 
that the Court may eventually create another categorical exemption for the severely 
mentally ill"). 
701 Early American jurists, by contrast, did not classify corporal punishments as 
unconstitutional. In reTurner, 1 Ware 83, 24 F. Cas. 340, 340-42 (D.C. Me. 1825) 
(rejecting a claim that it was a cruel and unusual punishment to chain a black seaman to 
the deck of a vessel); Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 6 Rand. 694, 1828 WL 860 (Va. Ga. 
1828) (a Virginia act making those convicted of gaming subject to stripes was held not to 
constitute a cruel and unusual punishment under state law; "The punishment of offenses 
by stripes is certainly odious, but cam1ot be said to be unusual.") (italics in original). 
702 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Eighth 
Amendment is addressed to always-and-everywhere 'cruel' punishments, such as the rack 
and the thumbscrew."); see also Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 372 
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Racks and thumbscrews, well-known instruments for 
inflicting pain, were not in use because they were regarded as cruel punishments."); 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 330 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[T]here are 
certain punishments that inherently involve so much physical pain and suffering that 
civilized people cannot tolerate them--e.g., use of the rack, the thumbscrew, or other 
mont. Regardless of public sentiment with respect to imposition of one of these 
punishments in a particular case or at any one moment in history, the Constitution 
prohibits it."); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(describing "the rack and thumbscrew" as "historic punishments that were cruel and 
unusual"); Twining v. State ofNew Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 125 (1908) (Harlan, J., 
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tempora/,7°3 whipping/04 the hitching post/05 branding706 and ear crop-
ping.707 In other instances, lower courts have ruled-often as a matter of 
constitutional law-that corporal punishments, including ones previously 
allowed by law, can no longer be employed.7°8 
By contrast, the Court has upheld the constitutionality of sentences 
imposing fines, imprisonment, and hard labor.7°9 For example, in Lockyer 
v. Andrade,710 the Court upheld a California decision affirming two con-
secutive terms of 25 years to life in prison for a "third strike" conviction 
involving the theft of nine videotapes worth $84.70 from a Kmart store.711 
In that regard, it is important to remember that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude, excluded "duly 
dissenting) (describing "the thumbscrew" and "the rack" as "cruel or unusual 
punishments"); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 691 (1977) (White, J., 
dissenting) (describing the use of"a thumbscrew" as an act of"torture"). 
703 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910) ("even if the minimum penalty of 
cadena temporal had been imposed, it would have been repugnant to the Bill of Rights"). 
The punishment of cadena temporal was a Filipino practice requiring inmates-who 
would be confined for years at a time-to "always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging 
from the wrists" and be "employed at hard and painful labor." Id. at 363-64. Under the 
law in question, "prison bars and chains" would be removed only after twelve years. I d. at 
366. Although the Court in Weems was interpreting the Philippine Bill of Rights, which 
prohibited the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, the Court emphasized that the 
provision "was taken from the Constitution of the United States, and must have the same 
meaning." Id. at 367. 
704 Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (Blackmun, J.). 
705 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) ("We agree with the Court of Appeals that 
the attachment of Hope to the hitching post under the circumstances alleged in this case 
violated the Eighth Amendment."). 
706 Furman, 408 U.S. at 283 n.28 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("No one, of course, now 
contends that the reference in the Fifth Amendment to 'jeopardy of ... limb' provides 
perpetual constitutional sanction for such corporal punishments as branding and 
earcropping, which were common punishments when the Bill of Rights was adopted."). 
101 Id. 
708 James v. Commonwealth, 1825 WL 1899 (Pa. 1825) ("We all agree in this, that this 
customary ancient punishment for ducking scolds, was never adopted, and therefore, is 
not the common law of Pennsylvania."); State v. Cawood, 2 Stew. 360, 1830 WL 516 *3 
(Ala. 1830) ("It cannot be, as insisted by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error, that a 
conspiracy is not an offense known to our laws; because the villanous judgment which 
was awarded to it by the common law, would not be tolerated by our constitution, as 
being, if not cruel, at least unusual."; "This doctrine in the case of a common scold, 
underwent a very able discussion in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania a few years ago, 
in which Judge Duncan delivered a very learned opinion, deciding, that though the 
ducking stool could no longer be used, fine and imprisonment might be substituted."). 
709 Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1866). 
710 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
711 I d. at 66, 70; see also I d. at 77 ("The gross disproportionality principle reserves a 
constitutional violation for only the extraordinary case. In applying this principle for § 
2254( d)(1) purposes, it was not an unreasonable application of our clearly established law 
for the California Court of Appeal to affirm Andrade's sentence of two consecutive terms 
of 25 years to life in prison."). 
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convicted" convicts from its provisions when sentences are imposed "as a 
punishment for crime."712 Fines, imprisonment and prison labor have long 
been considered traditional criminal-law sanctions.713 While a criminal jus-
tice system can certainly employ more than one "usual" punishment at the 
same time, the question the U.S. Supreme Court must confront as regards 
executions is this: have executions, in practice, become too "unusual" to be 
constitutional any longer? 
Under the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court-using propor-
tionality principles-has already struck down "excessive" fines as unconsti-
tutional.714 A leading case is United States v. Bajakajian,715 where a defend-
ant pleaded guilty to failing to report exported currency after he was 
charged with trying to board an international flight while carrying 
$347,144. A federal district court in California determined that the entire 
amount was subject to forfeiture under the applicable federal statute, but 
that a full forfeiture would be grossly disproportional to the offense and 
would violate the Excessive Fines Clause. The district court judge thus or-
dered that defendant forfeit only $15,000, a decision the government ap-
pealed. After the Ninth Circuit affirmed, the U.S. Supreme Court did too, 
holding in its 5-4 opinion that the forfeiture of the entire amount of money 
would violate the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.716 
Writing for the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas held that a forfeiture 
is a "fine" and that "full forfeiture of respondent's currency would be 
grossly disproportional to the gravity of his offense."717 In coming to that 
conclusion, Justice Thomas focused on the text and history of the Eighth 
Amendment. After noting that the Court "has had little occasion to inter-
pret, and has never actually applied, the Excessive Fines Clause," Justice 
712 U.S. CONST., amend. XIII. 
713 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) ("[b]ail, fines, and punishment 
traditionally have been associated with the criminal process"); Weems v. United States, 
217 U.S. 349, 350 (1910) ("we perceive nothing excessive, or cruel, or unusual in a fine 
of $50 and imprisonment at hard labor in the house of correction for three months") 
(citing Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. 475 (1866)). 
714 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103 (1997) ("The Eighth Amendment protects 
against excessive civil fines, including forfeitures."); Department of Revenue of Montana 
v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778 (1994) ("A civil forfeiture may violate the Eighth 
Amendment's proscription against excessive fines."). Compare United States v. Ursery, 
518 U.S. 267, 287 (1996) (forfeitures "are subject to review for excessiveness under the 
Eighth Amendment") and United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 331 n.6 (1998) ("a 
modem statutory forfeiture is a 'fine' for Eighth Amendment purposes if it constitutes 
punishment even in part") with Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco 
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989) (holding that the Excessive Fines Clause does 
not apply to awards of punitive damages in cases between private parties); see also 
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 434 (2001) ("[t]he 
Due Process Clause of its own force also prohibits the States from imposing 'grossly 
excessive' punishments on tortfeasors") (citations omitted). 
715 524 u.s. 321 (1998). 
716 Id. at 324-26. 
717 /d. at 324, 334. 
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Thomas explained that a "fine" is "a payment to a sovereign as punish-
ment for some offense" 718 and that "excessive" means "surpassing the usu-
al, the proper, or a normal measure of proportion. "719 "The text and histo-
ry of the Excessive Fines Clause," Thomas wrote, "demonstrate the cen-
trality of proportionality to the excessiveness inquiry," though Thomas 
emphasized that "they provide little guidance as to how disproportional a 
punitive forfeiture must be to the gravity of an offense in order to be 'ex-
cessive. "'720 
Justice Thomas-in focusing on proportionality in that context-
concluded that neither the text nor the history of the Eighth Amendment 
answered the constitutional question of "just how proportional to a crimi-
nal offense a fine must be." 721 "[T]he text of the Excessive Fines Clause 
does not answer it," "[n]or does its history," Thomas ruled.722 "The 
Clause," Thomas noted, "was little discussed in the First Congress and the 
debates over the ratification of the Bill of Rights. "723 After noting that the 
Excessive Fines Clause "was taken verbatim from the English Bill of Rights 
of 1689," Thomas emphasized that none of the English sources suggest 
"how disproportional to the gravity of an offense a fine must be in order to 
be deemed constitutionally excessive. "724 
"The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive 
Fines Clause," Thomas opined in Bajakajian, "is the principle of propor-
tionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the 
gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish. "725 Finding the text and 
history of the Eighth Amendment unhelpful, Justice Thomas concluded, 
"We must therefore rely on other considerations in deriving a constitution-
718 /d. at 327-28 (citing Browning-Ferris Industries ofVt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 
492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)). 
719 Id. at 335 (citing 1 N. Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) 
(defining excessive as "beyond the common measure or proportion") & S. Johnson, A 
Dictionary of the English Language 680 (4th ed. 1773 (defining excessive as "[b]eyond 
the common proportion")). 




724 !d. at 335-36 (citing Earl of Devonshire's Case, 11 State Tr. 1367, 1372 (H.L.1689) & 
Magna Charta, 9 Hen. III, ch. 14 (1225), 1 Stat. at Large 6-7 (1762 ed.)). The Earl of 
Devonshire was fined £30,000 by the Court of King's Bench during the reign of James II, 
a sum that was found to be "excessive and exorbitant," "against Magna Charta, the 
common Right of the Subject, and the Law of the Land," and "a great Violation of the 
Privileges of the Peers of England." 1 THE HISTORY AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF 
LORDS, FROM THE RESTORATION IN 1660, TO THE PRESENT TIME 362-64 (1742) (italics in 
original). 
725 !d. at 334 (citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1993) & Alexander v. 
United States, 509 U.S. 544, 559 (1993)). The question of whether a fine is 
constitutionally excessive, Justice Thomas wrote, was entitled to "de novo" review, 
without any deference to the district court's determination of excessiveness. !d. at 336 
n.10. 
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al excessiveness standard. "726 He found two such considerations "particu-
larly relevant. "727 "The first, which we have emphasized in our cases inter-
preting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause," Thomas wrote, "is 
that judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in 
the first instance to the legislature. "728 "The second," Thomas added, "is 
that any judicial determination regarding the gravity of a particular crimi-
nal offense will be inherently imprecise."729 Finding both principles "coun-
sel against requiring strict proportionality between the amount of a puni-
tive forfeiture and the gravity of a criminal offense," the majority in Ba-
jakajian adopted the standard of "gross disproportionality," the standard 
also articulated in the Court's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
precedents.730 
In applying the "gross disproportionality" standard, words that do 
not appear in the Constitution itself, the Court in Bajakajian found that a 
forfeiture of $357,144 would violate the Excessive Fines Clause.731 Justice 
Thomas emphasized that the crime "was solely a reporting offense"; that 
the offense was "unrelated to any other illegal activities"; that the money 
"was the proceeds of legal activity and was to be used to repay a lawful 
debt"; that "it was perfectly legal" for the defendant to "possess the 
$357,144 in cash and to remove it from the United States"; and that the 
defendant "is not a money launderer, a drug trafficker, or a tax evader."732 
Justice Thomas also specifically rejected the contention that "the propor-
tionality of full forfeiture is demonstrated by the fact that the First Con-
gress enacted statutes requiring full forfeiture of goods involved in customs 
offenses or the payment of monetary penalties proportioned to the goods' 
value. "733 Thomas pointed out that the type of forfeiture imposed by these 
early customs statutes was civil or remedial, not criminal, in nature.734 
In Bajakajian, Justice Kennedy's dissent expressed outrage, finding 
that the Constitution "does not forbid forfeiture of all of the smuggled or 
unreported cash."735 "For the first time in its history," the dissent began, 
726 !d. at 336. 
727 /d. 
728 /d. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) ("Reviewing courts ... should 
grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in 
determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes") & Gore v. United States, 
357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) ("Whatever views may be entertained regarding severity of 
punishment, ... these are peculiarly questions oflegislative policy")). 
729 !d. 
730 !d. Justice Thomas noted that the "gross disproportionality" standard had been 
developed by the Court in its Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause precedents. !d. 
731 /d. at 337; see also id. at 337 n.ll ("The only question before this Court is whether the 
full forfeiture ofrespondent's $357,144 ... is constitutional under the Excessive Fines 
Clause. We hold that it is not."). 
732 !d. at 337-38 & n.13. 
733 /d. at 340. 
734 !d. at 340-43. 
735 /d. at 354 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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"the Court strikes down a fine as excessive under the Eighth Amend-
ment. "736 As Justice Kennedy wrote: "The decision is disturbing both for its 
specific holding and for the broader upheaval it foreshadows. At issue is a 
fine Congress fixed in the amount of the currency respondent sought to 
smuggle or to transport without reporting. If a fine calibrated with this 
accuracy fails the Court's test, its decision portends serious disruption of a 
vast range of statutory fines. "737 The dissent agreed with the gross dispro-
portionality test, but took issue with the Court's application of it. "This 
test would be a proper way to apply the Clause," Kennedy wrote, "if only 
the majority were faithful in applying it." 738 "The majority's assessment of 
the crime accords no deference, let alone substantial deference, to the 
judgment of Congress," Kennedy emphasized.739 
Apart from the Excessive Fines Clause arena, judges have already con-
cluded that certain modes of execution-among them, burning at the 
stake/40 crucifixion/41 and breaking on the wheeF42-would be excessive 
and thus unconstitutional.743 As Justice William Douglas, for example, 
wrote in his concurrence in Robinson v. California: "The historic punish-
ments that were cruel and unusual included 'burning at the stake, crucifix-
ion, breaking on the wheel,' quartering, the rack and the thumbscrew, and 
in some circumstances even solitary confinement. "744 
In 1857, the Supreme Court of Ohio-after noting that, under Eng-
lish law, drawing and quartering, being dragged to the place of execution, 
or being disemboweled or burned alive, were sometimes "[s]uperadded"-
also opined as follows: "These cruel devices for purposes of torture in in-
flicting the punishment of death for what was deemed the more atrocious 
crimes, as well as the ignominous inventions, as the punishment for minor 
offenses, by mutilation or dismemberment, such as the cutting off the hand 
or the ears, or fixing a lasting stigma by slitting the nostrils, or branding 
736 !d. at 344. 
737 /d. 
738 /d. at 348. 
739 !d. 
740 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 435, 446-47 (1890) (describing burning at the stake as "cruel 
and unusual"); Twining v. State of New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 125 (1908) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (describing "burning at the stake" as a "cruel or unusual" punishment); accord 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 385 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (writing that capital punishment "is not 
a punishment such as burning at the stake that everyone would ineffably find to be 
repugnant to all civilized standards"). 
741 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446-47 (describing crucifixion as "cruel and unusual"). 
742 !d. (describing breaking on the wheel as "cruel and unusual"). 
743 In a dissent in one case, Justice John Paul Stevens-joined by Justice Blackmun-
noted that "[t]o that list we might have added the garrotte, a device for execution by 
strangulation developed-and abandoned-centuries ago in Spain." Gomez v. United 
States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 658 n.10 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
744 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted). 
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the hand or cheek, or by the use of the pillory, the stocks, or the ducking 
stool, etc., have been wholly discarded in this country, as relics of barba-
rism, inconsistent with the humane and enlightened spirit of the age." 745 
In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld, or declined to hear 
legal challenges to, the following methods of execution: hanging746 and 
firing squads,747 electrocution748 and lethal gas,749 and lethal injection.750 In 
Baze v. Rees751-the 2008 case upholding Kentucky's lethal injection pro-
tocol-the Supreme Court first explained that "[a] total of 36 States have 
now adopted lethal injection as the exclusive or primary means of imple-
menting the death penalty, making it by far the most prevalent method of 
execution in the United States. "752 The Court's opinion, written by Chief 
Justice John Roberts, and joined by Justices Kennedy and Alita, then 
opined: "Some risk of pain is inherent in any method of execution-no 
matter how humane-if only from the prospect of error in following the 
required procedure. It is clear, then, that the Constitution does not demand 
the avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out executions."753 "Through-
745 Robbins v. State, 1857 WL 73 *20 (Ohio 1857). 
746 Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119 (1994) (denying a petition for writ of certiorari). By 
the middle of the nineteenth century, hanging was the "nearly universal form of 
execution" in the United States. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008). 
747 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1879). 
748 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Louisiana ex ref. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 
459 (1947). In 1888, New York became the first state to authorize electrocution as a 
method of execution. Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1082 & n.4 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting from denial of cert. ). Electrocution remained a predominant mode of execution 
for nearly a century. Baze, 553 U.S. at 42. Compare Bryan v. Moore, 528 U.S. 1133 
(2000) (mem.) (dismissing a challenge to Florida's electric chair as moot after the Florida 
legislature adopted lethal injection as an alternative means of execution). 
749 Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 653 
(1992) (refusing to consider on the merits a claim that execution by lethal gas is cruel and 
unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment). The Supreme Court also refused to hear a 
challenge to the constitutionality oflethal gas in an earlier case. Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 
1237, 1239-40 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring in denial of cert.) (rejecting an Eighth 
Amendment challenge to lethal gas because the petitioner had not shown that '"the pain 
and terror resulting from death by cyanide gas is so different in degree or nature from that 
resulting from other traditional modes of execution as to implicate the eighth amendment 
right'") (quoting Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1061 (5th Cir. 1983)). 
750 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008). 
751 553 u.s. 35 (2008). 
752 Baze, 553 U.S. at 42. 
753 !d. at 47. The constitutionality of certain methods of execution has been attacked in the 
past, with at least some judges inclined to find particular methods of execution 
unconstitutional. Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for the Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 
U.S. 653, 654, 656-57 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that lethal gas is 
unconstitutional because of "the availability of more humane and less violent methods of 
execution"); Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1093 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from 
denial of cert.) (arguing that electrocution is unconstitutional); Campbell v. Wood, 114 S. 
Ct. 2125, 2126 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The public condemnation of hanging 
is overwhelming. Not only have 46 of the 48 States that once regularly imposed hanging 
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out our history," Chief Justice Roberts wrote, "whenever a method of exe-
cution has been challenged in this Court as cruel and unusual, the Court 
has rejected the challenge. "754 
On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has also squarely held 
that prisoners must be protected from harm, even prospective harm. For 
example, in Nelson v. Campbell/55 the Supreme Court held that a federal 
civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was an appropriate vehicle for a pris-
oner to challenge Alabama's proposed use of a "cut-down" procedure to 
access his compromised veins during a lethal injection procedure.l56 In that 
case, the petitioner, David Nelson, alleged three days before his scheduled 
execution that the use of the "cut-down" procedure would violate the 
Eighth Amendment.757 Petitioner had been informed by the warden that 
prison personnel would cut a 0.5-inch incision into petitioner's arm and 
catheterize a vein 24 hours before the scheduled execution.758 Writing for 
the Court and allowing the section 1983 claim to proceed, Justice Sandra 
Day O'Connor concluded that "the gravamen of petitioner's entire claim is 
that use of the cut-down would be gratuitous."759 "Merely labeling some-
thing as part of an execution procedure," O'Connor emphasized, "is insuf-
ficient to insulate it from a§ 1983 attack." 760 
abandoned the practice, but many state legislatures rejected the practice because it was 
perceived as inhumane and barbaric, precisely the concern that lies at the core of the 
Eighth Amendment."); Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 715 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, 
J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that hanging violates the Eighth Amendment 
because it involves risks of pain and mutilation not presented by lethal injection). 
754 Baze, 553 U.S. at 62. "Our society," Roberts added, however, "has nonetheless steadily 
moved to more humane methods of carrying out capital punishment." "The firing squad, 
hanging, the electric chair, and the gas chamber," he wrote, "have each in tum given way 
to more humane methods, culminating in today's consensus on lethal injection." Id. From 
a constitutional perspective, Chief Justice Roberts explained his position as follows: "The 
broad framework of the Eighth Amendment has accommodated this progress toward more 
humane methods of execution, and our approval of a particular method in the past has not 
precluded legislatures from taking the steps they deem appropriate, in light of new 
developments, to ensure humane capital punishment." Id. "The fact that society has 
moved to progressively more humane methods of executions," Roberts emphasized, "does 
not suggest that capital punishment itself no longer serves valid purposes; we would not 
have supposed that the case for capital punishment was stronger when it was imposed 
predominantly by hanging or electrocution." Id. at 62 n.7. 
755 541 u.s. 637 (2004). 
756 Id. at 639. 
757 Id. 
758 I d. at 641. 
759 I d. at 645 (italics in original). As Justice O'Connor noted: "petitioner has been careful 
throughout these proceedings, in his complaint and at oral argument, to assert that the cut-
down, as well as the warden's refusal to provide reliable information regarding the cut-
down protocol, are wholly unnecessary to gaining venous access." Id. at 645-46 (italics in 
original). 
760 Id. at 645. 
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Indeed, in Farmer v. Brennan/61 the Supreme Court ruled that a pris-
on official may be held liable for "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's 
Eighth Amendment right to protection against violence while in custody if 
the official "knows that [the] inmat[ e] face[ s] a substantial risk of serious 
harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to 
abate it." 762 "The Amendment," the Court ruled, "also imposes duties on 
these officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; pris-
on officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shel-
ter, and medical care, and must 'take reasonable measures to guarantee the 
safety of the inmates."' 763 In yet another case, dealing with a prisoner's 
exposure to second-hand smoke, the Court also opined that a prisoner's 
Eighth Amendment claim could be based upon "future harm" to health.764 
IV. THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 
A. The Fourteenth Amendment's Ratification 
The U.S. Bill of Rights originally applied only to the federal govern-
ment.765 In the landmark case of Barron v. Baltimore/66 the Supreme 
Court-in an opinion written by Chief Justice John Marshall-held that 
"[t]hese amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to ap-
ply them to the state governments. "767 The Fifth Amendment, he wrote in 
that case, "must be understood as restraining the power of the general gov-
ernment, not as applicable to the states. "768 As Marshall wrote: "The con-
stitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States 
for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of 
the individual states. Each state established a constitution for itself, and in 
that constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers 
of its particular government, as its judgment dictated." 769 
761 511 u.s. 825 (1994). 
762 !d. at 828, 834, 847; accord Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884, 892-93 (2011) (citing that 
language). 
763 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. 
764 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see 
also id. ("It would be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, 
life-threatening condition in their prison on the ground that nothing yet had happened to 
them."); Washington v. Medical StaffT.C.S.O., No. A-06-CA-130-SS, 2006 WL 
2052848 *5 (W.D. Tex., July 21, 2006) ("The Eighth Amendment embraces the treatment 
of medical conditions which may cause future health problems."). 
765 Barker v. People, 3 Cow 686 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824) ("The provision in the constitution 
of the United States, that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted, is a 
resiriction [sic] upon the government of the United States only; and not upon the 
government of any state."). 
766 32 u.s. 243 (1833). 
767 !d. at 250. 
768 Id. at 247. 
769 Id.; see also Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410, 434 (1847) ("The prohibition alluded to as 
contained in the amendments to the constitution ... were not designed as limits upon the 
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The Fourteenth Amendment, however, made the Eighth Amendment 
and other individual rights applicable to the states.770 The Fourteenth 
Amendment, ratified in 1868, begins: "All persons born or naturalized in 
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the state wherein they reside. "771 Coming on the heels 
of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery,772 the Fourteenth 
Amendment gave American citizens-including all newly emancipated citi-
zens-additional legal rights. As the remainder of Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment reads: "No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. "773 
The Fourteenth Amendment's ratification thus changed the nature of 
the U.S. Constitution in profound ways.774 First, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment changed the federal-state power structure. States-and not just the 
federal government-were now explicitly prohibited from taking certain 
actions, and the federal courts themselves became more powerful instru-
ments of justice. Second, the Fourteenth Amendment-as determined in a 
series of subsequent cases-applied various provisions of the U.S. Bill of 
Rights to the states through the Supreme Court's "selective incorporation" 
doctrine.775 This legal development gave federal judges the power to protect 
the rights of American citizens from abusive state power-even power tra-
ditionally exercised by Southern states to repress minorities.776 Finally, 
along with replicating the Fifth Amendment's "due process of law" provi-
sion, the Fourteenth Amendment went further, realizing the Declaration of 
State governments in reference to their own citizens. They are exclusively restrictions 
upon federal power ... "). 
77° Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433-34 (2001) 
("Despite the broad discretion that States possess with respect to the imposition of crimi-
nal penalties and punitive damages, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Federal Constitution imposes substantive limits on that discretion. That Clause 
makes the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual 
punishments applicable to the States."). 
771 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. 
772 U.S. CONST., amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."). 
773 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. 
774 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV (ratified July 9, 1868). 
775 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010). 
776 Akhil Reed Amar, America's Lived Constitution, 20 YALE L.J. 1734, 1779 (2011) 
("Reconstruction Republicans used Section 1 of that Amendment to take special aim at 
the abusive practices of state governments of the Deep South, a region that had lagged 
behind national norms of liberty and equality. Even if a particular state legislature 
consistently authorized a given punishment, that consistency hardly made the practice 
"usual" when judged by the national baseline envisioned by the Fourteenth 
Amendment."). 
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Independence's emphasis on equality by putting in place the new guarantee 
to "equal protection of the laws." 777 
Unfortunately, it took considerable time before the U.S. Supreme 
Court actually recognized the Fourteenth Amendment's legal significance. 
Indeed, after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its Barron v. Baltimore holding for many decades.778 In almost 
open defiance of the Fourteenth Amendment's plain language, the Court-
in case after case-simply stuck to its prior ruling in Barron.779 This hap-
pened in spite of the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment's advocates 
plainly intended to make the U.S. Bill of Rights-including the Eighth 
Amendment-applicable to the states.780 Indeed, legislators pushing for the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly said so during the de-
bates while it was being considered.781 
Not until the early 1960s-over ninety years after the Fourteenth 
Amendment's ratification-was the Eighth Amendment finally held appli-
cable to the states.782 In Robinson v. California/83 the 1962 case that did it, 
777 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV (ratified July 9, 1868). 
778 In 1866, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether fines and penalties 
imposed under a Massachusetts law were "excessive, cruel, and unusual." Pervear v. 
Commonwealth, 72 U.S. 475, 479 (1866). Adhering to its holding in Barron v. Baltimore, 
the Court in Pervear held that the Eighth Amendment "does not apply to State but to 
National legislation." !d. at 479-80. In affirming the judgment of the Massachusetts court, 
the Court in Pervear also emphasized in dicta: "[I]t appears from the record that the fine 
and punishment in the case before us was fifty dollars and imprisonment at hard labor in 
the house of correction for three months. We perceive nothing excessive, or cruel, or 
unusual in this." !d. at 480. A "NOTE" to the Pervear case also notes that "[t]he same 
order was made in four other cases, presenting, as the Chief Justice said, 'substantially the 
same facts and governed by the same principles."' !d. (citations omitted). 
779 Twitchell v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 74 U.S. 321, 322, 325-26 (1868) (citing 
Barron v. Baltimore with approval and rejecting the habeas corpus petition of a man 
convicted of murder and sentenced to be hanged in spite of his argun1ent based on the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) 
("The first amendment to the Constitution ... like the other amendments proposed and 
adopted at the same time, was not intended to limit the powers of the State governments 
in respect to their own citizens, but to operate upon the National government alone.") 
(citing Barron); see also Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31, 
34 (1890) ("[T]he first eight articles of the amendments to the constitution have reference 
to powers exercised by the government of the United States, and not to those of the states. 
The limitation, therefore, of articles 5, 6, and 8 of those amendments, being intended 
exclusively to apply to the powers exercised by the government of the United States, 
whether by congress or by the judiciary, and not as limitations upon the powers of the 
states, can have no application to the present case ... ") (citations omitted). 
780 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 204-205. 
781 !d. Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan also explained in 1866 that the Fourteenth 
Amendment "prohibits the hanging of a black man for a crime for which the white man is 
not to be hanged." Id. at 206. 
782 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 660 (1962) for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment was made applicable to 
the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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the Supreme Court held that punishing someone for being addicted to nar-
cotics is a cruel and unusual punishment.784 In spite of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's recognition of citizens' "privileges or immunities," the right 
to be free from "cruel and unusual punishments" was not grounded-as 
might have been expected-in the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or 
Immunities Clause. Instead, as it had done with other individual rights in 
the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court used the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause to make the Eighth Amendment applicable to the 
states. Since 1962, the Supreme Court has routinely reaffirmed that the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause made the Eighth Amendment 
applicable to the states.785 
B. Due Process and Equal Protection 
The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause unequivocally prohibits 
the federal government from depriving an individual "of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law."786 States are similarly restricted by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides in part: "nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law."787 Initially, the U.S. Supreme Court looked to what procedures were 
required by the English common law to define the contours of due pro-
cess.788 For example, in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement 
Co.,789 the Supreme Court analyzed the types of procedures the framers of 
the Fifth Amendment would have considered "the law of the land. "790 That 
"frozen-in-history" approach, however, soon gave way to a non-historical 
methodology, with the Court asking instead-as two scholars put it-
"whether a given procedure was essential to modern-as opposed to 17th 
century-notions of fairness. "791 
783 370 u.s. 660 (1962). 
784 !d. at 666-68. 
785 E.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018; Baze, 553 U.S. at 47. 
786 U.S. CONST., amend. V. The Fifth Amendment also states: "nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy oflife or limb." !d. The right to be 
free from bodily harm has long been noted in the American legal system, and dates back 
to the time of the Founding Fathers. See ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF LAWS OF THE 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT 179 (1795): 
Not only is a man protected against loss of limb, but the body and the limbs, are protected 
against all menaces, assaults, beating, and wounding. Such acts are a breach of the peace, 
and punishable by fine. The person injured, has an action of trespass for assault and 
battery, against the wrong-doer, to recover damages for the injury he has sustained. This 
security of our body and limbs, from all corporal injuries, is an inestimable right. 
787 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. 
788 John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private 
Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REv. 511, 550 (1994). 
789 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855). 
790 !d. at 276. 
791 Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values 
of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 468-69 (1986); see also Adamson v. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court, in fact, has repeatedly emphasized that "due 
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particu-
lar situation warrants. "792 As Justice Felix Frankfurter once explained, due 
process is, "perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law-the least con-
fined to history and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a 
progressive society."793 Thus, it has been concluded that even "ancient" 
procedural rules "must satisfy contemporary notions of due process. "794 In 
Mathews v. Eldridge/95 the Court-in setting forth its flexible balancing-
of-interests approach-articulated the following three areas of importance 
for a court to consider in determining what process is due: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; sec-
ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the pro-
cedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including 
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.796 
The private interest at stake in the death penalty debate-the right of 
an inmate to remain alive-is of utmost importance.797 Indeed, the right to 
"life" has, since America's very inception, been considered a basic right, 
or-to use the exact wording of the Declaration of Independence-an "un-
alienable" right.798 The Supreme Court, in a number of cases, has con-
firmed that principle, characterizing the "right to life" as "fundamental."799 
California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (asking whether 
procedures are necessary for the "protection of ultimate decency in a civilized society"). 
792 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 
15 n.l5 (1978) (same); Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (same); Lujan v. G & 
G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 196-97 (2001) (same); see also Connecticut v. 
Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) ("Due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical 
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."). 
793 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
794 Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County ofMarin, 495 U.S. 604, 630 (1990) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
795 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
796 !d. at 335; see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) ("we generally have 
declined to establish rigid rules and instead have embraced a framework to evaluate the 
sufficiency of particular procedures"). 
797 Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1493-97 (lOth Cir. 1990) (holding that a 
prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was murdered while in 
custody); Harris v. Maynard, 843 F.2d 414, 416 (lOth Cir. 1988) (holding that "wanton or 
obdurate disregard of or deliberate indifference to the prisoner's right to life as a condition 
of confinement is a substantive constitutional deprivation whether it falls under the due 
process clause or the Eighth Amendment"). 
798 Butts v. People of State oflll., 333 U.S. 640, 651 (1948); see also Elizabeth R. 
Jungman, Beyond All Doubt, 91 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1077 (2003) ("Capital cases necessarily 
implicate a defendant's fundamental right to life."). "The self-evident truths and the 
unalienable rights" set forth in the Declaration of Independence, Justice Thurgood 
Marshall once remarked, "were intended, however, to apply only to white men." Regents 
4I9 
2 Br. ]. Am. Leg. Studies (2013) 
The risk of wrongful convictions and executions is, in the twenty-first 
century, well documented,800 making the possibility of "erroneous depriva-
tion" of life-to borrow the words of Mathews-a real one. While deter-
ring crime is a legitimate government function, there is no persuasive evi-
dence that executions deter crime more effectively than life-without-parole 
sentences,801 making death sentences unnecessary. The Founding Fathers-
living in an era when American penitentiaries were not yet a universal reali-
ty-themselves often expressed the view that any punishment beyond that 
which was necessary was "tyrannical."802 The first U.S. penitentiary, Phila-
delphia's Walnut Street Prison, was not even opened until 1790, and it 
took several decades before America's penitentiary system was built out on 
a state-by-state basis. Pennsylvania itself authorized two new peniten-
tiaries-the Western Penitentiary in 1818 and the Eastern Penitentiary in 
of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 388 (1978) (opinion of Marshall, J.); 
accord Bell v. State of Maryland, 378 U.S. 226,286 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) 
(the "ideal" of the Declaration "was not fully achieved with the adoption of our 
Constitution because of the hard and tragic reality of Negro slavery"). 
799 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458, 462 (1938) (referring to the "fundamental human rights of life and liberty"); Woods 
v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211, 216 (1946) (referring to the "fundamental rights to life and 
liberty guaranteed by the United States Constitution"); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 
550 (1888) (referring to "the fundamental rights oflife, liberty, and property"); Powell v. 
Commonwealth ofPennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888) (same); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (referring to "the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness"); Hurtado v. People of State of California, 110 U.S. 516, 539 (1884) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The phrase 'due process oflaw' is not new in the constitutional 
history of this country or of England. It antedates the establishment of our institutions. 
Those who had been driven from the mother country by oppression and persecution 
brought with them, as their inheritance, which no government could rightfully impair or 
destroy, certain guaranties of the rights of life, liberty, and property which had long been 
deemed fundamental in Anglo-Saxon institutions."); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 
116 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (describing the right to "life" as one of the 
"fundamental rights which can only be taken away by due process oflaw"); West Virginia 
Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("One's right to life, liberty and 
property * * * and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on 
the outcome of no elections."); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Colorado General Assembly, 377 
U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964) ("A citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be infringed simply 
because a majority of the people choose that [they] be."). 
800 The Innocence List, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
http://www .deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row (last visited Aug. 
29, 2013) (listing 142 cases where defendants had their convictions overturned, with a 
subsequent acquittal at re-trial or where charges were dropped, or where defendants were 
given a pardon by a governor based on new evidence of innocence). 
801 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, DETERRENCE AND THE 
DEATH PENALTY (Apr. 2012) (finding that deterrence studies are flawed and do not factor 
in the effects ofnoncapital punishments). 
802 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 50 (discussing the copying of 
Beccaria's maxim to that effect by John Adams). 
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1821-after the Walnut Street Prison proved inadequate to the state's 
needs.803 
Although the Declaration of Independence mentions the concept of 
equality, the Equal Protection Clause, which now unequivocally reaches 
state actors,804 was not added to the Constitution until the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. That provision specifically commands 
that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." 805 Unlike the Thirteenth Amendment, which ex-
empted those convicted of crimes from its protection, the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects every person, even inmates, without exception. In the 
non-capital context, that Fourteenth Amendment's unequivocal language 
has already been used to strike down discriminatory policies at schools on 
the basis of race806 and gender. 807 The Supreme Court so held based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment's plain language-and "even though those who 
drafted the Amendment evidently thought that separate was not une-
qual."808 In short, the Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, 
has been read in a contemporary fashion based upon its plain and une-
quivocal language-and not in accord with the antiquated personal views 
and prejudices of its drafters.809 
The Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence has, significantly, 
regularly concerned itself "with governmental classifications that 'affect 
803 Meskell, supra note 140, at 853-54; L.A. Tulin, Book Review, 37 YALE L. J. 1168, 
1168-69 (1928) (reviewing HARRY ELMER BARNES, TIIE EVOLUTION OF PENOLOGY IN 
PENNSYLVANIA (1927)). 
804 Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 257 (2009). It is well settled that 
the Equal Protection Clause applies to administrative as well as legislative acts. Engquist 
v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 597 (2008). 
805 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV (ratified July 9, 1868); see also Parents Involved in Cmty 
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 743 (2007) ("the Equal Protection Clause 
'protect[s] persons, not groups"') (quotingAdarand, 515 U.S. at 227) (emphasis in 
original). 
806 Brown v. Bd ofEduc. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting segregated 
schools). 
807 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (male-only admissions policy at 
Virginia Military Institute violated the Equal Protection Clause); Miss. Univ. for Women 
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982) (female-only admission policy at a traditionally 
single-sex public college violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
808 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 732 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
809 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court, 104 YALE L.J. 2309, 
2337-42 (1995) ("[e]qual protection had not been identified with social integration when 
the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted in 1866, nor when it was ratified in 1868, nor 
when Plessy [v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537] was decided in 1896"). The Equal Protection 
Clause has also been used to invalidate discriminatory practices injury selection. J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex ret. T. B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (discrimination injury selection on the basis 
of gender violates the Equal Protection Clause); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 44 
(1992) (racial discrimination injury selection offends the Equal Protection Clause). 
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some groups of citizens differently than others."' 810 In some circumstances, 
an equal protection claim can be sustained "even if the plaintiff has not 
alleged class-based discrimination," but instead claims to have been "irra-
tionally singled out as a so-called 'class of one."' 811 In Village of Willow-
brook v. Olech,812 the Court specifically held that a property owner stated 
a valid claim under the Equal Protection Clause because she had been "in-
tentionally treated differently from others similarly situated" and because 
there was "no rational basis for the difference in treatment. "813 Although 
the word "unusual" in the Eighth Amendment invites the Court to gauge 
what is currently being done throughout the country to assess a punish-
ment's constitutionality, the Court also, because of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, needs to be sure not to allow arbitrary or unequal applica-
tions of the law that violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
The Equal Protection Clause-as the Supreme Court itself has held-
is concerned with arbitrary and discriminatory governmental conduct. 
"'The purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment," the Court has emphasized, "'is to secure every person within the 
State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, wheth-
er occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution 
through duly constituted agents."' 814 As the Court ruled as long ago as 
1887 in Hayes v. Missouri,815 the Fourteenth Amendment "requires that all 
persons subjected to ... legislation shall be treated alike, under like cir-
cumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the lia-
bilities imposed. "816 Thus, "when it appears that an individual is being sin-
gled out by the government, the specter of arbitrary classification is fairly 
raised, and the Equal Protection Clause requires a 'rational basis for the 
difference in treatment."' 817 
810 Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (quoting McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961)); see also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974) 
('"Equal Protection' ... emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes of 
individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("the basic concern of 
the Equal Protection Clause is with state legislation whose purpose or effect is to create 
discrete and objectively identifiable classes"). 
811 Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (citing Village of 
Willowbrook v. Olech ). 
812 528 u.s. 562 (2000). 
813 !d. at 564. In that case, a municipality had attempted to condition the connection to the 
municipal water supply on the granting of a 33-foot easement instead of the norm-a 15-
foot easement-required of other property owners. 
814 Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cnty., 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923) (quoting Sunday 
Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918)); accord Olech, 528 
U.S. at 564 (quoting the same language). 
815 120 u.s. 68 (1887). 
816 Id. at 71-72. 
817 Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008). In Engquist, the Supreme 
Court pointed out that "[t]here are some forms of state action" involving "discretionary 
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Indeed, the prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" has 
long been associated with preventing arbitrary abuses at criminals' sentenc-
ing proceedings.818 In Batson v. Kentucky,819 the Supreme Court held that 
decisionmaking" where "allowing a challenge based on the arbitrary singling out of a 
particular person would undermine the very discretion that such state officials are 
entrusted to exercise." !d. at 603. In that case, the Court used the example of a traffic 
officer handing out speeding tickets to some people but not others. Id. at 603-4. The Court 
emphasized: "[A]n allegation that speeding tickets are given out on the basis of race or 
sex would state an equal protection claim, because such discriminatory classifications 
implicate basic equal protection concerns. But allowing an equal protection claim on the 
ground that a ticket was given to one person and not others, even if for no discernible or 
articulable reason, would be incompatible with the discretion inherent in the challenged 
action." !d. at 604. Of course, death sentences and executions-the most severe 
punishments ever conceived by lawmakers-are a far cry from parking tickets. 
818 See, e.g., 1 FRANCIS HARGRA VB, ED., A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS, AND 
PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH-TREASON, AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS xi (4th ed. 
1776) (italics in original): 
As to smaller Crimes and Misdemeanors, they are differenc'd with such a variety of 
extenuating or aggravating Circumstances, that the Law has not, nor indeed could affix to 
each a certain and determinate Penalty; this is left to the Discretion and Prudence of the 
Judge, who may punish it either with Fine or Imprisonment, Pillory or Whipping, as he 
shall think the nature of the Crime deserves; but tho' he be intrusted with so great Power, 
yet he is not at liberty to do as he lists, and inflict what arbitrary Punishments he pleases; 
due regard is to be had to the Quality and Degree, to the Estate and Circumstances of the 
Offender, and to the greatness or smallness of the Offense; that Fine, which would be 
mere Trifle to one Man, may be the utter Ruin and Undoing of another; and those Marks 
of Ignominy and Disgrace, which would be shocking and grievous to a Person of a liberal 
Education, would be slighted and despised by one of the vulgar sort. A Judge therefore 
who use this discretionary Power to gratify a private Revenge, or the Rage of a Party, by 
inflicting indefinite and perpetual Imprisonment, excessive and exorbitant Fines, unusual 
and cruel Punishments, is equally guilty of perverting Justice and acting against Law, as 
he, who in a Case, where the Law has ascertained the Penalty, wilfully and knowingly 
varies from it... . [W]here a Court has a Power of setting Fines, that must be understood of 
setting reasonable Fines; an excessive Fine, says Lord Coke, is against Law, and so it is 
declared to be by the Act for declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, &c. The 
same Statute declares the illegality of unusual and cruel Punishments. 
It was the non-observance of these Rules, which occasioned the dissolution of the Star 
Chamber ... when once its Authority was abus'd to wreak the Malice of particular 
Persons, and prostituted to the base Ends of a Court-Faction, when no Limits were 
observed in the Exercise of its Jurisdiction, nor Humanity in its Sentences, when the 
Judges thereof, however dignified by their Posts, became a Disgrace to human Nature by 
their barbarous and cruel butcherings, punishing pretended Libels not only with perpetual 
Imprisonments, but with brandings in the Face and mutilation of Members, when the Case 
was thus (as it appears to have been from some Instances in this Collection) it was then 
high time to tear it up by the Roots, as a Grievance no longer to be borne with. A Judge 
therefore ought to be strictly careful that he conform to the Rules of Law not only as to 
the nature of the Punishment, but likewise as to the degrees thereof. 
It is indeed no easy matter to settle the precise Limits, how far a Court of Justice may 
go; every Case must depend upon its own particular Circumstances. But some Fines and 
some Punishments are so monstrously extravagant, that no body can doubt their being so; 
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the unlawful exclusion of jurors based on race required reversal because it 
"violates a defendant's right to equal protection," "unconstitutionally dis-
criminate[s] against the excluded juror," and "undermine[s] public confi-
dence in the fairness of our system of justice. "820 The Supreme Court, in 
other instances, has also invalidated capital sentences based on racial bias 
and the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause. 821 In one case involving the 
exclusion through peremptory strikes of 10 of the 11 African Americans 
eligible to serve on the jury,822 the Court held that "[d]efendants are 
harmed, of course, when racial discrimination in jury selection compromis-
es the right of trial by impartial jury."823 "[T]he statistical evidence alone," 
the Court held, "raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted 
with a race-based reason when striking prospective jurors. "824 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that "death is different." 825 Yet, 
when it comes to the death penalty's actual infliction, the Court-raising 
the specter of a slippery slope-has shunned reliance on statistical studies826 
showing that racial discrimination is prevalent in capital charging and sen-
tencing.827 In McCleskey v. Kemp,828 the Court instead held that the Equal 
Protection Clause-while aimed at eliminating racial discrimination829-
only prohibits intentional discrimination that can be proven through means 
other than statistics.830 In effect, unlike what it does in jury selection cases, 
such were the Fines of Sir Samuel Barnardiston and Mr. Hampden, such were the 
repeated Pilloryings and barbarous Whippings of Oates, Dangerfield, and Johnson. 
819 476 US. 79 (1986). 
820 !d. at 86-87. 
821 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 342 (2003) (noting that statistical evidence could 
support a finding of discrimination injury selection); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 
240-41, 266 (2005) (considering statistical evidence in case dealing with improper 
exclusion of black jurors); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 (1987) 
(noting that the Supreme Court "has accepted statistical disparities as proof of an equal 
protection violation in the selection of the jury venire in a particular district"). 
822 Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 326, 331. 
823 Dretke, 545 U.S. at 237. 
824 Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 342. 
825 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605-06 (2002) ("[T]here is no doubt that '[d]eath is 
different."') (citation omitted). 
826 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
827 E.g., U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Senate and House Committees on the 
Judiciary: Death Penalty Sentencing 5 (Feb. 1990) (reporting on studies showing "pattern 
of evidence indicating racial disparities in the charging, sentencing, and imposition of the 
death penalty"). 
828 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
829 Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) ("[T]he 'moral imperative of racial neutrality 
is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause,' and racial classifications are permit-
ted only 'as a last resort."') (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518-19 
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
830 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Equal 
Protection Clause, this Court has held, prohibits only intentional discrimination; it does 
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when it comes to death sentences themselves, an American death row in-
mate is required by the Court to prove that an individual prosecutor exhib-
ited racial animus in that inmate's particular case-a tough row to hoe, to 
be sure.831 
C. The Effect on What Is Considered "Cruel and Unusual" 
One effect of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification-a byproduct 
of its adoption-was to expand the Eighth Amendment's scope. When the 
Eighth Amendment was ratified in 1791, it only constrained the actions of 
the federal government832-then a small institution with only a few legisla-
tors and a few employees.833 Although many states had similar protections 
against "cruel and unusual," "cruel or unusual," or simply "cruel" pun-
ishments, 834 in the pre-Fourteenth Amendment era-rampant with racial 
prejudice and slavery835-African Americans were often excluded from le-
gal protection of such constitutional rights altogether.836 To have a consti-
tutional protection that ensured "equal protection of the laws" was thus a 
remarkable achievement. 
After the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, aimed at stamp-
ing out invidious racial discrimination, once lawful state actions became 
not have a disparate-impact component.") (citing Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 
442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) & Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)). 
831 Michael D. Hintze, Attacking the Death Penalty: Toward a Renewed Strategy Twenty 
Years After Furman, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 395, 421 (1993). 
832 United States v. Henning, 4 Cranch C. C. 645, 26 F. Cas. 267, 271 (C.C.D.C. 1836) ("If 
congress have a right to pass laws prohibiting those acts to be done in the district, they 
have a right to affix penalties and punishment to the violation of those laws; and they are 
not limited in the degree of punishment, if it be not 'cruel and unusual' within the 
meaning of the 8th article of the amendments of the constitution."). 
833 KRISHNA K. TUMMALA, ED., COMPARATIVE BUREAUCRATIC SYSTEMS 83 (2003) ("In 
1791 the federal government employed roughly 4,500 individuals."). 
834 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 176-81. 
835 See generally WALTER JOHNSON, SOUL BY SOUL: LIFE INSIDE THE ANTEBELLUM SLAVE 
MARKET (1999). 
836 In Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 47, 1824 WL 1072 (Va. Gen. 1824), the 
General Court of Virginia held that the state's "cruel and unusual punishments" clause did 
not even apply to "a free man of color." Id. at* 1, 3. As the Virginia court ruled: 
"Notwithstanding the general terms used in the Bill of Rights, it is undeniable that it never 
was contemplated, or considered, to extend to the whole population of the State. Can it be 
doubted, that it not only was not intended to apply to our slave population, but that the 
free blacks and mulattoes were also not comprehended in it?'' Id. at *3; see also Id. 
("[N]obody has ever questioned the power of the Legislature, to deny to free blacks and 
mulattoes, one of the first privileges of a citizen; that of voting at elections, although they 
might in every particular, except color, be in precisely the same condition as those 
qualified to vote. The numerous restrictions imposed on this class of people in our Statute 
Book, many of which are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, both of 
this State and of the United States, as respects the free whites, demonstrate, that, here, 
those instruments have not been considered to extend equally to both classes of our 
population."). 
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unlawful. The Thirteenth Amendment had abolished slavery, but in re-
sponse, Southern states enacted "Black Codes"-laws attempting to limit 
the rights of former slaves.837 With the Fourteenth Amendment's "equal 
protection" language, though, such laws were destined to fall. Now that 
former slaves were citizens and were to be afforded equal protection, the 
idea expressed at one time that racial minorities were not entitled to be 
protected from "cruel" or "unusual" punishments under the Eighth 
Amendment could no longer withstand judicial scrutiny. While a practice 
such as whipping might be customary or usual in a given state, the federal 
courts would ultimately be able to review the matter-and put a stop to 
it.838 In the modern era, the racial bias present in the death penalty's ad-
ministration can no more be ignored than other forms of discrimination, 
especially given the fundamental nature of the right to life. 
In fact, in interpreting the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court must 
decide for itself whether executions, with all their arbitrariness and racial 
bias, have become "cruel and unusual." Just as the Court has been called 
upon in the past to decide what is an "infamous" crime or punishment, it 
can judge for itself perfectly well whether executions are "cruel" and "unu-
sual" at this juncture and thus unconstitutional. Early American legal 
commentators themselves spoke of the "cruel and unusual punishments" 
prohibition as reflecting "the improved spirit of the age" 839 and "the spirit 
of our humane general constitution." 840 
The case of Ex parte Wilson, 841 decided by the Supreme Court in 
1885, is instructive. In that case, the Court found that "if the crime of 
which the petitioner was accused was an infamous crime, within the mean-
ing of the fifth amendment of the constitution, no court of the United 
States had jurisdiction to try or punish him, except upon presentment or 
837 Sean M. Heneghan, Employment Discrimination Faced by the Immigrant Worker: A 
Lesson from the United States and South Africa, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1780, 1787 
(2012). 
838 Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (Blackmun, J.). 
839 JAMES BAYARD, A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 154 
(2d ed. 1840) ("The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, marks the improved 
spirit of the age, which would not tolerate the use of the rack or the stake, or any of those 
horrid modes of torture, devised by human ingenuity for the gratification of fiendish 
passion."). 
840 BENJAMINL. OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN 186 (1832): 
Under the [Eighth] amendment the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, is also 
prohibited. The various barbarous and cruel punishments inflicted under the laws of some 
other countries, and which profess not to be behind the most enlightened nations on earth 
in civilization and refinement, furnish sufficient reasons for this express prohibition. 
Breaking on the wheel, flaying alive, rendering assunder with horses, various species of 
horrible tortures inflicted in the inquisition, maiming, mutilating and scourging to death, 
are wholly alien to the spirit of our humane general constitution. 
841 114 U.S. 417 (1885). 
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indictment by a grand jury." 842 Just as the Court can decide what consti-
tutes an "infamous" crime, it can decide with little difficulty what qualifies 
as a "cruel and unusual" punishment. 
In deciding whether the petitioner's crime was "infamous" or not, the 
Supreme Court in Ex parte Wilson first noted that "the scope and effect" 
of the Fifth Amendment provision at issue, "as of many other provisions of 
the constitution, are best ascertained by bearing in mind what the law was 
before. "843 But after noting that the Fifth Amendment's purpose was "to 
limit the powers of the legislature, as well as of the prosecuting officers, of 
the United States," 844 the Supreme Court framed the question as "whether 
imprisonment at hard labor for a term of years is an infamous punish-
ment."845 "What punishments shall be considered as infamous," the Court 
held in language reminiscent of the "evolving standards" approach, "may 
be affected by the changes of public opinion from one age to another." 846 
Ultimately, the Court in Ex parte Wilson ruled: "In former times, be-
ing put in the stocks was not considered as necessarily infamous. And by 
the first judiciary act of the United States, whipping was classed with mod-
erate fines and short terms of imprisonment in limiting the criminal juris-
diction of the district courts to cases 'where no other punishment than 
whipping, not exceeding thirty stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred 
dollars, or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, is to be in-
flicted."847 "But at the present day," the Court emphasized, "either stocks 
or whipping might be thought an infamous punishment. "848 In other 
words, the Supreme Court opined-as it would later with its "evolving 
standards of decency" test-that a punishment might be classed one way in 
one generation and a different way in another.849 The lesson: the fact that 
842 !d. at 422. The Fifth Amendment provides in part: "No person shall be held to answer 
for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in 
actual service in time of war or public danger." U.S. CONST., amend. V. 
843 Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. at422. 
844 !d. at 426. 
845 !d. "Infamous punishments cannot be limited to those punishments which are cruel or 
unusual," the Supreme Court ruled, "because ... 'cruel and unusual punishments' are 
wholly forbidden, and cannot therefore be lawfully inflicted even in cases of convictions 
upon indictments duly presented by a grand jury." Id. at 426-27. 
846 Id. at 427. The Court noted that "Mr. Dane," a legal commentator, "while treating it as 
doubtful whether confinement in the stocks or in the house of correction is infamous, 
says, 'punishments, clearly infamous, are death, gallows, pillory, branding, whipping, 
confinement to hard labor, and cropping."') (citation omitted). 
847 !d. at 427-28 (quoting Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9). 
848 !d. at 428. 
849 In Ex parte Wilson, the Supreme Court-anxious to leave flexibility for future 
decisionmaking-ultimately held as follows: "Deciding nothing beyond what is required 
by the facts of the case before us, our judgment is that a crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term of years at hard labor is an infamous crime, within the meaning 
of the fifth amendment." !d. at 429. 
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executions were deemed constitutional at one time does not make them 
constitutional for all time. 
V. TOWARD A PRINCIPLED EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
A. The Punishment Continuum 
When viewed on a continuum, as the Founding Fathers so often 
viewed them, punishments range from de minimis all the way to death it-
self.850 In 1777, Thomas Jefferson methodically divided crimes into three 
categories: (1) capital offenses or-in his words-"Crimes whose pun-
ishmt. Extends to Life"; (2) "Crimes whose punishment goes to Limb," 
such as castration for rapists; and (3) "Crimes punishable by Labor &c."851 
Cesare Beccaria had suggested a "scale of punishments," writing that "a 
scale of misdeeds can be identified, at the top of which are those that are 
immediately destructive to society and at the bottom those that cause the 
least possible injustice to its individual members." 852 "If geometry were 
applicable to the infinite and obscure combinations of human actions," 
Beccaria concluded, "there would be a corresponding scale of punishments, 
descending from the most severe to the mildest." 853 
Most punishments the Eighth Amendment is concerned with are met-
ed out at criminals' sentencing proceedings. But other post-sentencing ac-
tions (i.e., those that occur within the confines of prisons) can also consti-
tute Eighth Amendment violations. Thus, in Estelle v. Gamble, 854 the Su-
preme Court first applied the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to 
deprivations that were not specifically part of a prisoner's sentence.855 Not 
all actions of guards or uses of force, of course, lead to Eighth Amendment 
violations. As the Supreme Court quite appropriately clarified: "de minimis 
uses of physical force" do not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition 
of "cruel and unusual punishments" unless the force used is "repugnant to 
the conscience of mankind." 856 
850 E.g., John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REv. 899, 957-58 (2011) ("Thomas Jefferson narrowly 
failed in his attempt to get Virginia to enact his "Bill for Proportioning Crimes and 
Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capital," which set forth a scale of crimes and 
punishments in the manner suggested by Beccaria and Blackstone."). 
851 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 144. 
852 AARON THOMAS, ED., CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PuNISHMENTS AND OTHER 
WRITINGS 18 (Aaron Thomas & Jeremy Parzen, trans. 2008). 
853 !d.; see also id. at 50 (referring to "a scale of punishments"). Citing Beccaria, 
Blackstone similarly spoke of"a corresponding scale of punishments, descending from 
the greatest to the least." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENT ARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 18 (19th ed. 1836). 
854 429 u.s. 97 (1976). 
855 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). 
856 McMillian, 503 U.S. at 9-10; Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010); 
compare Hudson, 503 U.S. at 18 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Court today ... broadly 
asserts that any 'unnecessary and wanton' use of physical force against a prisoner 
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In other words, the protection provided to inmates by the Eighth 
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has limits. "An in-
mate who complains of a 'push or shove' that causes no discernible inju-
ry," the Court has emphasized, "almost certainly fails to state a valid ex-
cessive force claim." 857 As the Court has ruled, prison officials are free to 
discipline prisoners, so long as the disciplinary rules serve a rational and 
legitimate purpose858 and prisoners are not disciplined in an "arbitrary" 
manner.859 In order to prevail on an excessive force claim, the inmate must 
prove "not only that the assault occurred but also that it was carried out 
'maliciously and sadistically' rather than as part of 'a good-faith effort to 
maintain or restore discipline."' 860 In the death penalty context, the issue 
becomes whether executions serve any rational or legitimate purpose now 
that maximum-security prisons and life-without-parole sentences are so 
widely available. 
automatically amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, whenever more than de minimis 
force is involved."). 
857 Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. at 1178. 
858 Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) ("the challenged regulations bear a 
rational relation to legitimate penological interests"); id. ("In Turner we held that four 
factors are relevant in deciding whether a prison regulation affecting a constitutional right 
that survives incarceration withstands constitutional challenge: whether the regulation has 
a "'valid, rational connection"' to a legitimate governmental interest; whether alternative 
means are open to inmates to exercise the asserted right; what impact an accommodation 
of the right would have on guards and inmates and prison resources; and whether there are 
'ready alternatives' to the regulation.") (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91); Overton, 539 
U.S. at 133 ("Turning to the restrictions on visitation by children, we conclude that the 
regulations bear a rational relation to MDOC's valid interests in maintaining internal 
security and protecting child visitors from exposure to sexual or other misconduct or from 
accidental injury. The regulations promote internal security, perhaps the most legitimate 
of penological goals .... "); id. ("MDOC's regulation prohibiting visitation by former 
inmates bears a self-evident connection to the State's interest in maintaining prison 
security and preventing future crimes."); id. at 134 ("Withdrawing visitation privileges is 
a proper and even necessary management technique to induce compliance with the rules 
of inmate behavior, especially for high-security prisoners who have few other privileges 
to lose."). 
859 Overton, 539 U.S. at 136 ("Respondents also claim that the restriction on visitation for 
inmates with two substance-abuse violations is a cruel and unusual condition of 
confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The restriction undoubtedly makes 
the prisoner's confinement more difficult to bear. But it does not, in the circumstances of 
this case, fall below the standards mandated by the Eighth Amendment."); id. at 137 
("This is not a dramatic departure from accepted standards for conditions of confinement. 
Nor does the regulation create inhumane prison conditions, deprive inmates of basic 
necessities, or fail to protect their health or safety. Nor does it involve the infliction of 
pain or injury, or deliberate indifference to the risk that it might occur."). In Overton v. 
Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003), the Supreme Court noted in dicta: "If the withdrawal of all 
visitation privileges were permanent or for a much longer period, or if it were applied in 
an arbitrary manner to a particular inmate, the case would present different 
considerations." Id. at 137. 
860 Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. at 1178. 
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The social movement to substitute incarceration in place of death sen-
tences-a movement that is still ongoing-has been taking place in Ameri-
ca for centuries. It began in the Founding Fathers' time, when the corner-
stones of state penitentiaries were laid, with the torch then being passed to 
succeeding generations. In 1922, Justice Louis Brandeis-joined by Chief 
Justice William Howard Taft and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes-noted 
the development in the law. In a dissenting opinion, they pointed out that 
"[c]onfinement in a penitentiary is the modern substitute for the death 
penalty and for the other forms of corporal punishment which, at the time 
of the adoption of the Fifth Amendment, were still administered in America 
for most of the crimes deemed serious." 861 As Justice Brandeis reminded his 
audience of New York's pre-Fifth Amendment laws: "The punishment, 
other than death, then prescribed for serious crimes were mutilation, cut-
ting off the ears or nailing them to the pillory, branding, whipping, the pil-
lory, the stocks and the ducking stool." 862 
B. The Abandonment of Corporal Punishments 
Corporal punishments were once prevalent in the English863 and 
American legal systems.864 In eighteenth-century America, corporal pun-
ishments could thus be described as common-or usual-punishments.865 
861 United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 448 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
862 !d. at 448 n.14. 
863 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 480 n.7 (2000) ("Subject to the limitations 
that the punishment not 'touch life or limb,' that it be proportionate to the offense, and, by 
the 17th century, that it not be 'cruel or unusual,' judges most commonly imposed 
discretionary 'sentences' of fines or whippings upon misdemeanants. Actual sentences of 
imprisonment for such offenses, however, were rare at common law until the late 18th 
century, for 'the idea of prison as a punishment would have seemed an absurd expense."') 
(quoting J. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 584 (3d ed.l990); JOHN 
BAKER, CRIMINAL COURTS AND PROCEDURE AT COMMON LAW 1550-1800, in Crime in 
England 1550-1800, p. 43 (J. Cockburn ed.l977)). 
864 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 189-90 & n.l2 (1957) (noting that Floyd, a 
Catholic, was ordered "to stand two hours in the pillory, and to be branded in the forehead 
with the letter K" and "to be whipped at the cart's tail," among other punishments, for 
"uttering a few contemptible expressions"); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 168 (1873) ("A 
criminal may be sentenced to a disgraceful punishment, as whipping, or, as in the old 
English law, to have his ears cut off, or to be branded in the hand or forehead."); Murphy 
v. Daytona Beach Humane Soc., Inc., 176 So.2d 922, 924 (Fla. App. 1965) (noting that, 
until its abolition, the English star chamber exercised the power of cutting off ears and 
branding the foreheads and slitting the noses of libelers); State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 553, 
1837 WL 154 * 10 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1837) (noting that English law punished blasphemy 
"by setting the offender in the pillory for the space of two hours, branding in the forehead 
with the letter B, and public whipping on the bare back with thirty-nine lashes, well laid 
on"). 
865 See James E. Robertson, Psychological Injury and the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A 
"Not Exactly," Equal Protection Analysis, 37 HARv. J. ON. LEGIS. 105, 149 (2000) 
("Corporal punishments once dominated the penal body. Whippings were a common 
punishment in colonial times. Other common punishments included branding; severing of 
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The whipping of slaves was a standard disciplinary practice, and many of-
fenses-both civilian and military-were punished with lashes, 866 often in a 
brutal or severe manner.867 The first criminal-law statute passed by the 
First Congress, for example, prescribed 39 lashes for falsifying federal rec-
ords, larceny, and receiving stolen goods and one hour in the pillory for 
perjury.868 "An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States"-
another law passed by the First Congress-gave the federal courts exclusive 
jurisdiction over "all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the 
authority of the United States" where, among other things, "no other pun-
ishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty stripes . . . is to be inflict-
ed." 869 Corporal punishments were purposely designed to inflict pain and 
to shame and humiliate offenders.870 
But over time, as societal attitudes changed, corporal punishments 
withered away.871 Ear cropping, hand and forehead branding, and flogging 
had been punishments in colonial times and in America's early years, as 
judicial opinions from the time make clear.872 In State v. Henderson,873 the 
ears and noses; and hanging."); Kathryn Preyer, Penal Measures in the American 
Colonies: An Overview, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 326, 348-49, 353 (1982) (recounting that 
eighteen-century punishments including whipping and public shaming). 
866 Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 43, § 15, 1 Stat. 736-737 (up to 40 lashes, as well as up to 10-
years imprisonment, could be imposed for first mail-robbery conviction; up to 30 lashes 
or imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, was the punishment for attempted 
robbery of the mails); see also Duncan v. State of Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 191-92 (1968) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Nor had the Colonies a cleaner slate, although practices varied 
greatly from place to place with conditions. In Massachusetts, crimes punishable by 
whipping (up to 10 strokes), the stocks (up to three hours), the ducking stool, and fines 
and imprisonment were triable to magistrates ... New York was somewhat harsher. For 
example, 'anyone adjudged by two magistrates to be an idle, disorderly or vagrant person 
might be transported whence he carne, and on reappearance be whipped from constable to 
constable with thirty-one lashes by each."'); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 711-
12, 749-50 (1964) (describing various seventeenth- and eighteenth-century laws that 
imposed ear cropping, hours in the stocks, the pillory, or lashes as forms of punishment). 
867 E.g., MARVIN L. MICHAEL KAY & LORIN LEE CARY, SLAVERY IN NORTII CAROLINA, 
1748-1775, at 82 (1999). 
868 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 262 n.6 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Act 
of Apr. 30,1790, §§ 15-18,1 Stat.115-16). 
869 An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (cited in 
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1969 nn.3-4 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring)). 
870 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 98 (2003) ("Punishments such as whipping, pillory, 
and branding inflicted physical pain and staged a direct confrontation between the 
offender and the public."). 
871 See Rita K. Lomio, Working against the Past: The Function of American History of 
Race Relations and Capital Punishment in Supreme Court Opinions, 9 J. L. SOCIETY 163, 
165 n.8 (2008) ("Certain practices such as branding, pillorying, and ear-cropping have 
fallen out of use and law even without Eighth Amendment invocation."). 
872 GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS: A STUDY IN 
'TRADITION AND DESIGN 175 (1960) (noting that ear cropping and whipping were 
punishments imposed by colonial magistrates); TERANCE D. MIETHE & HONG Lu, 
PuNISHMENT: A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 35 (2005) ("The early American 
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Supreme Court of North Carolina faced this issue: "whether one convicted 
of manslaughter may be sentenced to be burned in the hand." 874 The court, 
citing English statutes, gave its answer as follows: "we are all of the opin-
ion, that he may." 875 Colonial New Jersey likewise punished burglary by 
branding the offender's hand for a first offense, and the offender's forehead 
for subsequent offenses.876 In an earlier era, a murderer escaping the gal-
lows might be branded with an "M" and a thief not punished capitally 
might be branded with a "T."877 "A common form of mutilation or maim-
ing was the detachment of an ear," a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit once explained, noting that "[t]he effect of branding, 
mutilation, or maiming was often to cast the offender out of society once 
and for all. "878 
But as noted, such punishments fell out of use over time.879 For exam-
ple, flogging fell into disuse at both the federal and state levels over the 
colonists also burned particular letters on offenders' hands and forehead."); Abner Mikva, 
What Justice Brennan Gave Us to Keep, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 655, 661 (1999) ("Ear-
cropping, which involved clipping off a piece of the ear, was a common punishment in the 
colonial days for people who stole or did other terrible things."); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Evolving Standards of Decency in 2003-Is the Death Penalty on Life Support?, 29 U. 
DAYTONL. REv. 201, 214 (2004) ("ear cropping and flogging were also in existence in 
1787''); Samuel R. Gross, Still Urifair, Still Arbitrary-But Do We Care?, 26 OHIO N.U. 
L. REv. 517, 520 (2000) ("Flogging and ear cropping were just two forms of mutilation 
and torture that were commonly available in 1789"); Margaret Jane Radin, The 
Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989, 1031 (1978) ("Whipping and ear-cropping were thought 
perfectly proper, neither torturous nor excessive, when the Bill of Rights was born."); J. 
Matthew Martin, The Nature and Extent of the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction by the 
Cherokee Supreme Court: 1823-1835, 32 N.C. CENT. L. REv. 27, 41 (2009) (listing "ear 
cropping" as a punishment in the Cherokee Nation in a section about criminal procedure 
in the 1820s and 1830s); State v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147, 228 n.6 (1996) (Berdon, J., 
dissenting) (noting that a judge of the Connecticut Superior Court in 1773 ordered that a 
burglar be "branded on his forehead" with a capital letter "B" with "a hot iron" and "have 
one of his Ears Nailed to a post and Cut off' and also be "Whipt on his Naked body 
fifteen Stripes"); compare State v. Frink, 1 Bay 168, 1791 WL 210 *1 (S.C. Com. Pl. 
Gen. Sess. 1791) (a man convicted of manslaughter "was brought up to receive sentence 
of burning in the hand, which had been usually inflicted instanter in open Court," but as 
the jury had recommended him as a fit object for mercy, punishment was delayed pending 
a review by the governor in Charleston); State v. Grisham, 2 N.C. 12, 1792 WL 50 * 1 
(N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1792) (noting that the judge "gave judgment that the prisoner 
should be branded in the hand; which was accordingly done in presence of the court"). 
873 2 Dev. & Bat. 543, 1837 WL 498 (N.C. 1837). 
874 !d. at * 1. 
875 !d. 
876 E. B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1116 (1997) (Becker, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
877 !d. 
878 !d. 
879 MICHAEL NEWTON, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF KIDNAPPINGS 51 (2002) (noting that 
Delaware's governor remitted the ear-cropping portion of a man's sentence following his 
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course of several decades.880 To encourage enlistment, Congress first abol-
ished flogging in the army in 1812,881 but then reinstated the punishment in 
1833 in an attempt to prevent desertions.882 A few years later, in 1839, 
Congress abolished flogging for all federal crimes, 883 then outlawed flog-
ging in the navy in 1850884 and again in the army in 1861.885 At the state 
level, flogging also came to be seen as unacceptable. For example, in 1847, 
New York's legislature abolished flogging in that state's prisons. 886 For 
purposes of understanding the Eighth Amendment and judicial readings of 
it, such history is informative. 
In fact, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has long been read 
to bar corporal punishments and abuse or mistreatment of inmates. The 
federal courts, cognizant that inmates are government wards, have repeat-
edly held that the Eighth Amendment requires that inmates be fed, clothed, 
and treated for illness. "To incarcerate," the U.S. Supreme Court has itself 
emphasized, "society takes from prisoners the means to provide for their 
own needs." 887 As a result, prisoners are "dependent on the State for food, 
clothing, and necessary medical care." 888 "Just as a prisoner may starve if 
conviction in 1822); State v. Cannon, 190 A.2d 514, 157 (Del. 1963) (noting the abolition 
of branding and cropping of ears). For a discussion of ear cropping under Massachusetts 
law, see JANE KAMENSKY, GOVERNING THE TONGUE: THE POLITICS OF SPEECH IN EARLY 
NEW ENGLAND 251 n.132 (1997). 
880 E.g., Brian Hauck, Cara Hendrickson & Zena Yoslov, Capital Punishment Legislation 
in Massachusetts, 36 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 479, 481 n.16 (1999) ("In 1805, the 
Massachusetts legislature abolished whipping, branding, the stocks, and the pillory."); W. 
J. Michael Cody & Andy D. Bennett, The Privatization of Correctional Institutions: The 
Tennessee Experience, 40 V AND. L. REv. 829, 829 (1987) ("In 1829 the Tennessee 
General Assembly, in accordance with a national reform movement, abolished traditional 
methods for the punishment of crimes. Imprisonment replaced whipping, branding, and 
stocks."). 
881 ALAN TAYLOR, THE CIVIL WAR OF 1812: AMERICAN CITIZENS, BRITISH SUBJECTS, IRISH 
REBELS, & INDIAN ALLIES 348 (2011 ); Michael I. Spak & Jonathon P. Tomes, Courts-
Martial: Time to Play Taps?, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 481, 483 n.13 (1999). 
882 Spak & Tomes, supra note 881, at 483 n.13. 
883 DAVID FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TODAY 396 (1976) (citing Act of Feb. 28, 
1839, 5 Stat. 322 ch. 36, § 5). 
884 MYRA C. GLENN, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PuNISHMENT: PRISONERS, SAILORS, 
WOMEN, AND CHILDREN IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 9 n.* (1984) (citing Act of Sept. 28, 
1850); KENNETH J. HAGAN, IN PEACE AND WAR: INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN NAVAL 
HISTORY 70 (2008). Traditions died hard, however. See W. JEFFREY BOLSTER, BLACK 
JACKS: AFRICAN AMERICAN SEAMENINTHEAGEOF SAIL 180 (1997) (noting that a seaman 
in 1853 overheard a captain telling another captain that "he sailed under the old law, & he 
should trust himself and that he should flog as much as ever"). 
885 CLAYTON R. NEWELL & CHARLES R. SHRADER, OF DUTY WELL AND FAITHFULLY DONE: 
A HISTORY OF THE REGULAR ARMY IN THE CIVIL WAR 46 (20 11 ). 
886 W. DAVID LEWIS, FROM NEWGATE TO DANNEMORA: THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY IN 
NEW YORK, 1796-1848, at 251 ( 1965). 
887 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011). 
888 /d. 
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not fed," the Supreme Court noted in Brown v. Plata,889 "he or she may 
suffer or die if not provided adequate medical care." 890 "A prison that de-
prives prisoners of basis sustenance, including adequate medical care, is 
incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place in civi-
lized society," the Court ruled as late as 2011.891 "If a government fails to 
fulfill this obligation," the Court held, "the courts have a responsibility to 
remedy the resulting Eighth Amendment violation." 892 
As a result, the Eighth Amendment is often used in civil rights cases to 
remedy the failure of prison officials to meet prisoners' basic health needs. 
In a recent case dealing with overcrowding in California's prisons, the Su-
preme Court took note of the large number of prisoners being housed in 
squalid, sardine-like conditions. 893 The overcrowding-and lack of suffi-
cient staff and medical and mental health services within the prisons894-
had led to rampant disease895 and preventable deaths, 896 including a num-
889 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
890 !d. at 1928. 
891 !d. 
892 !d. 
893 !d. at 1923 ("For years the medical and mental health care provided by California's 
prisons has fallen short of minimum constitutional requirements and has failed to meet 
prisoners' basic health needs. Needless suffering and death have been the well-
documented result."); id. at 1923 ("The degree of overcrowding in California's prisons is 
exceptional. California's prisons are designed to house a population just under 80,000, but 
at the time of the three-judge court's decision the population was almost double that. The 
State's prisons had operated at around 200% of design capacity for at least 11 years. 
Prisoners are crammed into spaces neither designed nor intended to house inmates. As 
many as 200 prisoners may live in a gymnasium, monitored by as few as two or three 
correctional officers. As many as 54 prisoners may share a single toilet.") (citations 
omitted). 
894 Id. at 1932 ("The record documents the severe impact of burgeoning demand on the 
provision of care. At the time of trial, vacancy rates for medical and mental health staff 
ranged as high as 20% for surgeons, 25% for physicians, 39% for nurse practitioners, and 
54.1% for psychiatrists."); id. at 1933 ("Delays are no less severe in the context of 
physical care. Prisons have backlogs of up to 700 prisoners waiting to see a doctor. A 
review of referrals for urgent specialty care at one prison revealed that only 105 of 316 
pending referrals had a scheduled appointment, and only 2 had an appointment scheduled 
to occur within 14 days. Urgent specialty referrals at one prison had been pending for six 
months to a year.") (citations omitted); id. at 1934 ("The effects of overcrowding are 
particularly acute in the prisons' reception centers, intake areas that process 140,000 new 
or returning prisoners every year. Crowding in these areas runs as high as 300% of design 
capacity. Living conditions are 'toxic,' and a lack of treatment space impedes efforts to 
identify inmate medical or mental health needs and provide even rudimentary care.") 
(citations omitted). 
895 !d. at 1933 ("Crowding also creates unsafe and unsanitary living conditions that 
hamper effective delivery of medical and mental health care. A medical expert described 
living quarters in converted gymnasiums or dayrooms, where large numbers of prisoners 
may share just a few toilets and showers, as '"breeding grounds for disease."'); id. at 
1933-34 ("Cramped conditions promote unrest and violence, making it difficult for prison 
officials to monitor and control the prison population. On any given day, prisoners in the 
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her of suicides.897 Such conditions, not surprisingly, eventually draw the 
attention of lawyers and the courts. 
general prison population may become ill ... and overcrowding may prevent immediate 
medical attention necessary to avoid suffering, death, or spread of disease. After one 
prisoner was assaulted in a crowded gymnasium, prison staff did not even learn of the 
injury until the prisoner had been dead for several hours."); id. at 1934 n.7 ("Correctional 
officials at trial described several outbreaks of disease. One officer testified that 
antibiotic-resistant staph infections spread widely among the prison population and 
described prisoners 'bleeding, oozing with pus that is soaking through their clothes when 
they come in to get the wound covered and treated.' Another witness testified that inmates 
with influenza were sent back from the infirmary due to a lack of beds and that the disease 
quickly spread to 'more than half the 340 prisoners in the housing unit, with the result 
that the unit was placed on lockdown for a week.") (citations omitted). 
896 Id. at 1925 n.4 ("In 2007, the last year for which the three-judge court had available 
statistics, an analysis of deaths in California's prisons found 68 preventable or possibly 
preventable deaths. This was essentially unchanged from 2006, when an analysis found 66 
preventable or possibly preventable deaths. These statistics mean that, during 2006 and 
2007, a preventable or possibly preventable death occurred once every five to six days.") 
(citations omitted). 
897 !d. at 1924-25 ("Prisoners in California with serious mental illness do not receive 
minimal, adequate care. Because of a shortage of treatment beds, suicidal inmates may be 
held for prolonged periods in telephone-booth sized cages without toilets. A psychiatric 
expert reported observing an inmate who had been held in such a cage for nearly 24 
hours, standing in a pool of his own urine, unresponsive and nearly catatonic. Prison 
officials explained they had '"no place to put him.'" Other inmates awaiting care may be 
held for months in administrative segregation, where they endure harsh and isolated 
conditions and receive only limited mental health services. Wait times for mental health 
care range as high as 12 months. In 2006, the suicide rate in California's prisons was 
nearly 80% higher than the national average for prison populations; and a court-appointed 
Special Master found that 72.1% of suicides involved 'some measure of inadequate 
assessment, treatment, or intervention, and were therefore most probably foreseeable 
and/or preventable."') (citations omitted); id. at 1925 ("Prisoners suffering from physical 
illness also receive severely deficient care. California's prisons were designed to meet the 
medical needs of a population at 100% of design capacity and so have only half the 
clinical space needed to treat the current population. A correctional officer testified that, 
in one prison, up to 50 sick inmates may be held together in a 12-by 2{}-foot cage for up 
to five hours awaiting treatment. The number of staff is inadequate, and prisoners face 
significant delays in access to care. A prisoner with severe abdominal pain died after a 5-
week delay in referral to a specialist; a prisoner with "constant and extreme" chest pain 
died after an 8-hour delay in evaluation by a doctor; and a prisoner died of testicular 
cancer after a 'failure of MDs to work up for cancer in a young man with 17 months of 
testicular pain.'") (citations omitted); id. at 1925-26 ("Many more prisoners, suffering 
from severe but not life-threatening conditions, experience prolonged illness and 
unnecessary pain."); id. at 1933 ("This shortfall of resources relative to demand 
contributes to significant delays in treatment. Mentally ill prisoners are housed in 
administrative segregation while awaiting transfer to scarce mental health treatment beds 
for appropriate care. One correctional officer indicated that he had kept mentally ill 
prisoners in segregation for '6 months or more.' App. 594. Other prisoners awaiting care 
are held in tiny, phone-booth sized cages. The record documents instances of prisoners 
committing suicide while awaiting treatment."); id. at 1934 ("Living in crowded, unsafe, 
and unsanitary conditions can cause prisoners with latent mental illnesses to worsen and 
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In that particular case, Brown v. Plata,898 the Court noted that 
"[c]ourts must be sensitive to the State's interest in punishment, deterrence, 
and rehabilitation, as well as the need for deference to experienced and 
expert prison administrators faced with the difficult and dangerous task of 
housing large numbers of convicted criminals. "899 Still, the Court held that 
"[c]ourts may not allow constitutional violations to continue simply be-
cause a remedy would involve intrusion into the realm of prison admin-
istration."900 As the Court stated: "The State's desire to avoid a population 
limit, justified as according respect to state authority, creates a certain and 
unacceptable risk of continuing violations of the rights of sick and mentally 
ill prisoners, with the result that many more will die or needlessly suffer. 
The Constitution does not permit this wrong." 901 
Although prisoners lose the right to their freedom by virtue of their 
criminality/02 the Supreme Court reiterated in Brown that "the law and the 
Constitution demand recognition of certain other rights. "903 As the Court 
put it: "Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all per-
sons. Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment. "904 In its 2011 decision, the Court 
found that the need to remedy unconstitutional conditions in California's 
prisons was so urgent because "[p]risoners in the general population will 
become sick ... with routine frequency; and overcrowding may prevent the 
timely diagnosis and care necessary to provide effective treatment and to 
prevent further spread of disease. "905 "Even prisoners with no present 
physical or mental illness may become afflicted," the Court noted, adding: 
"all prisoners in California are at risk so long as the State continues to pro-
vide inadequate care."906 
develop overt symptoms. Crowding may also impede efforts to improve delivery of care. 
Two prisoners committed suicide by hanging after being placed in cells that had been 
identified as requiring a simple fix to remove attachment points that could support a 
noose. The repair was not made because doing so would involve removing prisoners from 
the cells, and there was no place to put them."). 
898 131 S. Ct. 1910,1928 (2011). 
899 !d. 
900 Id. at 1928-29. 
901 Id. at 1941. 
902 Id. at 1928 ("As a consequence of their own actions, prisoners may be deprived of 
rights that are fundamental to liberty."). 
903 !d. 
904 !d. 
905 !d. at 1940. 
906 !d. As the Supreme Court wrote: "Relief targeted only at present members of the 
plaintiff classes may therefore fail to adequately protect future class members who will 
develop serious physical or mental illness. Prisoners who are not sick or mentally ill do 
not yet have a claim that they have been subjected to care that violates the Eighth 
Amendment, but in no sense are they remote bystanders in California's medical care 
system. They are that system's next potential victims." !d. 
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The concept of "human dignity"-also referred to as the "dignity of 
man"-has long been a touchstone of the Court's Eighth Amendment ju-
risprudence.907 Thus, it is well established that "state prisoners are entitled 
to reasonably adequate food" 908-one thing needed for basic survival. "A 
prison's failure to provide sustenance for inmates," the Supreme Court has 
determined, "may actually produce physical 'torture or a lingering 
death."' 909 An Eighth Amendment violation will therefore be found-even 
in the death penalty-prone Fifth Circuit-where a denial of food constitutes 
a denial of the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. "910 "Because 
depriving a prisoner of adequate food is a form of corporal punishment," 
the Fifth Circuit specifically ruled in 1991, "the [E]ighth [A]mendment im-
poses limits on prison officials' power to so deprive a prisoner."911 Death-
row inmates traditionally get a last meal, but executions-by their very 
nature-deprive inmates of all rights whatsoever. If new evidence of inno-
cence-or a constitutional violation that occurred at trial-comes to light 
later, nothing can be done; it is too late. 
Just as non-lethal corporal punishments are considered unconstitu-
tional, so too should executions be treated as such. Indeed, the concepts of 
cruelty and unusualness-linked together as they are in the Eighth 
Amendment-both point to that conclusion. On the cruelty front, this is 
especially so given that lethal punishments are more severe than non-lethal 
ones. How can it be less cruel, for instance, to take someone's life than it is 
to cut off that person's ear? Given how arbitrary, discriminatory and error-
ridden America's death penalty has proven to be, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantees to due process and equal protection only reinforce the 
conclusion that executions are unconstitutional. Not only is it cruel to in-
ject another human being with lethal chemicals, but when such a punish-
ment is carried out so sporadically and arbitrarily that it resembles a state-
run lottery, the punishment of death must be considered unusual in the 
extreme. 
907 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion) ("The basic concept 
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting that language from Trap). 
908 Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock Cnty., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991); see also 
Marquez v. Woody, No. 10-40378, 2011 WL 3911080 *4 (5th Cir., Sept. 6, 2011) ("It is 
clearly established that 'state prisoners are entitled to reasonably adequate food."'). 
909 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1928 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) & In re 
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)). 
910 Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 214 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998); accord Marquez v. Woody, No. 
10-40378, 2011 WL 3911080 *4 (5th Cir., Sept. 6, 2011) ("Accepting Marquez's 
competent summary judgment evidence as true, as we must at this stage, Lemaster's 
actions clearly violated the Eighth Amendment because she refused to provide Marquez 
with a soft food despite the fact that a doctor prescribed him such a diet. It would be 
difficult to argue that Marquez did not need to eat soft food when it is apparent that 
Marquez has no teeth and when Marquez presented a prescription for a soft food diet to 
Lemaster which indicated that such a diet was medically necessary."). 
911 Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbuck Cnty., 929 F.2d 1078, 1083 (5th Cir. 1991). 
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Significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has already held that the pun-
ishment of denationalization may not be imposed on a prisoner as it de-
prives a person of the "right to have rights." 912 Ironically, the death penalty 
does just that. It deprives the convicted inmate of the Eighth Amendment 
right to food, shelter and basic medical care, and it deprives the inmate of 
the "right of access to the courts."913 Once executed, an inmate can no 
longer assert any rights at all. An execution, for example, deprives the in-
mate of the right to prove his or her innocence-and to be adjudged not 
guilty-should new, exculpatory evidence be brought to light after the in-
mate's execution.914 Indeed, executions deprive inmates of every single right 
inmates typically have. In so doing, executions fly in the face of existing 
and long-settled Eighth Amendment precedents aimed at safeguarding in-
mates from harm. 
The question that the U.S. Supreme Court needs to squarely confront 
is whether this contradiction in the law makes any sense? Stated differently, 
should the Supreme Court rule that the death penalty must go the way of 
the stocks, the pillory, and the whipping post915 and be ruled "cruel and 
unusual," just as corporal punishments in prisons are already a relic of the 
past?916 In early America, the lex talionis principle-an eye for an eye, a 
tooth for a tooth-was still in vogue, with Jefferson himself once proposing 
that offenders who maimed be maimed themselves.917 Yet, Jefferson can-
didly acknowledged that this approach to crime and punishment would fall 
out of favor, telling his mentor George Wythe: "The 'Lex talionis' will be 
912 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-2 (1958) (plurality opinion). But see People v. Potter, 
4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 177, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846) ("[T]he governor may 
grant a pardon on a condition which does not subject the prisoner to an unusual or cruel 
punishment. Banishment is neither. It is sanctioned by authority, and has been inflicted, in 
this form, from the foundation of our government."); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 
537 (1952) ("Deportation is not a criminal proceeding and has never been held to be 
punishment. No jury sits. No judicial review is guaranteed by the Constitution.") (citing 
Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290 (1904); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 
(1912); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 
(1924)). 
913 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
914 In Texas, questions have already been raised as to whether that state recently convicted 
and executed an innocent man based on faulty evidence. See David Grann, Trial by Fire: 
Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009. 
915 E.g., Radix v. Caruso, 461 F. Supp.2d 574, 591-92 (W.D. Mich. 2006) (noting that 
Congress abolished the pillory in 1839); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 427 (1885) 
(same); Daniel E. Hall, When Caning Meets the Eighth Amendment: Whipping Offenders 
in the United States, 4 WIDENERJ. PuB. L. 403, 421 n.103 (1995) ("The Act of February 
28, 1839, abolished whipping and standing in the stocks.") (citing Act of Feb. 28, 1839, 
ch. 36, § 5, 25 Stat. 321, 322 (1839)). 
916 The death penalty's constitutionality was debated in the 1970s. See, e.g., Arthur J. 
Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 
HARv. L. REv. 1773 (1970). However, American society has changed a lot since then, as 
has our understanding of mental illness and human rights issues generally. 
917 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 142. 
438 
The Anomaly of Executions 
revolting to the humanized feelings of modern times." "An eye for an eye, 
and a hand for a hand," Jefferson wrote, "will exhibit spectacles in execu-
tion, whose moral effect would be questionable. "918 With the exception of 
executions, which continue to sporadically occur, Jefferson's prediction 
came true. The American judicial system no longer tolerates the lopping off 
of offenders' limbs or the maiming of inmates, just as no judge today 
would order that, as a punishment for rape, a rapist be raped. Why then 
should a killer be killed? 
If the meaning of cruel is carefully considered, executions-the inten-
tional killing of human beings-must thus be found to fall within that ru-
bric. That executions are inherently cruel must also, in some fashion, be 
taken into account when judges determine if executions are unusual. That 
is because it would be highly unusual for any civilized society to inflict a 
cruel and unnecessary punishment, especially in a more or less random 
fashion. The American people are living at a time when there is a greater 
awareness of human rights principles than ever. Although the Constitution 
requires a punishment be both cruel and unusual to be unconstitutional, 
the cruelty of a punishment must surely be found to contribute to its unu-
sualness. Conversely, the rarity and sheer unusualness of executions mutu-
ally reinforces the notion that they are cruel. It is inherently cruel and in-
humane, after all, to arbitrarily or discriminatory inflict the punishment of 
death. 
C. To Kill or Not to Kill? 
The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is in a state of 
chaos and confusion. Instead of construing the actual phrase "cruel and 
unusual punishments" in the Eighth Amendment, the Court has adopted a 
nice-sounding legal standard-the "evolving standards of decency" test-to 
evaluate Eighth Amendment claims. In doing so, the Court has lost its way 
by failing to focus on what the Constitution states in no uncertain terms: 
that "cruel and unusual punishments" are unconstitutional. While early 
American jurists grappled with what "cruel" and "unusual" meant in par-
ticular factual contexts such as the ducking of scolds, today's Justices grap-
ple not with the meaning and proper interpretation of the words "cruel" 
and "unusual," but with somehow trying to divine the "evolving standards 
of decency of a maturing society." Instead of just focusing on whether exe-
cutions are "cruel" and have become "unusual," as the Constitution re-
quires, the Court tries to gauge trends, the consistency of the direction of 
the change, or if a "national consensus" has been reached. In the twenty-
first century, a return to first principles-interpret the text, not decades-old 
judicial gloss imposed on it-seems to be in order. 
Turnipseed v. State919-an 1844 case decided before slavery was abol-
ished through Abraham Lincoln's Thirteenth Amendment-illustrates how 
918 Id. at 141. 
919 6 Ala. 664, 1844 WL 301 (Ala. 1844). 
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American judges, though operating in a completely different time, once 
focused on the words of a legal provision to decide upon its meaning. In 
that case, a person was indicted by an Alabama grand jury for inflicting 
"on a negro woman named Rachel, a slave," a "cruel and unusual punish-
ment. "920 The accused contested the indictment but was tried by a jury and 
found guilty of the crime, with the punishment being the assessment of a 
fifty dollar fine. 921 The Alabama law under which the accused was indicted 
provided: "No cruel or unusual punishment shall be inflicted on any slave, 
and any master, or other person having charge of a slave, who shall be 
guilty of inflicting such punishment, or authorizing, or permitting the same, 
shall be subject to indictment therefor, and on conviction thereof, be pun-
ished by a fine not less than fifty, and not exceeding one thousand dollars; 
and in addition thereto, be required to give security for his good behavior 
for the space of twelve months." 922 
When the jury's verdict was appealed, the convicted defendant argued 
that "[t]he indictment is double in charging the infliction of punishment 
both cruel and unusual" 923 and that "[t]he indictment is too general: it 
should have stated what and how the punishment was inflicted. "924 As to 
the first objection, the Alabama Supreme Court acknowledged that "[i]t is 
certainly a general rule, that the defendant cannot be charged, in one count 
of an indictment, with two distinct offenses."925 In rejecting the "objection 
of duplicity," the Alabama court held, however, that the law did not re-
quire two separate indictments and that the indictment in question "is not 
bad for duplicity." 926 The court first emphasized: "True, the statute makes 
two offences, or rather does not require that the punishment inflicted upon 
a slave shall be both cruel and unusual to subject the offender to its sanc-
tions: it is enough if the proof show it to be either the one or the other. To 
punish cruelly is one, and unusually is another breach of criminallaw." 927 
"The statute, it is apprehended," the court then held, "does not use the 
epitheths as synonymous, nor in contrast with each other; but it was mere-
ly intended to make the enactment sufficiently broad to embrace a high 
offence against good morals, no matter under what circumstances commit-
ted. ,928 
In so holding, the Alabama Supreme Court-in that unsavory factual 
context-focused on the concept of cruelty and unusualness separately. As 
920 !d. at * 1. 
921 Id. 
922 !d. (citing Clay's Dig. 431 ). 
923 !d. The defendant--described as "[t]he plaintiff in error" on appeal-contended on 
appeal that "[t]o punish cruelly is one offense, and unusually is another; and they should 
have been so charged." !d. 
924 Id. 
925 Id. 
926 Id. at *2. 
927 !d. at * 1. 
928 !d. 
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the 1844 ruling stated: "Cruel, as indicating the infliction of pain of either 
mind or body, is a word of most extensive application; yet every cruel pun-
ishment is not, perhaps, unusual; nor, perhaps, can it be assumed that eve-
ry uncommon infliction is cruel."929 "But be this as it may," the court then 
held, "there may be punishment that is both cruel and unusual; thus, if a 
slave should be punished, even without bodily torture, in a manner offen-
sive to modesty, decency and the recognized proprieties of social life, the 
offender would be chargeable in the broad terms employed in the indict-
ment."930 "An offence, committed under such circumstances," the court 
concluded, "might be charged according to its true character, without sub-
jecting the indictment to the imputation of duplicity; and upon conviction, 
the accused would be liable to but one penalty."931 
As to the defendant's second objection-that the indictment was too 
vaguely worded-the Alabama Supreme Court agreed.932 "In the present 
case," the court began, "the statute merely denounces the cruel and unusu-
al punishment of a slave as a public offence, and prescribes the punish-
ment."933 "It does not," it said of the statute, "declare with particularity 
what are its elements; and consequently, in framing the indictment the 
statute affords but little aid. "934 Under the circumstances, the Alabama Su-
preme Court held that "the general terms in which the charge is made 
against the defendant, is not sufficient; but it should be alleged what pun-
ishment was inflicted and how, that the court might judge whether the ac-
cused should have been put upon his trial; that he may know what he is to 
defend against, and the jury know how to apply the evidence. "935 "This 
brings us to the conclusion," the court wrote, "that the indictment is defec-
tive, because of the generality of the terms in which the defendant is 
charged. "936 The court-beholden to the Deep South's peculiar institution 
of slavery-thus reversed the conviction, finding that the "defect" in the 
indictment warranted that result.937 
In this day and age, state-sanctioned killing-the ultimate penal sanc-
tion-must be considered unconstitutional. Executions are cruel, and they 
have become unusual. The U.S. Supreme Court has already held, in fact, 
that "'the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ... constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment."' 938 Not 
only do executions carry with them the risk of serious physical pain and 
929 Id. (italics in original). 
930 Id. 
931 !d. 






938 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,319 (1986) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 
651, 670 (1977)). 
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suffering/39 but the psychological injury associated with death sentences-
which amounts to a threat of possible execution-must be taken into con-
sideration in gauging their cruelty.940 The overall harm, equivalent to cruel 
and inhumane treatment or torturous conduct/41 must no longer be coun-
tenanced by American law despite prior court rulings to the contrary.942 A 
judicial death sentence places the inmate at risk for the future deprivation 
of life-something far more credible and serious than, say, idle threats or 
verbal abuse of inmates by prison officials which normally does not result 
939 Karin Buhmann, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't? The Lundbeck Case of 
Pentobarbital, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and Competing 
Human Rights Responsibilities, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 206, 208 (2012). 
94° Compare Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628, 635 (D. Ala. 1979) ("The 
cumulative effect of these deficiencies and abuses is a threat to life and limb that violates 
the Eighth Amendment."); Crawford v. Wisconsin Dep't ofCorr., No. 09-C-0616G *7 
(E.D. Wis., Sept. 30, 2011) ("Threats and harassment may constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment.") (citing DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000)); French v. 
Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir. 1985) (where prison conditions included prison 
rapes, assaults, and one prisoner being doused with lighter fluid and attempted to be set 
aflame, the court held that "[t]he constitution cannot countenance such widespread 
abuses") with Pabon v. Lemaster, Civil Action No. 07-805, 2008 WL 1830500 *3 (W.D. 
Pa. 2008) ("To the extent that Plaintiff claims these verbal threats, abuse and harassment 
constituted cruel and unusual punishments, Defendants are entitled to dismissal of the 
claims because such verbal threats and abuse do not constitute a sufficiently objective 
deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.") (citations omitted); Williams v. Fleming, 
Civil Action No. 7:07CV00199, 2007 WL 2693644 *3 n.5 (Sept. 13, 2007) ("To the 
extent that Williams alleges that the threat of force feeding was cruel and unusual 
punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, his claim fails because he does not 
allege any physical or mental injury."); Walton v. Terry, 38 Fed. Appx. 363, 364-65 (9th 
Cir. 2002) ("verbal threats do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment"); Grant v. 
Fernandez, No. C 96-1788, 1997 WL 118257 *2 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 5, 1997) ("allegations 
of harassment and threats generally fail to state a cognizable claim under§ 1983"). 
941 See, e.g., State v. Fielder, No. W2009-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 3689134 * 13 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 2011) ("Among the facts found by the trial court to constitute exceptional 
cruelty to the victim was the manner of use of the Ski! saw to threaten amputation of the 
victim's hand and cutting his face, and the threats to the lives of the victim's family. This 
mental torture was clearly beyond the elements of the offenses."); id. ("The proof showed 
that Defendant immobilized the victim's hand while the Ski! saw was operated in the 
threatening manner it was used. Furthermore, the proof supports the inference that 
Defendant allowed the victim to be frightened by serious threats to his life and the lives of 
his family."). 
942 See Lucas v. State, 841 So.2d 380, 389 (Fla. 2003) (twenty-five years on death row 
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Foster v. State, 810 So.2d 910, 916 
(twenty-three years on death row does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); 
Knight v. State, 746 So.2d 423, 437 (Fla. 1998) (more than two decades on death row 
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); United States v. Walker, 66 M.J. 721, 
756 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2008) ("no American court appears to have found that a 
lengthy confinement followed by execution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment"). 
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in an Eighth Amendment violation.943 Just as American physicians have 
concluded that participation in executions violates their solemn ethical 
oaths/44 so too should American lawyers and judges decide that executions 
are not compatible with their profession-or the practice of law. 
By extinguishing the inmate's life, executions inflict the most harm 
that one can possibly do to an inmate. In its existing Eighth Amendment 
case law, however, the Supreme Court has already firmly rejected the no-
tion that "significant injury"-let alone death-is even a "threshold" re-
quirement for stating an excessive force claim.945 "What is necessary to 
establish an 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,"' the Court has 
ruled, "varies according to the nature of the alleged constitutional viola-
tion."946 When prison officials fail to attend to an inmate's serious medical 
needs, the appropriate inquiry is whether officials exhibited "deliberate 
indifference."947 "This standard is appropriate," the Court states, "because 
the State's responsibility to provide inmates with medical care ordinarily 
does not conflict with competing administrative concerns."948 "Because 
society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health 
care," the Court held in Hudson v. McMillian/49 "deliberate indifference 
to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if those 
needs are 'serious."' 950 
Because death sentences inflict severe mental anguish and torment on 
par with other acts of psychological cruelty, they should be declared un-
constitutional. Judicial precedents, in fact, already recognize Eighth 
Amendment claims based on psychological951 or emotional distress/52 in-
943 Hahn v. Bauer, No. 09-2220,2010 WL 396228 *10 (D. Minn. Jan. 27, 2010) (citing 
cases). 
944 Travis Cade Armstrong, "Veneer of Medical Respectability": How Physician 
Participation in Lethal !Jyections Perpetuates the Illusion of a Humane Execution, 51 S. 
TEx. L. REv. 469, 484-85 (2009); Emily Pokora, Should State Codes of Medical Ethics 
Prohibit Physician Participation in State-Ordered Executions?, 37 W. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 2 
(2009). 
945 Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 U.S. 1175, 1178 (2010). 
946 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). "What is necessary to show sufficient 
harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause depends upon the claim 
at issue, for two reasons." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). First, "[t]he 
general requirement that an Eighth Amendment claimant allege and prove the 
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain should ... be applied with due regard for 
differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment objection is 
lodged." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. Second, "the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishments 'draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society,' and so admits of few absolute limitations." 
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (citations omitted). 
947 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5-6 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). 
948 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). 
949 503 u.s. 1 (1992). 
950 Id. at 9. 
951 Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003) (allegation of strip search of 
male prisoner in front of female prison guards sufficed to state an Eighth Amendment 
443 
2 Br. ]. Am. Leg. Studies (2013) 
humane or undignified punishments/53 or-in some cases-threatening 
conduct.954 And the suffering of death-row inmates, many of whom at-
tempt suicide or abandon their appeals and choose to die/55 is only exacer-
bated by the many years or decades they spend on death row in relative 
isolation. In this regard, the failure of the Supreme Court to take up the 
question of whether it is "cruel and unusual" punishment to execute in-
mates who have spent in some cases more than 25 years on death row is 
inexplicable.956 In a dissent in Solesbee v. Balkcom,957 a case decided more 
than sixty years ago, Justice Felix Frankfurter himself noted that the "onset 
of insanity while awaiting execution of a death sentence is not a rare phe-
nomenon." 958 
claim if the search was "conducted in a harassing manner intended to humiliate and inflict 
psychological pain"; "physical injury need not result for the punishment to state a cause of 
action, for the wanton infliction of psychological pain is also prohibited"); Jordan v. 
Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1522-31 (9th Cir. 1993) (en bane) (severe "psychological" pain 
and trauma can violate the Eighth Amendment); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 
1522-25 (lOth Cir. 1992) (placing a revolver to a prisoner's head without justification and 
threatening to kill the inmate create an actionable Eighth Amendment claim based on 
"psychological injury"); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 16 (1992) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring) ("It is not hard to imagine inflictions of psychological harm-without corre-
sponding physical harm-that might prove to be cruel and unusual punishment."); Madrid 
v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1264 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("[I]fthe particular conditions of 
segregation being challenged are such that they inflict a serious mental illness, greatly 
exacerbate mental illness, or deprive inmates of their sanity, then defendants have de-
prived inmates of a basic necessity of human existence--indeed, they have crossed into 
the realm of psychological torture."). 
952 Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057, 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) (inmate's statement that "I'm 
sure I was depressed from it" was sufficient, when coupled with allegations of harsh 
conditions of administrative confinement, to state a claim for violation of the Eighth 
Amendment standards for prison conditions); Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 
(4th Cir. 1993) ("[I]n order to withstand summary judgment on an Eighth Amendment 
challenge to prison conditions a plaintiff must produce evidence of a serious or significant 
physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions."). 
953 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 ("Our more recent cases ... have held that the [Eighth] 
Amendment proscribes more than physically barbarous punishments. The Amendment 
embodies 'broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and 
decency ... "') (citations omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 
1968)). 
954 Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1986) (where complaint alleged that a 
guard pointed a lethal weapon at the prisoner, cocked it, and threatened him with instant 
death accompanied by racial epithets, the court held that "a prisoner retains at least the 
right to be free from the terror of instant and unexpected death at the whim of his 
allegedly bigoted custodians"). 
955 John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: "Volunteers," Suicide and Competency, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 939 (2005). 
956 See Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299 (2009); Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541 
(2009); Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995). 
957 339 U.S. 9 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
958 !d. at 14. 
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The Supreme Court's "deliberate indifference" standard actually al-
ready applies to Eighth Amendment claims about conditions of confine-
ment.959 To make out a conditions-of-confinement claim, the Court has 
determined, extreme deprivations are required because routine discomfort 
is "part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against 
society."960 As the Supreme Could held in Wilson v. Seiter,961 "only those 
deprivations denying 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities' are 
sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. "962 
Because the death penalty, however, deprives an inmate of his or her life, it, 
if anything, must certainly be considered an extreme-and therefore un-
constitutional-deprivation. And because death sentences-the terrifying 
prerequisite to the execution of inmates-also appear deliberately indiffer-
ent to the physical and mental health of inmates, they, too, should be con-
sidered unlawful. 
The law makes crystal clear that, in a prison setting, prison officials 
can protect themselves. At the same time, though, they must not cross the 
line into the gratuitous infliction of inmate suffering. Officials confronted 
with a prison disturbance, the Supreme Court has held, "must balance the 
threat unrest poses to inmates, prison workers, administrators, and visitors 
against the harm inmates may suffer if guards use force. "963 In Whitley v. 
Albers,964 the Court specifically ruled that the "deliberate indifference" 
standard is inappropriate where force is used to quell a prison disturb-
ance.965 In dealing with prison riots or unrest, "the question whether the 
measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ulti-
mately turns on 'whether force was applied in a good faith effort to main-
tain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very pur-
pose of causing harm."' 966 
The Whitley standard was extended to all excessive force claims in 
Hudson v. McMillian. 967 Under Whitley, the Court ruled in Hudson, "the 
extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest 
'whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary' in a 
particular situation, 'or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to 
the unjustified infliction of harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness 
959 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. 
960 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). 
961 501 u.s. 294 (1991). 
962 Id. at 298 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). 
963 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6 (citing Whitley). 
964 475 U.S. 312 (1986). 
965 !d. at 320-21. 
966 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7 (citations omitted). The "core judicial inquiry," the Court re-
emphasized in Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175 (20 1 0), is "not whether a certain 
quantum of injury was sustained, but rather 'whether force was applied in a good-faith 
effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Id. 
at 1178. 
967 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). 
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that it occur."' 968 "In determining whether the use of force was wanton and 
unnecessary," the Court added, "it may also be proper to evaluate the need 
for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount 
of force used, the threat 'reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,' 
and 'any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response."' 969 The 
utter lack of necessity for executions within prisons make them unconstitu-
tional as there is no need to kill an incarcerated inmate, particularly one 
tied down to a prison gurney. 
Executions, because they are unnecessary, are nothing more than acts 
of sadistic vengeance. "When prison officials maliciously and sadistically 
use force to cause harm," the Court has ruled in another context, "con-
temporary standards of decency always are violated." 970 "Otherwise," the 
Court has determined, "the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical 
punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some 
arbitrary quantity of injury." 971 Under the Court's precedents, even injuries 
far less significant than death are already expressly prohibited. As Justice 
Harry Blackmun wrote in 1992 in his concurrence in Hudson, explaining 
the ruling's significance: "The Court today appropriately puts to rest a se-
riously misguided view that pain inflicted by an excessive use of force is 
actionable under the Eighth Amendment only when coupled with 'signifi-
cant injury,' e.g., injury that requires medical attention or leaves permanent 
marks."972 
At executions, of course, the level of injury is off the charts: the in-
mate's death. And the intent to harm the inmate is clear: the state, through 
its judicial process and using execution protocols to carry out its will, me-
thodically plans the inmate's death, often for years or decades in advance. 
Bizarrely, the Supreme Court has held that executions pass constitutional 
muster even though injuries characterized as "minor"-as the Fifth Circuit 
described the prisoner's in Hudson-can be Eighth Amendment viola-
tions.973 Though the Supreme Court acknowledged in Hudson that not eve-
ry "malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of ac-
tion,"974 it expressly excluded only de minimis uses of force from the 
Eighth Amendment's scope.975 As the Court ruled: "The Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual' punishments necessarily excludes 
968 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). 
969 Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321). 
970 !d. at 9. "This is true," the Court emphasized, "whether or not significant injury is 
evident." Id. 
971 Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010). 
972 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 13-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
973 !d. at 10 (citation omitted). 
974 !d. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Not every push or 
shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a 
prisoner's constitutional rights.")). 
975 "An inmate who complains of a 'push or shove' that causes not discernible injury 
almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim," the Supreme Court 
emphasized in Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178 (2010). 
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from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided 
that the use of force is not of a sort 'repugnant to the conscience of man-
kind."'976 
A comparison of the injuries suffered by the inmate in Hudson-and 
found to be actionable-should be contrasted with those inflicted at execu-
tions. "The blows directed at Hudson, which caused bruises, swelling, 
loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate," the Court concluded in Hud-
son, "are not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes."977 Thus, the 
Court in Hudson refused to dismiss the prisoner's section 1983 claim alleg-
ing the use of excessive force.978 "Injury and force," the Court also empha-
sized in its per curium opinion in Wilkins v. Gaddy,979 "are only imperfect-
ly correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts. "980 As the Court 
wrote in that 2010 decision: "An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by 
guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely 
because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury."981 Exe-
cutions, by contrast, inflict death itself. 
VI. Conclusion 
The history of the death penalty is one of successive restrictions on its 
use. The death penalty was once inflicted for a whole host of offenses. Eng-
land's "Bloody Code" made more than 200 crimes punishable by death, 
and laws in the American colonies were modeled on English practice.982 In 
the late eighteenth century, however, many of America's founders and 
framers read and were inspired by the writings of an Italian philosopher, 
Cesare Beccaria. In the 1760s, Beccaria wrote On Crimes and Punish-
ments, a book in which he called for proportion between crimes and pun-
976 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10 (citations omitted). 
977 Id. 
978 Id. 
979 130 S. Ct. 1175 (2010). 
980 !d. at 1178. 
981 !d. at 1178-79. In Wilkins, the inmate alleged that he was "punched, kicked, kneed, 
choked, and body slammed 'maliciously and sadistically' and '[w]ithout any 
provocation."' !d. at 1179. The District Court in that case dismissed the inmate's action 
sua sponte because the purported assault-which allegedly left the inmate with "a bruised 
heel, pack pain, and other injuries requiring medical treatrnent"-involved "de minimis 
force." Id. After the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit summarily affirmed the 
district court's ruling, id. at 1177, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 1176. In 
reserving judgment on the inmate's specific allegations, the Court in Wilkins held as 
follows: "In holding that the District Court erred in dismissing Wilkins' complaint based 
on the supposedly de minimis nature of his injuries, we express no view on the underlying 
merits of his excessive force claim. In order to prevail, Wilkins will ultimately have to 
prove not only that the assault actually occurred but also that it was carried out 
"maliciously and sadistically" rather than as part of "a good-faith effort to maintain or 
restore discipline." Id. at 1180. 
982 Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America's Severity Revolution, 
56 U. MIAMIL. REv. 217,223 (2001). 
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ishments and opposed both torture and capital punishment. That treatise 
influenced Europeans such as Sir William Blackstone and Jeremy Bentham, 
as well as leading American revolutionaries, including John Adams, Dr. 
Benjamin Rush, and Thomas Jefferson.983 
Today, executions are seen in other parts of the world-including in 
England, America's mother country-as human rights violations. Europe 
has treaties in place that already forbid the use of executions/84 and the 
unmistakable trend worldwide is toward abolition.985 Some countries even 
refuse to extradite offenders to the United States unless assurances are giv-
en that the death penalty will not be sought.986 And here in the United 
States, the number of executions and death sentences has declined marked-
ly. The number of U.S. executions fell from 98 in 1999 to 43 in 2012, and 
the number of American death sentences fell from more than 300 per year 
in 1995 and 1996 to 78 in 2011.987 In truth, executions are rarely and arbi-
trarily imposed-and often in a racially discriminatory manner. 
The death penalty has a long, sordid history, dating back to the very 
beginnings of recorded history.988 In the United States, executions were 
once used to quell slave rebellions, and their use has long been associated 
with racial prejudice.989 Executions are now heavily concentrated in the 
South, the same region where slavery was once so stubbornly entrenched 
and where racially motivated extra-judicial lynchings were prevalent.990 In 
fact, multiple studies show that the odds of receiving a death sentence in-
crease dramatically for African Americans who kill whites. This disturbing 
state of affairs runs counter to basic precepts of U.S. law, including equal 
protection of the laws, though-to date-the U.S. Supreme Court has in-
sisted on more than statistical proof to demonstrate racial bias in capital 
cases.991 
983 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 48-49, 70-71. 
984 Protocol No.6 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, opened for 
signature Apr. 28, 1983, E.T.S. No. 114 (entered into force Mar. I, 1985); Protocol No. 
13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances, opened for signature 
May 3, 2002, E.T.S. No. 187 (entered into force July 1, 2003). 
985 Figures on the Death Penalty, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/numbers (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). 
986 Joseph Anzalone, Extraordinary Times Demand Extraordinary Measures: A Proposal 
to Establish an International Court for the Prosecution of Global Terrorists, 16 U.C. 
DAVIS J. lNT'L L. & POL'Y 273, 311 (2010). 
987 Facts about the Death Penalty, supra note 48. 
988 GARY P. GERSHMAN, DEATH PENALTY ON TRIAL: A HANDBOOK WITH CASES, LAWS, 
AND DOCUMENTS 16 (2005). 
989 DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, GABRIEL'S REBELLION: THE VIRGINIA SLAVE CONSPIRACIES OF 
1800 AND 1802, at 111-12, 187 (1993). 
990 PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK 
AMERICA (2007). 
991 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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Although the Founding Fathers did not abolish all death penalty laws, 
they actively explored alternatives to executions.992 Indeed, it was during 
their time-as well as that of succeeding generations-that America's peni-
tentiary system, on a state-by-state basis, began to be built and then pro-
gressively developed.993 The Walnut Street Prison in Philadelphia opened 
only a year before the ratification of the U.S. Bill of Rights/94 though other 
states were soon to follow Pennsylvania's example.995 New York passed 
legislation in 1796 providing for the construction of the Newgate state 
prison in Greenwich Village996; New Jersey completed its state penitentiary 
in 1797; and penitentiaries in Virginia and Kentucky opened in 1800, the 
same year Massachusetts appropriated money for one.997 The Maryland 
Penitentiary was opened in 1811,998 and construction of other state peni-
tentiaries began in that decade and the ones that followed. 999 In Adam 
Hirsch's The Rise of the Penitentiary, the author states that "[t]he peniten-
tiary had its heyday in the United States in the 1830s" as "[f]acilities pro-
liferated. "1000 
Today, state and federal penitentiaries around the country-built with 
concrete and iron-are readily available to house violent offenders, making 
executions anachronistic and obsolete. In fact, in America, life-without-
parole sentences-now available as a sentencing option in all death penalty 
states-have already largely displaced executions as society's preferred 
method of punishment.1001 There are now more than 41,000 offenders in 
the U.S. serving life-without-parole sentences.1002 In comparison, as of Jan-
uary 1, 2013, there were 3,125 death row inmates in the United States, 
with even fewer executions-1,343 to be exact-having occurred in the 
United States since 1976.1003 When those numbers are thoughtfully consid-
992 BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 7, at 66-161. 
993 ADAM J. HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND PuNISHMENT IN EARLY 
AMERICA (1992). 
994 Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences: Defining Felony in the Early 
American Republic, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 461, 496 (2009). 
995 !d. at 4 70. 
996 Leonard G. Leverson, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Restrict Access to 
Prisons: An Historical Re-examination, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 409, 415 (1983). 
997 James M. Binnall, Respecting Beasts: The Dehumanizing Quality of the Modern 
Prison and an Unusual Model for Penal Reform, 17 J.L. & PoL'Y 161, 171 n.68 (2008) 
(citation omitted). 
998 Nancy J. King, The Origins of Felony Jury Sentencing in the United States, 78 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 937, 990 (2003). 
999 Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the 
De institutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 53, 62-
63 (2011). 
1000 HIRSCH, supra note 993, at 112 (1992). 
1001 Marilyn Peterson Armour & MarkS. Umbreit, Assessing the Impact of the Ultimate 
Penal Sanction on Homicide Survivors: A Two State Comparison, 96 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 5-
6 & n.lO (2012). 
1002 Sharon Dolovich, Teaching Prison Law, 62 J. LEGAL Enuc. 218, 223 (2012). 
1003 Facts about the Death Penalty, supra note 48. 
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ered, the inescapable conclusion is that life-without-parole sentences have 
become the typical-or usual-choice of juries, while death sentences and 
executions are now unusual, less preferred, and no longer the norm. 
At the Jefferson Memorial in Washington, D.C., a series of quotes are 
inscribed under the dome. On one panel, Jefferson's familiar and immortal 
words from the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, 
and the pursuit of Happiness." 1004 But another panel contains a lesser-
known quotation, an excerpt from a letter Thomas Jefferson wrote in 
1816.1005 That excerpt reads: "I am not an advocate for frequent changes in 
laws and constitutions, but laws and institutions must go hand in hand 
with the progress of the human mind." 1006 As Jefferson's letter read: "As 
that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are 
made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the 
change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace 
with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which 
fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen 
of their barbarous ancestors." 1007 Jefferson's words, written as part of the 
American Enlightenment, serve as a valuable reminder that the right to life 
is to be protected-and that equality and human progress are important 
American values. 
The genius of the U.S. Constitution's Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause is that it allows each generation of American judges, in their own 
time, to evaluate anew what punishments are "cruel and unusual." Every 
generation must decide for itself what societal practices will be allowed, 
and it that respect, Jefferson's words should be taken to heart. While crime 
is about what the offender does, punishment is about how society behaves 
and reacts. The absence of cruel and unusual punishments in a society is a 
sign of progress that also furthers human dignity, that long-standing Eighth 
Amendment touchstone. Indeed, the Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of South Africa ruled back in 1995-more than fifteen years ago-that the 
death penalty violated principles of human dignity and was thus unconsti-
tutional in that society.1008 
In America, the time has finally come for the U.S. Supreme Court to 
put an end to capital punishment once and for all. The death penalty-
whether seen as a product of the Dark Ages or a step-child of the peculiar 
institutions of slavery or apartheid-must be seen as a vestige of a bygone 
1004 Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776). 
1005 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816). 
1006 Quotations on the Jefferson Memorial, THOMAS JEFFERSON'S MONTICELLO, 
http://www.monticello.org/site/jefferson!quotations-jefferson-memorial (last visited Feb. 
16, 2013). 
1007 Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 1005. 
1008 S. v. Makwanyane (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (6) BCLR 665; 1995 (3) SA 
391. 
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era. Because it has no place in a civilized society, be it in Africa or America, 
it should go the way of the stocks, the pillory, and the whipping post. Just 
as American society no longer tolerates ear cropping or hand-branding, it 
should no longer tolerate executions. Penitentiaries and life-without-
possibility-of-parole sentences are more than sufficient to protect the public 
from violent offenders while allowing us to maintain our own respect for 
human dignity and human rights. 
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